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ABSTRACT 
 
The remedy system in the WTO for prompt dispute settlement has attracted a lot 
of attention by international trade scholars due to its unique enforcement mechanism 
which is not available in other areas of international law. In particular, the remedy system 
for prohibited subsidies deserves more focused attention due to a contradiction: Despite 
the tight regulations and rules to ensure compliance with WTO subsidy rules, the actual 
implementation rate of the WTO DSB rulings to remove violating prohibited subsidy 
measures fares the poorest. This leads to the question of whether the current remedy 
system for prohibited subsidies is indeed effective, or at least desirable from the 
perspective of WTO Members.  
During the process of this study, several proposals have been made to ‘remedy’ 
the current inefficiency in the remedy system for prohibited subsidies by examining the 
following issues: (1) Whether retrospective remedies should be allowed for the effective 
‘withdrawal’ of subsidies; (2) What the ‘appropriate’ level of retaliation for prohibited 
subsidies should be; (3) Whether monetary compensation could be allowed as an 
alternative remedy for inducing compliance in prohibited subsidy disputes; and (4) How 
the current mechanism for inducing compliance through the ‘fast track’ procedure for 
prohibited subsidies could be strengthened.  
In order to address these questions, this research has relied on both legal and 
economic analyses to provide an economic justification for the legal arguments that are 
made in this study. In particular, existing research using economic models have been 
applied to this work in order to provide interesting perspectives that help to suggest a 
renewed approach for the remedy system, at least for the case of prohibited subsidies. In 
conclusion, the results of this study suggest that when it comes to the remedy rules on 
prohibited subsidies, a stronger incentive for prompt compliance is needed through the 
retrospective application of the retaliation remedy, especially for dealing with non-
recurring prohibited subsidies. This study further suggests that the possibility of using 
monetary compensation as an alternative remedy for prohibited subsidies is not viable, 
mainly due to the purpose of remedies in prohibited subsidy rules that is served by the 
‘property rule’. For determining the level of retrospective retaliation, proportionality and 
the multilateral nature of remedies should be considered, under which the trade effects of 
the subsidy measure on individual WTO Members should be the basis for calculation.  
The problem of delayed implementation involving recurring prohibited subsidies 
may be a more intricate matter that mainly derives from the fundamental nature of 
subsidies as a strategic national policy. However, the loophole that is created, which 
undermines the stability and predictability of the WTO remedy system should not go 
unaddressed. In this regard, the existing fast track procedures that are in place as the 
remedy system for prohibited subsidies may be made more effective by addressing the 
problems that incur from the narrow jurisdiction of WTO compliance panels and the 
arbitrary ‘sequencing’ arrangements in compliance and authorization proceedings. 
Ultimately, it will be the role of the WTO adjudicating bodies and the Members to apply 
the rules in a sensible and practical manner that gives meaning and effectiveness to the 
WTO rules in accordance with the purpose and objectives of the respective WTO 
Agreements.   
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Retrospective Remedies, Level of Retaliation  
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1.1 THE IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEM IN PROHIBITED SUBSIDY DISPUTES 
 
The WTO dispute settlement system has in place a remedial mechanism that 
enables the enforcement of the rulings and recommendations made by the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) on the violations of the WTO law and obligations contained 
therein. Due to its unique enforcement mechanism which has not been available in other 
areas of international law, the remedy system for dealing with non-compliant actions in 
the WTO dispute settlement system has attracted a lot of attention by international trade 
scholars. As compared to the international legal regime in general, the WTO has dispute 
settlement procedures specified by law that are comparable to domestic legal proceedings, 
and the rulings made by the WTO DSB has binding authority on its Members and 
remedies available to enforce the rulings if Members do not comply with the rulings 
promptly enough.   
Within the subject matter of remedies, however, the narrower field of the remedy 
system for prohibited export subsidies deserves more focused attention, due to a 
contradiction: Under the WTO, the regulation on subsidies and dispute settlement 
procedures for subsidy disputes, especially prohibited subsidies, are the most severe and 
tightly disciplined. However, surprisingly, the rate of actual implementation of DSB 
recommendations in subsidy disputes is one of the lowest in the WTO. In other words, 
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despite tight regulations and rules to ensure compliance with WTO subsidy rules, the 
implementation of the recommendations by the WTO DSB to terminate the violating 
subsidy measures is faring the poorest. Therefore, this leads to the question of whether 
the current WTO remedy system, especially for prohibited subsidies, is indeed effective, 
or at least, desirable from the perspective of WTO members.
1
  
The evidence of stringency regarding the discipline on prohibited subsidies is 
shown from the provisions in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM Agreement) which contains the following rules: the outright prohibition 
of export subsidies (and import substitution subsidies)
2
; the corresponding obligation for 
immediate withdrawal when ruled to be a violation of WTO rules
3
; higher retaliation 
levels authorized by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB); and ‘fast track’ dispute 
                                           
1
 Many prominent scholars have discussed this specific issue of remedies to WTO subsidy 
disputes, from both legal and economic perspectives: R. Lawrence and N. Stankard, ‘Should 
Export Subsidies be Treated Differently?’, Conference paper at University of Wisconsin (2005); A. 
Green and M. Trebilcock, ‘Enforcing WTO Obligations: What Can We Learn from Export 
Subsidies?’, 10 Journal of International Economic Law 653  (2007); T. Lin, ‘Remedies for 
Export Subsidies in the Context of Article 4 of the SCM Agreement: Rethinking Some Persistent 
Issues’, 3 Asian Journal of WTO & International Health Law and Policy 21 (2008); K. Bagwell 
and R. Staiger, ‘Will International Rules on Subsidies Disrupt the World Trading System?’, 96 
American Economic Review 877 (2006); K. Bagwell, ‘Remedies in the WTO: An Economic 
Perspective’, Columbia University Discussion Paper No. 0607-09 (2007); G. Grossman and A. 
Sykes, ‘‘Optimal’ Retaliation in the WTO – A Commentary on the Upland Cotton Arbitration’, 10 
World Trade Review 133 (2011); K. Bagwell and R. Staiger, ‘The Economics of Trade Agreements 
in the Linear Cournot Delocation Model’, 88 Journal of International Economics 32 (2012).  
2
 While the category of prohibited subsidies in the SCM Agreement (Article 3) includes both 
subsidies contingent upon export performance (export subsidies) and subsidies contingent upon 
the use of domestic over imported goods (local content subsidies), the focus of this article is on 
export subsidies for which all dispute cases involving prohibited subsidies have been raised 
against.  
3
 SCM Agreement Article 4.7 provides that, “If the measure in question is found to be a prohibited 
subsidy, the panel shall recommend that the subsidizing Member withdraw the subsidy without 
delay. In this regard, the panel shall specify in its recommendation the time-period within which 
the measure must be withdrawn.” (emphasis added). 
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settlement procedures as compared to the general DSU process.
4
 Despite the evidently 
tight regulations regarding prohibited subsidies, subsidy disputes have resulted in the 
highest number of Article 22.6 arbitrations, which authorize retaliatory measures against 
the infringing member retaining its non-compliant measure, the highest amount of 
countermeasures to enforce compliance with the DSB recommendations, and some of the 
lengthiest dispute processes due to delayed implementation actions.
5
  
While there may be many problems involving subsidies in general, some of the 
most prominent dispute cases involve prohibited subsidies, and most of the disputes 
involving subsidies are concerned with prohibited subsidies. More specifically, while in 
terms of scope of coverage, actionable subsidies may be the largest, in terms of legal 
disputes (of which legal scholars are most interested in), prohibited subsidies are by far 
the most problematic. Therefore, more focus may be warranted for prohibited subsidies 
with a more rigorous legalistic, in addition to an economic approach for analysis.  
 
1.2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF STUDY  
 
This study focuses on the problematic area regarding the remedy system for 
                                           
4
 Article 4 of the SCM Agreement provides for shorter periods for establishment of a panel after 
consultation request (30 days), circulation of panel report (90 days), adoption of panel report (30 
days), and adoption of Appellate Body report (20 days). In contrast, the general rules on dispute 
settlement contained in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides for 60 days for 
establishment of a panel after consultation request (Article 4.7), 9 months for circulation of panel 
report (Article 12.9), 60 days for adoption of panel report (Article 16.4), and 30 days for adoption 
of Appellate Body report (Article 17.14).   
5
 Out of a total of 9 Article 22.6 disputes that have authorized retaliation amounts to date, 5 cases 
are subsidy-related disputes, among which 4 cases involve prohibited subsidies.  
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prohibited subsidies under the WTO dispute settlement system. There has been quite a 
large amount of legal research on the purpose or the role of remedies in the WTO dispute 
settlement system,
6
 and many economic analyses on the optimal level of retaliation as a 
form of remedy in the WTO system.
7
 However, there still lacks sufficient research that 
provides a more comprehensive approach from both the legal and the economic 
perspectives, which may provide a more ‘balanced’ view for understanding the discipline 
on prohibited subsidies in terms of its rules and remedies. Furthermore, the focus and 
analysis results of the legal and economic research on this subject tends to be quite the 
opposite: the former arguing for tighter restrictions on prohibited subsidies and stronger 
remedies for inducing compliance, while the latter calling for a more welfare and 
                                           
6
 See, for example, J. Pauwelyn, ‘The Calculation and Design of Trade Retaliation in Context: 
What is the Goal of Suspending WTO Obligations?’, in C. Bown and J. Pauwelyn eds., The Law, 
Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement (2010); D. Palmeter and S. 
Alexandrov, ‘‘Inducing Compliance’ in WTO Dispute Settlement’, in D. Kenney and J. Southwick 
eds., The Political Economy of International Trade Law (2002); P. Mavroidis, ‘Remedies in the 
WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place’, 11 European Journal of International 
Law 763 (2000); S. Charnovitz, ‘Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions’, 95 American Journal of 
International Law 792 (2001); C. Carmody, ‘Remedies and Conformity under the WTO 
Agreement’, 5 Journal of International Economic Law 307 (2002); J. Jackson, ‘International Law 
Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to Comply or to “Buy Out”?’, 98 American 
Journal of International Law 109 (2004); J. Bellow, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: 
Less is More’, 90 American Journal of International Law 415 (1996); R. Lawrence, Crimes and 
Punishments? Retaliation Under the WTO, Institute for International Economics (2003), at 13-47. 
7
 See, for example, C. Bown and M. Ruta, ‘The Economics of Permissible WTO Retaliation’, in C. 
Bown and J. Pauwelyn eds., The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute 
Settlement (2010); G. Maggi and R. Staiger, ‘Breach, Remedies and Dispute Settlement in Trade 
Agreements’, NBER Working Paper No. 15460 (2009); M. Beshkar, ‘Optimal Remedies in 
International Trade Agreements’, 54 European Economic Review 455 (2010); K. Bagwell, P. 
Mavroidis, R. Staiger, ‘The Case for Tradable Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement’, World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 3314 (2004); W. Schwartz and A. Sykes, ‘The Economic Structure 
of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization’, 31 Journal of Legal 
Studies 179 (2002); A. Sykes, ‘The Remedy for Breach of Obligations under the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding: Damages or Specific Performance?’, in M. Bronckers and R. Quick 
eds., New Directions in International Economic Law: Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson (2000).  
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efficiency-based view of the issue, arguing for a more lenient treatment of prohibited 
(export) subsidies. In this light, the goal of this study is to build on the existing studies to 
provide economic justification for the legal remedy system on prohibited subsidies, which 
further provides important implications for remedies in the WTO dispute settlement 
system as a whole.  
This paper is organized as follows. Chapter II gives an overview of the legal 
remedies in general, from those in domestic contract law, public international law, 
international investment treaties, and intellectual property law. The purpose is to provide 
the context for examining the remedy system for breach of obligations in other legal 
regimes so as to better understand the remedy system in the WTO. A key element for 
understanding remedies is a discussion on the purpose of remedies, which is traditionally 
distinguished as the property rule and liability rule, which are concepts derived from the 
theory of entitlements. The principle of proportionality will also be discussed, as another 
important principle regarding remedies in international law.  
Chapter III deals with the remedy system for prohibited subsidies in the WTO, 
beginning with an overview of the current status of the remedial mechanism for 
prohibited subsidies in the WTO. The compliance problem in prohibited subsidy disputes 
will be examined in more detail, going over the type of remedies in place for enforcing 
rulings regarding prohibited subsidies, and how they are applied in prohibited subsidy 
disputes. A substantial part of this chapter will be devoted to the distinctive treatment of 
prohibited subsidies in the WTO, starting from how the rules on prohibited subsidies have 
evolved throughout the trade regulations history. The application of the rules is examined 
6 
 
in more detail to identify some of the most persistent issues that remain unresolved in 
WTO jurisprudence on prohibited subsidies.  
Chapter IV gives an overview of the existing literature that provides important 
economic evidence on the WTO remedy system in general, and the remedy system for 
prohibited subsidies. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the approaches of trade 
economists in assessing the remedy system in the WTO dispute settlement system using 
technical methods based on economic principles in order to provide some more rigorous 
framework of analysis for the discussion on remedies.  
Based on the above legal and economic analyses of the remedies as applied in 
the WTO dispute settlement system, Chapter V proposes several alternative remedy 
systems for ‘remedying’ the current remedy system for prohibited subsidies in the WTO. 
The main arguments are focused on devising more effective and practical remedial means 
that pertain to the objective and purpose of the WTO dispute settlement system. Finally, 
Chapter VI discusses the implications of the results of this paper, the remaining agenda 
for further research, and concludes.  
  
1.3 RESEARCH METHODS AND SOURCES  
 
Several methods of research have been used for this study, including literature 
review, case analysis, and treaty interpretation, based on legal and economic analysis 
methods. Primary sources for literature review include academic literature written by 
legal and economic scholars related to the subject of WTO remedies and export subsidy 
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disciplines, books written by prominent trade law specialists and trade economists on 
subjects related to subsidies, remedies, and WTO dispute cases, and GATT/WTO 
documents, including adopted reports by WTO adjudicating bodies, submitted proposals 
by WTO Members, and other communication and notifications by WTO members to the 
DSB. 
 First of all, statistical data provided by the WTO website and international trade 
law-related portals, in addition to information from existing academic literature on the 
related subject, were gathered to examine the current status of implementation of WTO 
disputes. To examine the remedy system in action and how they are applied with regard to 
prohibited subsidies, GATT and WTO documents, particularly the decisions made by the 
WTO adjudicating bodies for relevant dispute cases, and WTO Agreement texts for the 
related provisions were referred to. For the review of economic perspectives on the 
discipline on prohibited subsidies and their remedy system, academic literature provided 
in relevant journals and books was the main source of information. The economic 
principles and models contained therein were applied to this study for assessing the 
approach by WTO adjudicating bodies in their interpretation and application of the 
relevant WTO text. Law-and-economic theories as explained by trade economists were 
applied as well to understand the purpose of the remedy system for prohibited subsidies, 
such as the property rule and liability rule from the theory of contract law.  
As for the case analysis, primary sources of information are GATT/WTO 
documents, consisting of adopted DSB reports on the decision of WTO adjudicating 
bodies on the relevant dispute cases. In addition, existing academic literature assessing 
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the decision process and results from both legal and economic perspectives served as 
reference points as well. Trade-related journal articles, such as from Inside U.S. Trade, 
were referred to gather up-to-date information on the status of relevant disputes regarding 
implementation by WTO Members as parties to the dispute. Analysis of relevant WTO 
dispute cases also contributed to identifying the issues that are persistent and remain 
unresolved in the area of remedies for dealing with non-complaint actions against 
prohibited subsidy rules.  
The examination of remedy rules in other legal regimes was conducted based on 
a comparative analysis, with focus on the type of remedies that are available for different 
legal regimes that are disciplined with distinct purposes of protecting rights. The primary 
source of analysis are books explaining the basic concepts and principles of respective 
laws, such as contract law, public international law, investment law, and intellectual 
property law.  
Analysis of economic theories based on trade economists’ literature published in 
academic journals or edited books on international economic law were mainly used to 
understand the economic principles enshrined in the SCM Agreement and the remedies 
used to enforce the obligations contained therein. Some economic theories were also used 
to substantiate the arguments made in this study regarding the alternative remedies that 
may be considered for ‘remedying’ the current remedy system for prohibited subsidy 
disputes. This study does not provide new economic models for explaining an alternative 
system of remedies for prohibited subsidies in the WTO; rather, it applies the existing 
economic research relevant to this study in order to provide more substantiated grounds 
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for suggesting a reformed legal path for dealing with remedies in the WTO prohibited 
























LEGAL REMEDIES IN GENERAL  
 
2.1 RULES ON REMEDIES  
 
The discussion on rules on remedies needs to begin with an observation of the 
different rules on remedies that are established in different legal systems. Prior to an in-
depth examination of the remedy rules of the world trading system, an observation of the 
remedy rules in other legal regimes deserves attention, since it may reveal some common 
or distinct features that explain the design of remedies in their respective legal regimes. 
While there have been a few studies comparing the WTO remedial system with domestic 
contract law or public international law,
8
 there does not seem to be any comprehensive 
work comparing the various remedial systems. In consideration of the distinct goals and 
structures of the respective legal regimes, this section will summarize some of the key 
features of the remedial systems in domestic contract law, international public law, 
international investment treaties, and laws governing intellectual property rights, in order 
                                           
8
 For example, see Carmody (2002), comparing private law, domestic public law, international 
public law, and WTO law, supra note 6; Lawrence (2003), discussing the difference between 
remedies in domestic law and international trade law, supra note 6; E. Posner and A. Sykes, 
‘Efficient Breach of International Law: Optimal Remedies, “Legalized Noncompliance”, and 
Related Issues’, 110 Michigan Law Review 243 (2011), discussing remedies in international law, 
international trade law, and investment law; J. Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of Public International Law in 
the WTO: How Far Can We Go?’, 95 American Journal of International Law 535 (2001), and S. 
Shadikhodjaev and N. Park, ‘Cessation and Reparation in the GATT/WTO Legal System: A View 
from the Law of State Responsibility’, 41 Journal of World Trade 1237 (2007), both discussing the 
role of public international law in WTO law; J. Trachtman, ‘The WTO Cathedral’, 43 Stanford 
Journal of International Law 127 (2007), for a more general observation of different remedies for 
different legal rules.  
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to understand the logic behind the design of remedies that are established against acts of 
non-compliance in the respective legal systems. This exercise will provide the context for 
understanding the rules on remedies in international trade law.  
 
2.1.1 REMEDIES IN DOMESTIC CONTRACT LAW  
 
In the context of tort or breach of contract, remedies refer to the relief that a 
court provides to a prevailing party in litigation.
9
 In a more strict sense, remedies used to 
denote the relief that a person can seek from the court are referred to as ‘judicial 
remedies’, distinguishable from ‘self-help’ remedies, which are available without coming 
to court, such as out-of-court settlements, termination of contract, or resorting to 
reputation as a non-legal market force.
10
 Remedies can be further distinguished between 
so-called ‘legal’ remedies and ‘equitable’ remedies. In general, ‘equitable’ remedies refer 
to ‘specific performance’ as the remedy for breach of contract, normally in the form of a 
judicial order requiring the defendant (or promisor) to perform his or her contractual 
promise. On the other hand, ‘legal’ remedies for contract breach refer to damage 
payments, mostly in the form of monetary compensation.
11
 
The traditional remedies against breach of contract usually fall into one of the 
three major categories under domestic contract law. First, a complainant may recover 
‘damages’, which provides compensation to the victim of the breach. There are several 
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different kinds of damages as the remedy for breach, depending on their primary 
functions and goals served. Second, the complainant may recover ‘restitution’, which is 
aimed at depriving the defendant of the unjust enrichment or improper gains resulting 
from the breach. Third, the complainant may recover ‘specific performance’, or the very 




2.1.1.1 Damages  
 
Damages for breach of contract aim at compensation of the complainant as the 
victim of the breach. Generally, the objective of compensatory damages is to place the 
complainant in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been 
performed.
13
 This concept is also referred to as ‘expectation damages’, or the damages 
remedy that attempts to give the complainant the kind of gains he would have made if the 
contract had been performed. The goal is to avoid either over-compensation or under-
compensation, but the practical difficulties of measurement due to costs and uncertainties 
of proof, make pure compensation often not feasible. Therefore, it would be fair to 
understand that while the law of contractual remedies do not aim to provide the 
complainant a perfect substitute for full performance, the overall aim is to find an 
‘approximately right and reasonably usable’ legal rule of damages.
14
 
 There is a general rule against ‘punitive’ damages for breach of contract. Firmly 
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established common law holds that punitive damages are not to be awarded for simple 
breach of contract.
15
 The rule against punitive damages prevails even if the breach is 
willful or malicious, so long as the breach does not amount to an independent tort, and 
there is almost no stated dissent in the courts regarding these rules. There are exceptions 
to these rules if a breach of contract also constitutes a violation of fiduciary duties or 
other tort, or fraud in inducing the contract in the first place. In practice, however, 
punitive damages have been awarded in cases involving arbitrary actions by government 
officials, and willful conduct resulting in profits that may well exceed the compensation 
payable to the complainant.
16
 In such cases, the assessment of punitive damages has 
traditionally been almost total discretion to award whatever sum deemed necessary to 
punish the defendant and to set an example to others.  
 
2.1.1.2 Restitution  
 
Restitutionary remedies for breach of contract are remedies for reversing unjust 
enrichments, such as through the claimant’s payment of money or services to the 
defendant by mistake, under duress, or other conditions which trigger restitution. The 
precondition of resorting to restitution as the remedy is when the defendant has made a 
profit or saved an expense due to the breach of contract.
17
 However, while the restitution 
remedy may be preferred to compensatory damages when the complainant may obtain 
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more profits by restitution than compensation, the remedy of restitution does not seem to 
be widely used against breach of contract. This is in part derived from the ‘efficient 
breach’ theory that it is more economically efficient to allow breach of contract than to 




2.1.1.3 Specific Performance  
 
Specific performance, or injunctive relief, is an ‘equitable’ remedy which 
enforces a defendant’s positive contractual obligations, or simply put, orders the 
defendant to do what he or she promised to do. Therefore, it is referred to as a remedy 
that protects the claimant’s expectation interest based on the morality of promise-keeping. 
In contrast to damages, the remedy of specific performance is not available for every 
breach of contract, but is invoked by the court only when the damages remedy is deemed 
to offer inadequate relief.
19
 Specific performance may be the appropriate remedy as 
compared to damages, when it is difficult to assess damages, and where the defendant 
may be unable to pay damages. As a consequence, the granting of such equitable relief is 
at the discretion of the court, when it is demonstrated by the complainant that damages 
are not adequately compensatory or that there is difficulty in assessing the damages.
20
  
According to Carmody, the remedies for private law are mainly concerned with 
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‘corrective justice’, since the remedies of specific performance or damages are largely 
about correcting the claimant’s injury or punishing the wrongdoer’s behavior. 




In sum, the remedies in contract law, generally understood to be consisting of 
damages and specific performance, award the party at loss the ‘benefit of the bargain’, or 
in more legal terminology, ‘expectation damages’. Also, in certain situations, both the 
legal and equitable remedies are perceived to perform the same or similar functions, such 
as in the case of restitutionary damages that result in monetary compensation for 
restitution, or specific performance accompanied with the award of an agreed sum to 
induce performance of contractual obligations. However, due to a number of restrictions 
in using the equitable remedy of specific performance, the legal remedy of damages 
seems to be more widely-used. The damages remedy is intended to provide compensation, 
and normally does not serve a punitive goal. More fundamentally, such a rule represents 
the ‘efficient breach’ principle in the law-and-economics theory, that one should be 
permitted to breach the contract so long as he pays the damages required to put the non-
breaching party in his rightful position.  
 
2.1.2 REMEDIES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW  
 
International law consists of rules and principles of general application dealing 
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with the conduct of states, on the basis of either customary international law or 
multilateral treaties. Unlike national legal systems, international law is primarily 
concerned with the legal regulation of the international interplay between the states, 
which are organized as territorial entities, and are considered as ‘sovereign’ and ‘equal’.
22
 
Thus, international law is a horizontal legal system, lacking supreme authority and the 
centralized use of force. According to Pauwelyn, international law is ‘decentralized’ in 
that it has no central legislator creating its rules. Neither is there any third-party enforcer 
which compels the performance of legal obligations by the parties. Such absence of third-
party enforcement in international law implies that enforcement relies on the states as 
parties subject to international law.
23
 However, this does not suggest that international 
law has no legal force, since the rules of general international law, in principle, are 
binding on all states.
24
 Furthermore, while the law enforcement capacity of international 
organizations, such as the United Nations, is both legally and politically limited, a state 
which violates an international obligation is responsible for the wrongful act incurred to 
the injured state, or, under certain circumstances, to the international community as a 
whole. By international norms, injured states can raise international claims which can be 
pursued on the basis of available remedies, or rely on third-party mediation or arbitration 
proceedings. In practice, however, states predominantly resort to ‘self-help’ when their 
rights have been violated, which is comparable with the restricted use of self-help by 
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individuals in the domestic legal systems.
25
 
The fundamental difference between remedies in national private law and public 
international law is that while the former is concerned with corrective justice for the 
individual as a victim of the breach of contract, the latter is more acutely concerned about 
the sovereignty of states, and international responsibility that arises in the context of 
negotiated diplomatic settlements.
26
 Therefore, as Pauwelyn has observed, even though 
there may be rules on remedies for breach of internationally negotiated agreements 
among states and their actors, the enforcement of such obligations may not be compelled 
as with domestic contracts.  
The effort to deal with the problem of effectiveness and enforcement of 
international law has resulted in the codification of the International Law Commission 
(ILC)’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(hereinafter ILC Draft Articles).
27
 After nearly four decades of attempts to codify and 
develop the rules on state responsibility, the final text of the Draft Articles were adopted 
by the ILC in 2001. They have been cited by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
numerously, and have generally been well received. Since there is no other authoritative 
international legal source on the international law of remedies, most of the existing 
studies, including this one, rely on the ILC Draft Articles. They are customary 
international law rules, and they are applied to breaches of both customary international 
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law and treaty law, except as otherwise provided in the treaties. They provide guidance 





Part Two of the ILC Draft Articles deals with the legal consequences for the 
responsible state arising upon an internationally wrongful act.
28
 The primary obligation 
in case of breach of an international obligation is ‘cessation’ of the wrongful conduct. 
There is also an obligation to offer appropriate ‘assurances’ and ‘guarantees’ of non-
repetition if circumstances so require.
29
 While cessation can be said to be a negative 
aspect of future performance, since it is concerned with securing an end to continuing 
wrongful conduct, assurances and guarantees serve as a preventive function and can be 
described as a positive reinforcement of future performance.
30
 The latter remedy involves 
somewhat more flexibility than cessation, and is most commonly sought when the injured 
state considers that the mere restoration of the status quo ante is not satisfactory. On the 
other hand, in order to apply the primary obligation of cessation, two essential conditions 
are required: “namely that the wrongful act has a continuing character and that the 
                                           
28
 Part Two of the Draft Articles consists of three chapters. Chapter I sets out the general 
principles and scope; Chapter II provides for the forms of reparation (restitution, compensation, 
satisfaction); and Chapter III deals with cases of breach of obligations under general international 
law and the legal consequences of such breaches.  
29
 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 27, Article 30.  
30
 Commentaries to ILC Draft Articles, in J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s 
Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002), at 196, para.1.  
19 
 
violated rule is still in force at the time in which the order is issued”.
31
 This implies that 
if the obligation has ceased following its breach, the remedy of cessation no longer 
applies (prospective function). The purpose of cessation is to put an end to a violation of 
international law, and to protect the interests of the international community as a whole 
for the preservation of the rule of law.  
 
2.1.2.2 Reparation  
 
The secondary obligation upon the commission of an internationally wrongful 
act is the obligation to make ‘full reparation’.
32
 According to the statement by the 
Permanent Court in the Factory at Chorzów case, full reparation refers to “wip[ing] out 
all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all 
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed”.
33
 There are three forms of 
reparation: restitution, compensation, and satisfaction.
34
 Restitution involves the 
“reestablishment as far as possible of the situation which existed prior to the commission 
of the internationally wrongful act”, for example, such conduct as the release of persons 
wrongly detained or the return of property wrongly seized.
35
 However, due to situations 
where restitution is not available or where it is not effective, there are difficulties in 
applying restitution in practice. Despite these difficulties, there have been certain cases 
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where restitution has been required as an aspect of compliance with the primary 
obligation. There are also limitations to using restitution as a form of reparation as set out 
in the ILC Draft Articles, under which restitution is not required if it is “materially 
impossible”, and if it would “involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving 
from restitution instead of compensation”.
36
 In other words, if the injury caused by the 
internationally wrongful act cannot be fully repaired with restitution, such as due to 
material impossibility, other forms of reparation will be required, and consideration 
should be taken to ensure that reparation by restitution be ‘equitable’ and ‘reasonable’ to 
either the injured state or the victim of the breach.
37
  
In international practice, compensation is perhaps the most commonly sought of 
the various forms of reparation. Since restitution is frequently unavailable or inadequate, 
the role of compensation is to fill in any gaps so as to ensure full reparation for damages 
suffered.
38
 Compensation generally consists of monetary payment, and it is not 
concerned to punish the responsible state, nor does it have an expressive or exemplary 
character.
39
 Monetary compensation is intended for a purely compensatory function, and 
to offset the damage suffered by the injured state as a result of the breach.  
Lastly, as the third form of reparation, satisfaction is provided for “insofar as 
[the injury] cannot be made good by restitution or compensation”.
40
 Although not a 
standard form of reparation, in that it may be required only in those cases where 
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restitution or compensation has provided full reparation, this kind of remedy for ‘non-
material injury’ is well-established in international law. According to a tribunal in an 
international arbitration: “There is a long established practice of States and international 
courts and tribunals of using satisfaction as a remedy or form of reparation (in the wide 
sense) for the breach of an international obligation. This practice relates particularly to 
the case of moral or legal damage done directly to the State, especially as opposed to the 
case of damage to persons involving international responsibilities”.
41
 The most common 
modalities of satisfaction would be a declaration of wrongfulness of the act by a 
competent court or tribunal, or an apology either in verbal or written form by an 
appropriate official or head of State. Furthermore, satisfaction is not intended to be 
punitive in character. Such limitation is set out in the related articles. First, they require 
proportionality to the injury, and second, the satisfaction should not be ‘humiliating’ to 
the responsible State.  
In sum, the remedies against breach of an international obligation set out in the 
ILC Draft Articles provide for the importance of ‘full reparation’, which seemingly allow 
for ‘retrospective’ remedies in the form of monetary compensation when restitution of the 
injury incurred is not possible. However, the compensation remedy is not designed to be 
punitive, but merely compensatory, or to ‘fill in gaps so as to ensure full reparation for 
damage suffered’.
42
 Despite the adopted codifications of the remedy rules for application 
to the international law regime, however, international law lacks important enforcement 
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capability to ensure that the rulings of the international tribunal are implemented. Instead, 
a noticeable feature in public international law remedies is the well-established use of the 
‘satisfaction’ remedy, which seemingly reflects the ‘equality’ of nation states in terms of 
their sovereignty and thus, the difficulty in administering remedies in the absence of any 
third-party enforcement authority.  
 
2.1.3 REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES  
 
Investment treaties, often referred to as ‘international investment agreements’ 
(IIA), are essentially instruments of international law through which states make 
commitments to other states with respect to the treatment accorded to the investors and 
investment from those other states, and establish mechanisms for enforcement of those 
commitments. Countries establish investment agreements for the purpose of protection 
and promotion of investment.
43
 International investment agreements are generally 
understood as to incorporate bilateral investment treaties (BITs), bilateral economic 
agreements with investment provisions, and other investment-related agreements among 
states (i.e. taxation agreements). Such investment agreements have been increasing in 
number, especially since the 1950s when World War II ended, as nations wished to create 
effective investment protection regimes that facilitate and protect investments of their 
nationals and companies abroad as international transactions grew. While bilateral efforts 
under such objectives led to significant growth in the number of bilateral treaties, 
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multilateral efforts to create an international legal framework to govern investments 
resulted in the creation of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) as an important institutional support for the enforcement of BIT provisions.
44
 
Accordingly, the key difference between the investment regime and the trade 
regime is that while the latter has been developed on a multilateral basis through a 
succession of multilateral negotiating rounds leading to multilateral agreements, the 
former has been built largely on a bilateral basis, as a large number of countries have 
bilaterally negotiated rules and enforcement mechanisms that apply to their nationals and 
investments in the territory of the other country. Another important nature of the 
investment regime that makes it unique is the broad scope of private decision-making, as 
non-state actors are delegated the authority to decide and act independently in the process 
of decision-making on the rules of the regime. This is in stark contrast to other regimes, 





2.1.3.1 Dispute Settlement Methods in Investment Arbitrations  
 
 Investment treaties contain enforcement mechanisms which function as a means 
for resolving disputes and securing compensation payment to the injured investors, and 
                                           
44
 Ibid., 88-95. ICSID was created on the basis of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (575 UNTS159; 4 ILM 524 (1965)), which 
was drafted in the framework of the World Bank and entered into force on 14 October 1966. 
ICSID provides a system of dispute settlement that is specialized in investor-state disputes. R. 
Dolzer and C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2008), 222-223.   
45
 Salacuse (2010), supra note 43, 11-14.  
24 
 
deter states from neglecting their treaty commitments to other investors. The dispute 
settlement methods that are contained in most investment treaties take the following four 
forms: (1) consultation and negotiations between contracting states; (2) arbitration 
between contracting states; (3) consultation and negotiations between investors and host 
governments; and (4) investor-state arbitration.
46
  
 Interstate consultations and negotiations serve as a useful function in preserving 
the investment relationships under the treaty, since conflicts over, for example, the 
interpretation and application of treaty provisions can be settled by discussions and 
negotiations diplomatically between representatives of the contracting states. Interstate 
arbitration is a traditional method for the peaceful resolution of state disputes, as the 
disputing parties agree to resort to a third party to resolve their dispute according to 
agreed-upon norms and procedures. Even for disputes between investors and host 
countries, consultations and negotiations substantially help toward their resolution, as 
parties increasingly recognize the disadvantages of arbitration in terms of time and cost.
47
 
 On the other hand, investor-state arbitration is a unique feature of the dispute 
resolution system in the international investment regime. While arbitration is a traditional 
dispute settlement method whereby disputants agree to refer their dispute to a third-party 
arbitrator, the fact that private investors can initiate a dispute against a state has 
significant implications. First of all, while such investor-state disputes (ISD) are subject 
to the host country’s domestic law, they are also governed by the public international law 
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in the form of treaties, making unilateral attempts by a host country unsuccessful. 
However, since public policy measures are often at the center of the investor-state 
conflicts, the result of dispute resolution may require corrective measures on the part of 
the host country government, and the controversy may become highly political in 
nature.
48
 Another feature of the investment remedy regime is the creation of ICSID, as 
mentioned previously, which provides the institutional support for establishing a 




2.1.3.2 Primary Remedy of Compensation  
 
 The primary purpose of remedies provided by investment law is to compensate 
an investor for the losses caused by an act of a state. This is based on the understanding 
that the purpose of investment treaties is to protect foreign investment by granting 
investors guarantee against expropriation or discriminatory treatment by the host 
government.
50
 While under the international law of state responsibility, reparation for the 
wrongful act takes the forms of restitution, compensation, or satisfaction, the remedy in 
investment arbitration nearly always consists of monetary compensation. This is because 
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satisfaction as a remedy for violation of investment-related commitments does not play a 
practical role, and restitution in kind is rarely ordered by arbitration courts. While this is 
not due to any inherent limitation upon investment arbitration tribunals, it is due to the 




Most modern BITs and multilateral investment treaties (i.e. NAFTA) expressly 
require the ‘prompt, adequate, and effective’ compensation for the damages incurred to 
the injured investor.
52
 The overriding principle is that the investor must be made whole 
for the deprivation of his assets. Such an approach is in line with the well-established 
principle in customary international law.
53
 The World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment 
of Foreign Direct Investment state that: “Compensation will be deemed ‘adequate’ if it is 
based on the fair market value of the taken asset as such value is determined immediately 
before the time at which the taking occurred or the decision to take the asset became 
publicly known”.
54
 Tribunals have frequently relied on the ‘fair market value’ as the 
appropriate standard for compensation, being considered as an objective standard that 
compares the amount that a willing buyer would normally pay to a willing seller in a free 
transaction.
55
 In calculating the compensation remedy for enforcement in international 
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investment arbitrations, the valuation date is the ‘date immediately before the fact of the 
expropriation became publicly known’. This is designed to avoid an influence of the 
impending expropriation on the investment’s market value. Furthermore, the award of 
compensation normally includes interest, normally a sum paid or payable as 
compensation for the temporary withholding of money. This is designed to cover the 




 Also notable regarding the review of investment arbitration decisions is that the 
awards granted by ICSID are final and not subject to any appeals procedures. This may 
be based on the existence of conflicting principles that are at work with regard to the 
process of review of a judicial decision in general, namely the principle of ‘finality’ and 
the principle of ‘correctness’. While finality serves to provide more efficiency in terms of 
an expeditious and economical settlement of disputes, correctness is a more elusive goal 
that consumes time and effort, and may involve several layers of control. In international 
arbitrations, the prevailing view is that the principal of finality is typically given more 
weight than the principle of correctness.
57
 As a result, the arbitral award of monetary 
compensation as the remedy for enforcing commitments is binding upon the parties and 
creates an obligation to comply with them.
58
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 In sum, the unique features of the remedy rules in international investment 
agreements seems to provide a stronger enforcement mechanism for the settlement of 
disputes involving international  investment commitments as compared to the dispute 
settlement systems in other international legal regimes. In particular, the creation of an 
international arbitration tribunal to rule on international investment disputes provide not 
only the institutional support for more efficient dispute settlement in investment-related 
disputes, but the power to enforce the awards through binding authority. More 
importantly, unlike most international arbitrations where state-to-state disputes are more 
common, foreign private investors are allowed to initiate a dispute against a host state, 
due to the purpose of investment arbitrations being designed to protect foreign investors. 
This has the effect of broadening the scope of participation in investment arbitration 
disputes, while also opening up the possibility for more challenges against a state’s public 
policy choice that has commercial implications. Lastly, monetary compensation as the 
primary remedy for enforcing international investment commitments, rather than the 
alternative requirement of specific performance against acts of violation, contrasts with 
the remedial mechanisms in place for the enforcement of commitments in other legal 
regimes.  
 
2.1.4 REMEDIES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW  
 
                                                                                                                   
except those provided for in this Convention. Each party shall abide by and comply with the terms 
of the award except to the extent that enforcement shall have been stayed pursuant to the relevant 
provisions of this Convention.” 
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 Intellectual property law comprises a wide range of forms of protection for 
intellectual property (IP). The definition of IP by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) refers to the “rights relating to: literary, artistic and scientific works; 
performance of performing artists, phonograms and broadcasts; inventions in all fields of 
human endeavor; scientific discoveries; industrial designs; trademarks, service marks, and 
commercial names and designations; protection against unfair competition, and all other 
rights resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic 
fields”.
59
 The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS Agreement), which covers all the main areas of IP, provides rules for copyright, 
trademarks, geographical indications, designs, patents, topographies of integrated circuits, 
undisclosed information, and anticompetitive practices involving contracts.
60
  
 While there are important differences between the various forms of intellectual 
property, one factor that they share in common is the protection of ‘intangible’ subject 
matters. This gives rise to problems over the control of property and its protection, such 
as the interference with intellectual property without the exhaustion of the property itself. 
For this reason, the rights and remedies for intellectual products are specific and not 
abstract. Furthermore, since IP protection is concerned with identifying and policing 
permissible and impermissible dealings with intellectual products, it is usually referred to 
the consent of the right holder. In a similar vein, intellectual property rights (IPR) 
eventually expire, leaving the subject matter without an owner and thus free to be used or 
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exploited. On the other hand, all forms of IP must qualify for protection according to 
stringent criteria which vary depending on the kind of property right it is being sought.
61
  
 Another defining characteristic of IPR is that it is national or territorial in nature, 
meaning that they do not operate outside the national territory where they are granted. 
Accordingly, considering that the works of intellectual property are subject to 
transnational trade, it has long been a problem to right holders. Therefore, as a way of 
protection, countries have first engaged in bilateral treaties, under which parties to the 
treaties agreed to allow the nationals of the other country to claim protection by their 
respective laws, and later developed several multilateral agreements which were 
eventually supervised by WIPO.
62
 Under these agreements, the central criterion for 
protection was the principle of national treatment. However, national treatment being 
only a partial solution to the protection of IPR, international efforts to provide more 
effective protection culminated in the TRIPS Agreement, as it became part of the WTO 
Agreement in 1994. The main advantage of the TRIPS rules was that it brought IPR into a 
broader framework, persuading countries to accept stronger IPR standards in exchange 
for other advantages elsewhere. Since not all countries had incorporated minimum 
standards of enforcement regarding IPR protection in their domestic laws, the WTO 
TRIPS Agreement has become significant as the first international treaty on intellectual 
property to place obligations on member states regarding enforcement of IPR at the 
domestic level. Through the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and the enforcement 
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procedures contained in therein, the TRIPS Agreement provides expedited dispute 
settlement for states at international levels. Prior to TRIPS, matters of procedure, 
remedies and criminal sanctions had largely been left to national law.
63
   
 The majority of enforcement procedures for dealing with IP infringements at the 
domestic level are, in fact, civil, and dealt as torts (illegal acts) committed against 
property.
64
 However, the growing incidence of counterfeiting and piracy has also led to 
the introduction and development of criminal procedures over the past years. Especially 
in the area of copyright, performers’ rights and trademarks, civil actions are assisted by 
criminal sanctions in cases where the infringement has been committed on a commercial 
scale.
65
 The civil and criminal remedies that claimants may obtain for a violation of IPR 





2.1.4.1 Interim and Final Injunctions  
 
Many civil intellectual property cases are subject to interim relief, as it is 
important for the injured party to halt the damages from the allegedly infringing act as 
soon as possible. After a claimant establishes a legal standing, the court considers 
whether it would be fair to grant interim relief, with the aim to reduce the changes of the 
provisional decision providing an unjust result.  
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A final injunction is usually granted to a claimant who proves at trial that their 
rights have been infringed by the defendant. As an order of the court, a final injunction 
will order the defendant to specific performance or to refrain from doing a certain act. 
Injunctions are normally highly effective, particularly since willful non-compliance will 





2.1.4.2 Delivery-up  
 
A court may order ‘delivery-up’, or destruction, of the infringing articles, for the 
purpose of effectively removing the infringing goods from circulation. When the 
infringement has been committed ‘in the course of a business’, the court may order 
delivery-up to the right owner pending a further order for destruction or forfeiture. It also 
applies to where a person has in their possession anything specifically designed or 






Damages are the most common form of remedy used in intellectual property 
cases. As with other actions in tort or breach of contract, the purpose of awarding 
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damages is to put the claimant back in the position he would have been had the 
infringement not occurred. Although there is no standard rule for the assessment of 
damages in IP cases, the amount of damage is normally calculated on the basis of lost 
profits, where the right owner has not granted a license. A secondary measurement 
method, applied when there is a license granted, is on a royalty basis, and other costs 
payable under the license. Although rarely awarded, exemplary damages may also be 
awarded, limited to cases where infringement by the defendant is based on the calculation 




2.1.4.4 Account for Profits  
 
Instead of claiming damages, a claimant may opt for an ‘account of profits’, 
through which the right owner may reclaim the amount earned by the defendant by way 
of unjust enrichment through infringement of the IPR. Once liability is established, the 
owner can opt for either damages or an account of profits, but not both, in order to avoid 
double liability. The net profits, after deducting the profit attributable to the infringer’s 




2.1.4.5 Criminal Remedies  
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Criminal sanctions do not play an important role in the IP area in general, but 
some exist in the areas of copyright, performers’ rights and trade mark infringement, 
where acts of piracy and counterfeiting occur. The publicity that a criminal trial can 
attract and the deterrent effect that it entails make the criminal remedy an attractive 
option. On the other hand, there is no criminal sanction for the infringement of patents or 
designs. Due to the prevalence of such offences and difficulties of detection, the courts 
have emphasized that criminal copyright infringement is to be regarded as a very serious 
matter. Liability of criminal offenses regarding performers’ rights depends on proof of 
knowledge or reason to believe that the recordings are ‘illicit’, and the penalties awarded 
are equivalent to those for infringement of copyrights. The criminal penalties for 
infringement of trademarks are similar to those for copyright infringement, where the 
punishment will depend largely on the gravity and the scale of the infringement and the 
persistence of the defendant. The courts also have the authority to order delivery-up of 
infringing copies of goods and to make certain compensation and confiscation orders.
71
 
 In sum, due to the national and transnational implications of intellectual property 
rights and laws governing them, the remedy rules for IPR protection makes available all 
civil and criminal proceedings at both national and international levels. Furthermore, 
while the remedy of damages is the most common remedy against the infringement of 
IPR, this is provided in addition to the primary remedy of injunction (since IPR is 
essentially a property right). This also implies that the remedies available against IPR 
infringement are both prospective and retrospective, as they include both the forward-
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looking injunctions and damages for past injury. In short, compared to other legal regimes, 
remedies available in intellectual property law are most comprehensive and inclusive in 
terms of the availability of remedies against infringement.  
 Table 1 below summarizes some of the key features of the remedy rules in each 
respective legal regime as examined above. The most common form of remedy available 
in all legal regimes is the legal remedy of damages, which are mostly purely 
compensatory in nature. While the equitable remedy of specific performance is available 
in most cases, investment treaties seemed to be an exception, at least as a formal remedy. 
The primary remedy in each legal regime differs depending on their purpose, object of 
protection, and features. Though it may be difficult to generalize, when property rights 
are involved, as in the case of public international law and intellectual property law, the 
primary remedy seems to be the equitable remedy of specific performance. On the other 
hand, for legal regimes in which the object of protection is related to monetary 
transactions, the primary remedy is the remedy of compensation. In conclusion, the rules 
on remedies in the respective legal regimes aptly reflect the purposes of protection that 
their regimes are trying to provide to their main object of protection, with the appropriate 
mechanisms to provide adequate forms of relief against any violation of obligations or 
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2.2 PURPOSE OF REMEDIES  
 
As observed in the previous section, the primary forms of remedy in various 
legal regimes seem to be generally divided into the remedy requiring specific 
performance (i.e. injunctive relief or cessation) and the remedy of compensatory payment 
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(i.e. monetary compensation). While a common fundamental role of remedies may be 
enforcement of the rights and obligations, the purpose these remedies serve may be 
dissimilar, as different situations require different means to enforce the obligations and 
commitments. Accordingly, when it comes to the discussion on the purpose of remedies, 
there are two main schools of thought: (1) remedies that serve to protect rights under the 
‘property rule’; and (2) remedies that protect rights under the ‘liability rule’.   
 The distinction between the property rule and the liability rule in the theory of 
entitlements (property rights) was first introduced by Calabresi and Melamed, who 
believed that a complete description of property and tort law required not only the 
specification of the entitlements to be protected, but also specification of the manner in 
which the entitlements are protected.
72
 Their framework led to a voluminous literature on 
remedies by following up or improving on their work, but their classification of the rules 
on remedies for protecting entitlements remains valid and provides the basis for 
understanding the choice of remedies for the enforcement of rights.  
 Where entitlements are protected by the ‘property rule’, infringement of a 
person’s entitlement is strictly prohibited, with the prohibition enforced by injunctive 
relief, or if necessary, by criminal sanctions. This rule is generally applied when the 
purpose is to protect individuals or right holders from having their possessions taken from 
them, and to ensure the fundamental right of ownership. Anyone who wishes to remove 
the entitlement from its holder must buy it from the owner in a voluntary transaction in 
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which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the owner. Hence, this form of 
entitlement gives rise to the least amount of state intervention, since once the initial 
entitlement is decided upon, state intervention is needed only for enforcing the initial 
entitlement, and not for determining the value of the entitlement (i.e. calculation of the 
amount of damages).
73
 Therefore, property rules are deemed to be the most appropriate 
when ‘transaction costs’ are low,
74
 since low obstacles to bargaining will enable parties to 
bargain and reach desirable outcomes at the initial stage when determining the value of 
the entitlement.  
 On the other hand, whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if the 
infringer is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, entitlements are 
protected by the ‘liability rule’. Hence, under the liability rule, violations are merely 
discouraged by requiring infringers to pay the victims for harms suffered.
75
 This rule is 
often employed to protect individuals against ‘harmful externalities’, such as in the case 
of environmental pollution or automobile accidents. This is because with the existence of 
harmful externalities, involved parties cannot practically bargain with one another, so that 
the resolution of difficulties may have to be determined by the courts which can 
objectively determine the extent of the harm done.
76
 Therefore, according to Calabresi 
and Melamed, this form of entitlement involves an additional stage of state intervention, 
since the transfer or destruction of entitlements is allowed on the basis of a value 
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determined by the state (i.e. determination of the amount of damages by the courts).
77
 As 
a result, it is believed that liability rules are more appropriate when the transaction costs 
of bargaining are high and bargaining on the initial entitlement is difficult, so that the 
resolution of difficulties would have to be determined directly by the legal rules as 
applied by the courts. In this context, the commonly held view is that liability rules are 
preferred to property rules, assuming that courts can accurately determine the magnitude 
of the harm caused by the violation. However, if courts have difficulty ascertaining the 
actual level of harm, the liability rule may be inferior to the property rule.
78
 Table 2 
below summarizes the purpose of remedies as explained so far.  
<Table 2> Purpose of Remedies 
 Property Rule Liability Rule 
Purpose 
To ensure fundamental right 
of ownership 
(protect individuals from 
having possessions taken) 
To protect individuals against 
‘harmful externalities’ for which 
bargaining is difficult 
Means of 
protection 
Strict prohibition of infringement of 
another person’s entitlement 
Infringement is merely discouraged 





Enforcement by injunctive relief  
(i.e. criminal sanctions) 
‘Expectation damages’ serve as 
criteria for enforcement when 





transaction costs are low 
(state intervention needed only for 
enforcement of initial right) 
Preferred when transaction costs  
(i.e. bargaining costs) are high 
(state intervention by courts needed 
to determine value of entitlement) 
Transfer of 
entitlement 
Voluntary transaction for removing 
entitlement from right holder, based 
on initial determination of value of 
the entitlement 
Initial entitlement may be removed if 
infringer is willing to pay the 
determined value of the entitlement 
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 In contract law, it has often been recognized that the remedies for breach of 
contract can be classified as either property rules or liability rules. In fact, the ordinary 
remedy of expectation damages against breach of contract resembles the remedy under 
the liability rule, for it allows one party to break the contract whenever he is willing to 
pay the court’s estimate of the value of his performance to the other party. By contrast, 
the remedy of specific performance protects the contract with a property rule, barring the 
promisor from breaking the contract unless he negotiates his release from the promisee.
79
 
 Transaction costs, or the costs of overcoming barriers to bargaining, play an 
important role in the distinction between the property rule and the liability rule in the 
choice of remedies. If barriers can be easily overcome (i.e. transaction costs are low), 
protecting the owner with a property rule will usually be appropriate, but if the barrier 
cannot be overcome, or can only be overcome at great expense (i.e. transaction costs are 
high), it will usually be better to adopt a liability rule.
80
 Put differently, a liability rule 
reduces transaction costs by not forcing parties to negotiate on the initial entitlement, so 
long as the parties are willing to enforce only what the court has reasonably determined to 
be the value of the entitlement as a payment for damages (‘expectation damages’). If the 
transaction costs saved by this method are large enough, it may be better to relieve the 
parties from the burden of bargaining by protecting promisors with a liability rule rather 
than a property rule.
81
 This reasoning also forms the basis for the notion of ‘efficient 
breach’ in the theory of contracts, where allowing the promisor to breach a contract and 
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not perform its commitments may be more efficient when the costs of performance is 
higher for the promisor than the benefits of compliance for the promisee.  
 There are also arguments challenging the belief that property rules are more 
appropriate when transaction costs are low, while liability rules are more appropriate 
when transaction costs are high. While existing literature suggests that liability rules may 
be inferior to property rules if courts have difficulty determining the actual level of 
injury,
82
 liability rules may be superior to property rules even when courts are uncertain 
about the magnitude of injury, especially if a court is able to set damages at a level equal 
to its best estimate of injury done, since the outcome will be superior to the outcome 
under property rules.
83
 Furthermore, even when transaction costs are low, there exists the 
possibility that bargaining might not always be successful, since parties sometimes 
misgauge what each other is willing to pay or accept. Hence, in such cases, either 




 As can be observed, the discussion on the choice of remedy as a means of 
protecting rights and obligations remains unresolved. In fact, both of the rules seem to 
coexist in respective legal regimes and their remedy systems, in an attempt to provide 
sufficient relief for the injury suffered by the violation of obligations that are of different 
natures. As will be examined in the following chapters, this situation is also evident in the 
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context of trade law as stipulated and applied in the GATT/WTO rules.
85
 While this may 
not be a problem per se, there may be some significance in discussing which rules are 
more appropriate, or at least more effective, for enforcing the rights and obligations of the 
Members of the WTO, especially in the area of prohibited subsidies, which contain some 
of the most stringent disciplines for rules enforcement. This subject matter will be 
covered in chapter III.  
 
2.3 THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY  
 
While there is no uniform standard for determining the level of remedies against 
the breach of rights and obligations in various legal regimes, the ILC codifications as a 
part of public international law establishes the principle of ‘proportionality’ which serves 
as the basis for determining the amount of countermeasures that are used to enforce 
obligations. Proportionality as a principle in customary international law is used to assess 
the lawfulness of countermeasures, mainly intended to place a ceiling on potential 
escalating cycles of transactional violence that can occur from the imposition of 
retaliatory countermeasures among disputing parties.
86
  
While the ILC Draft Articles on state responsibility specifically provides for 
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‘full reparation’ against injury caused by an internationally wrongful act, the principle of 
proportionality serves as a limitation to each form of reparation as the remedy against the 
injury caused. In the case of restitution, as the first form of reparation, it shall “not 
involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution”,
87
 
otherwise compensation should be the remedy for repairing the injury caused. The 
commentaries to this provision further explain that the requirement of proportionality 
implies considerations of ‘equity and reasonableness’ in balancing the burden between 
restitution which is imposed on the responsible state and the benefit which would be 
gained by the injured state.
88
   
Despite there being no specific mentioning of proportionality with regard to the 
second form of reparation, commentaries explain that compensation is “not concerned to 
punish the responsible State, nor… have an expressive or exemplary character”.
89
 In 
other words, the remedy of compensation should be proportionate to the actual injury 
caused, and not serve to have any deterrent or punitive impact.
90
 As for satisfaction, as 
the third form of reparation to be resorted to when the injury caused cannot be fully 
addressed by restitution or compensation, the related provision specifies that it “shall not 




Many commentators have observed that the textual language of the ILC 
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provisions indicate that the focus of the proportionality requirement is on the actual harm 
caused, rather than the culpability of the actor or the need to induce compliance which 
could weigh in favor of a lower or higher penalty than the actual level of injury.
92
 
However, there also seems to be some confusion due to the reference in the same ILC 
provisions which state that “countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury 
suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights 
in question”.
93
 Furthermore, the objective of imposing countermeasures is to “induce that 
[responsible] State to comply with its obligations”.
94
 Consideration of the ‘gravity’ of the 
act and the ‘rights’ infringed separately from the injury suffered seem to have led several 
WTO Arbitrators to interpret the provisions as suggesting that countermeasures may serve 
some ‘fairness’ or ‘retributive’ purpose.
95
 However, a careful reading of the 
commentaries to the relevant provision explains that proportionality is a limitation even 
on measures which may be justified as required for the purpose of inducing compliance 
with the responsible state’s obligations, and clearly states that: “In every case a 
countermeasure must be commensurate with the injury suffered”, and has a function that 
is partly “independent of the question whether the countermeasure was necessary to 
achieve the result of ensuring compliance”.
96
 This may be understood to imply that 
despite the importance of the purpose of countermeasures in inducing responsible states 
to comply with their obligations in the first place, countermeasures need be ensured to 
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provide full reparation, but imposed at a level that is closely linked to the actual injury 
suffered. In other words, full reparation from an injury caused by an act of infringement 
must be equal to the actual injury suffered. In essence, the principle of proportionality as 
provided in international law requires that for assessing the lawfulness of any proposed 
countermeasures, the actual injury suffered and the proposed countermeasure need always 
be ‘proportionate’.   
 
2.4 SUMMARY  
This chapter has examined the various rules on different legal systems in order 
to understand the logic behind the design and form of remedies in respective legal 
regimes. As a result, in addition to the fact that different legal regimes have different 
remedies for enforcement, all regimes seem to have in place remedies that provide 
protection for their rights and obligations based on either the property rule or the liability 
rule. Furthermore, the remedies are mostly in the form of some specific performance of 
compliance (or injunctive relief to enforce compliance) or payment of compensatory 
damages. As will be examined in the following chapters, this situation is not much 
different in the WTO regime.  
Despite these commonalities, there also exist particular features of the legal 
regimes which are unique in nature, considering the different purposes and the object of 
protection. With these features of the legal systems in mind, we will be able to understand 
the rules on remedies in the WTO regime for prohibited subsidies in a better context. This 




THE REMEDY SYSTEM FOR PROHIBITED SUBSIDIES IN THE WTO 
 
3.1 OVERVIEW OF THE REMEDY SYSTEM IN THE WTO  
 
The dispute settlement mechanism that has been established with the launch of 
the WTO mainly refers to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and the juridical 
proceedings that are governed by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). The DSU 
is viewed as the most significant achievement of the Uruguay Round negotiations, and 
unique in public international law, since it confers compulsory jurisdiction on the DSB 
for the purpose of resolving disputes.
97
 According to Article 3.2 of the DSU, the dispute 
settlement system of the WTO is a “central element in providing security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system”. In comparison to early GATT dispute 
settlement, which has very much been a diplomatic process, the WTO dispute settlement 
process provides for a far more legalized system. The WTO dispute settlement system has 
established a unified and integrated framework, where disputes involving most of the 
WTO Agreements are resolved by a single dispute settlement system, thereby providing 
consistency and coherence to the rulings and determinations by the DSB. Decisions made 
by the panel and the standing Appellate Body are quasi-automatically adopted, due to the 
consensus rule by which panel and Appellate Body reports are adopted unless there is a 
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negative consensus not to.  
This section aims to examine the remedy system that is established under the 
WTO, also looking into the purpose WTO remedies are trying to serve, and the 
limitations these remedies have under the current WTO system. This will be based on the 
voluminous existing literature on the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO, with 
particular attention to the merits and shortcomings of the WTO remedy system. Based on 
this context, this study will further examine the specific area of prohibited subsidies, 
going over the historical evolution of the legal rules disciplining subsidies and the 
features of the remedy system that are in place and active for dealing with prohibited 
subsidy disputes in the following sections.  
 
3.1.1 REMEDIES IN THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM  
 
The WTO regime deals with three different types of legal actions that are 
available to WTO Members when their rights are infringed upon: violation complaints; 
non-violation complaints; and situation complaints. However, since the latter two 
categories do not pertain to internationally wrongful acts, the discussion of WTO 
remedies provided in this study shall be focused on the former type of remedy that 
addresses acts of violation against international obligations.
98
  
Remedies are, in fact, a part of the enforcement mechanism that, in a broader 
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sense, includes both the subject of enforcement and the means for achieving 
enforcement.
99
 In this light, WTO remedies should be understood to include both: as a 
primary means to redress actions that have been determined to be illegal under the WTO 
system, and as a secondary means that is used to enforce WTO law.  
The remedies that are available under the WTO are set out in the provisions of 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).
100
 Under the aim to secure a positive 
solution to disputes, parties are first recommended to engage in consultations to reach a 
mutually satisfactory agreement which is acceptable to the parties and consistent with the 
WTO agreements. However, if a mutually agreed solution cannot be attained, the parties 
may request to establish a panel, after which a decision issued by the panel is adopted by 
the Members in the form of a recommendation or suggestion for the removal of the 
infringing measure if determined to be a violation of WTO obligations.
101
 If the 
respondent party, however, appeals, a standing Appellate Body reviews the case, after 
which it may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel.
102
  
The primary remedy in the case of a DSB ruling that determines that the 
respondent party has violated its obligations under the WTO is to ‘bring its measure into 
conformity’ with the WTO agreements, normally referring to the removal or ‘withdrawal’ 
of the violating measure.
103
 Article 21.1 of the DSU requires ‘prompt compliance’ to 
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ensure the effective resolution of disputes. Withdrawal of the infringing measure is the 
primary obligation of the WTO Members when determined by the WTO adjudicating 
bodies to have acted inconsistently with WTO rules. However, when such act of 
compliance is not promptly implemented, usually within a ‘reasonable period of time’ for 
implementation,
104
 the WTO dispute settlement mechanism provides for secondary 
remedies to enforce the rulings.  
There are two types of secondary remedies, which consists of ‘compensation’ 
and ‘suspension of concessions or other obligations’. These are remedies available by the 
DSU when a Member fails to bring a non-conforming measure into compliance with the 
DSB ruling within the given time for implementation. They are ‘secondary’, in the sense 
that they are temporary measures that are only available when the DSB rulings cannot be 
promptly implemented, and to be used only until the primary remedy of ‘withdrawal’ is 
possible.
105
 Compensation typically takes the form of reduction of tariff or other bound 
trade barriers, and should be granted on a most-favored-nation (MFN) basis.
106
 If an 
agreement on compensation is not reached within 20 days after the implementation period 
expires, the second and last remedy available under the WTO is the ‘suspension of 
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concessions’, more commonly referred to as ‘retaliation’ or ‘countermeasures’, of which 
WTO Members may request for authorization from the DSB in case of continued non-
compliance.
107
 The level and type of retaliation are set out in the DSU provisions, under 
which the level should be “equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment” caused 
by the measure found to be in violation,
108
 and shall be applied to the same sector of the 
violating measure or otherwise, depending on the circumstances of the case.
109
 
Countermeasures in the WTO are bilateral in nature, meaning that they can only be taken 
by Members that have initiated the dispute. Furthermore, as opposed to compensation, 
countermeasures imply the ‘raising’ of trade barriers, which is perceived to be against 
free trade principles. Table 3 below summarizes the remedies in the WTO dispute 
settlement system as explained so far.  
 
<Table 3> Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
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The key objective of the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO is to enable 
effective functioning of the WTO as a facilitator of world trade and to maintain the proper 
balance between the rights and obligations of the WTO member countries. Under this aim, 
the role of remedies in the WTO is to facilitate the prompt settlement of situations where 
any benefits accruing to a Member has been impaired by measures imposed by other 
Members.
110
 The WTO dispute settlement system and its remedies are central to 
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system by preserving the 




3.1.2 PURPOSE OF REMEDIES IN THE WTO  
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The question of remedies in the WTO has attracted considerable attention and 
academic research from scholars of international trade law, demonstrating the 
significance, but at the same time, the perplexities concerning the issue.
112
 The purpose 
of remedies in the WTO is important in that it has direct implications on the level and the 
design of countermeasures that would be allowed in response to continued non-
compliance of the WTO rulings for enforcement of the obligations. However, the text and 
practices in the WTO lead to different interpretations as to the purpose of WTO remedies 
as conceived by the drafters of the system.  
 The two main strands of argument regarding the debate over the purpose of 
WTO remedies are that of ‘inducing compliance’ and ‘rebalancing concessions’. The 
argument that the goal of WTO suspensions is to induce compliance may well be 
represented by John Jackson, who argues that in the current system, WTO rulings are 
legally binding and must be complied with. In his view, the DSU text expresses a strong 
                                           
112
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preference for the immediate withdrawal of the measure found inconsistent, and that 
compensation and suspension are only fallback measures, with either alternatives being 
only temporary.
113
 Such a view is also referred to as the ‘absolutist view’, supporting the 
position that strict compliance with all obligations at all points in time should be the 
preferred outcome for the WTO membership in order to serve the important goal of 
‘security and predictability’. It is also consistent with the view that WTO obligations are 
protected by the ‘property rule’, from the contract theory of entitlements, under which the 
infringement of a person’s entitlement is strictly prohibited, with enforcement by specific 
performance.  
 On the other hand, the argument that the purpose of WTO remedies is to 
rebalance concessions is based on the view that international trade agreements are 
basically ‘contracts’ among politically-motivated governments, and that the current WTO 
system does not impose a legal obligation to comply with WTO rulings. Therefore, 
suffering WTO suspension or paying compensation are equally valid alternatives to 
compliance. Most notably, Schwartz and Sykes claim that the concept of ‘efficient breach’ 
is a central feature of the WTO dispute settlement system, especially where WTO 
provisions respecting renegotiation and settlement of disputes over breach of obligations 
are designed to facilitate efficient adjustments to unanticipated circumstances.
114
 In other 
words, the objective of WTO dispute settlement is compliance only when the gains of 
compliance outweigh its costs. However, when compliance incurs net cost, breach is the 
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preferred efficient outcome. Under this view, WTO obligations are protected by the 
‘liability rule’, where entitlements can be removed through the payment of compensatory 
damages that are legally determined by courts.  
 However, rather than this black-or-white perspective, there are also arguments 
that the system of trade remedies consists of both objectives. Such a view is led by 
Pauwelyn, who claims that when viewed historically, the goal of GATT/WTO 
suspensions and dispute settlement in general is multiple, and even sometimes 
overlapping. More specifically, there seems to have been a gradual evolution from 
‘rebalancing’ to ‘compliance’ throughout the GATT and WTO systems.
115
 In other words, 
the focus of dispute settlement in GATT has been the negotiated balance of benefits that 
has been harmed by ‘nullification or impairment’ from the violating measure, which 
provides justification for using remedies to ‘rebalance’ the upset negotiated balance of 
benefits. However, the changing character of WTO rules and the parties they affect seems 
to provide reason to move toward treating WTO obligations more as international legal 
obligations.
116
 This flexibility in the goals pursued by trade remedies is arguably more 
desirable, when carefully calibrated, based on the view that different types of legal 




In practice, the approaches employed by the WTO Arbitrators in DSU Article 
22.6 proceedings for measuring the level of countermeasures to be authorized to the 
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violating WTO Member can be divided into the property rule and the liability rule as well. 
While there have been only less than a dozen of these arbitration rulings to date,
118
 a 
certain trend can be identified. According to Pauwelyn, the goal of WTO suspensions as 
identified by the Arbitrators’ statements can be classified into three categories: (1) rulings 
with unequivocal statements that the goal of WTO suspensions is ‘inducing compliance’; 
(2) rulings where close to punitive suspension was authorized in response to prohibited 
subsidies; and (3) rulings in regular cases with statements that the goal of WTO 
suspensions is not clear, and it might not be compliance.
119
 Pauwelyn mentions that a 
‘cyclical evolution of WTO case law’ may be identified, that moves through phase (1) to 
phase (3), and back to phase (1), as shown in Table 4.
120
 However, in addition to the 
classification proposed by Pauwelyn, there seems to be a recent additional trend regarding 
the view of Arbitrators in determining the award in terms of the permissible level of 
countermeasures, with the recent Article 22.6 Arbitration in US-Upland Cotton. As a 
result, there seems to be an evident departure from the previous Arbitrators’ positions 
regarding the purpose of WTO remedies, particularly with respect to violations of 
                                           
118
 EC-Bananas (US), WT/DS27/ARB, 9 April 1999; EC-Bananas (Ecuador), WT/DS27/ARB/ 
ECU, 24 March 2000; EC-Hormones (US), WT/DS26/ARB, 12 July 1999; EC-Hormones 
(Canada), WT/DS48/ARB, 12 July 1999; Brazil-Aircraft (Canada), WT/DS46/ARB, 28 August 
2000; US-FSC (EC), WT/DS108/ARB, 30 August 2002; Canada-Aircraft II (Brazil), 
WT/DS222/ARB, 17 February 2003; US-1916 Act (EC), WT/DS136/ARB, 24 February 2004; US-
Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Brazil, Canada, Chile, EC, India, Japan, Korea, Mexico), 
WT/DS217/ARB, 31 August 2004; US-Gambling (Antigua), WT/DS285/ARB, 21 December 2007; 
US-Upland Cotton (Brazil), WT/DS267/ARB, 31 August 2009.  
119
 J. Pauwelyn (2010), supra note 112, 50.  
120
 For example, the Arbitrator in US-Gambling noted that while the purpose of suspension of 
concessions is to “induce compliance”, it does not mean that countermeasures can be imposed 
beyond what is “equivalent” to the level of nullification or impairment. Article 22.6 Arbitration 
Decision, US – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 
WT/DS285/ARB, 21 December 2007, para. 2.7.  
56 
 
prohibited subsidy obligations. This will be discussed in more detail in section 3.3.2 of 
this chapter.    
<Table 4> Purpose of Countermeasures in DSU Article 22.6 Rulings 
Purpose of WTO Countermeasures Arbitration Cases 
Goal of ‘inducing compliance’ 
(Phase 1)  
EC-Bananas (DS27) 
EC-Hormones (DS26,48)  
US-Gambling (DS285) 
Punitive countermeasures in response to  
prohibited subsidies  
(Phase 2)  
Brazil-Aircraft (DS46) 
US-FSC (DS108) 
Canada-Aircraft II (DS222) 
Goal of suspension is not clear  
(Phase 3)  
US-1916 Act (DS136) 
US-Offset Act (DS217) 
‘Equivalent’ countermeasures in 
response to prohibited subsidies  
(New trend)  
US-Upland Cotton (DS267) 
Source: Author’s compilation, based on Pauwelyn (2010) classification of DSU  
Article 22.6 Arbitration disputes 
 
3.1.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE WTO REMEDY SYSTEM  
 
The WTO remedies of withdrawal, compensation or suspension of concessions 
are essentially forward-looking remedies that offer only prospective relief. In the case of 
withdrawal, the best circumstances may offer an immediate withdrawal of the 
inconsistent measure upon the adoption of DSB recommendations and rulings. However, 
in most cases, the inconsistent measure will be recommended to be withdrawn within a 





 If not so withdrawn, compensation may be provided in the form of 
reduced trade barriers, but the level of compensation is counted only from the date of 
expiration of the reasonable period of time, thus offering only prospective relief for the 
injury caused. Similarly, the level of suspension of concessions to be authorized by the 
DSB is also calculated from the date of expiry of the implementation period.  
As previously mentioned, the remedy of trade compensation is considered to be 
‘trade-liberalizing’ as compared to the remedy of retaliation which is considered to be 
‘trade-restrictive’. However, due to the requirement of MFN application when using the 
remedy of compensation, which necessarily imposes a burden on the respondent party 
since it has to provide compensation to all the WTO Members, the remedy of 
compensation is rarely used. Instead, complainant parties more frequently resort to the 
remedy of retaliation which results in raising trade barriers, albeit on a bilateral basis.  
The remedy of suspension of concessions is essentially bilateral in nature, which 
has many implications. In short, this feature of WTO countermeasure, as the last resort 
for the Members to induce compliance, has resulted in a weak enforcement mechanism 
for the WTO dispute settlement system. Particularly when politically sensitive disputes 
are involved, and weaker Members have to face negotiations with stronger Members in 
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terms of economic and political power, the likely result is that WTO remedies will not be 
effective enough to induce compliance from the defying Members. According to 




Furthermore, an inherent problem of counterproductive countermeasures renders 
the WTO remedies impractical and ineffective not only for the weaker Members but also 
for all Members of the WTO. Especially for the developing countries, suspending 
concessions towards the respondent country’s exports may effectively block the much 
needed imports from the developed countries, resulting in ‘shooting oneself in the foot’ 
by using retaliatory countermeasures and actually harming the complainant’s economy. 
Therefore, while from a legal perspective, the remedy of countermeasures in the form of 
raising tariff barriers against the defying member may seem a reasonable enough remedy, 
in effect, the results are not desirable and thus not usable for the weaker members of the 
WTO. In addition, the use of countermeasures results in discrepancy between the losing 
export sectors (which are harmed from the initial infringing measure) and the benefiting 
import-competing sectors (which benefit from the blocked imports due to the retaliatory 
measure) for the complainant party. Therefore, retaliation does not necessarily help the 
export industry that has been denied market access by the respondent in the first place. 
Rather, it is the complainant’s competing industries that benefit from the temporarily 
raised tariff barriers against imports. A similar situation also exists for the respondent 
party, where the injured sectors from the retaliatory measure are not the same as the 
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benefiting sectors from the initial infringing measure. Rather, the benefiting industries are 
chosen by the complainant, typically with a view to having the largest negative impact on 
the respondent country’s government.
123
 
There also exists a problem related to the level of authorized countermeasures 
when using the remedy of retaliation. Article 22.7 of the DSU provides that when 
determining the level of suspension of concessions, it shall be ‘equivalent to the level of 
nullification or impairment’. Typically, the gross value of imports which have been 
wrongfully blocked due to the initial infringing measure has been used as the basis of 
calculation for ensuring ‘equivalence’ to the amount of harm done by the violating 
measure. However, from an economic perspective, it is doubtful whether such gross 
values of trade may accurately represent the actual economic welfare effects of  
government policy measures. In fact, Anderson (2002) posits that the effects of retaliation 
calculated on the basis of ‘trade loss’ equivalence will never translate into equivalent 
‘damage to economic welfare’, except by coincidence. In addition, the complainant will 




The ineffectiveness of the WTO enforcement mechanism due to its prospective 
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nature has been quite controversial among legal scholars.
125
 Compared to public 
international law, WTO remedies are perceived as perhaps offering less.
126
 This is 
because the ILC Draft Articles, that provide codification for situations regarding 
international disputes and remedies, explicitly require ‘full reparation’ for any damages 
incurred, which include retrospective compensation for past damages. On the other hand, 
WTO remedies do not include monetary compensation for damages in the past.
127
 Instead, 
the level of countermeasures (either in the form of compensation or suspension of 
concessions) is required to be equivalent to the damages done which are measured 
prospectively, or after the date of expiry of the reasonable period of time. Consequently, 
WTO Members might not have an incentive to comply promptly or comply at all, 
especially when a Member considers that the profit of retaining its inconsistent measure 
is higher than the cost of compensating for the damage done.  
According to Mavroidis, remedies are an ‘institutional guarantee’ that a contract 
will always be served.
128
 Therefore, remedies must be effective. However, as observed so 
far, the WTO countermeasures as the ultima ratio of its enforcement mechanism seems to 
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be failing both in terms of effectiveness and impartiality. This situation is not an 
exception in the case of prohibited subsidies, where the rules are most stringent, but the 
performance of the WTO enforcement mechanism seems to be the weakest. The 
following section will examine the current problems regarding the effectiveness of 
remedies for prohibited subsidies.  
 
3.2 CURRENT STATUS OF REMEDIES FOR PROHIBITED SUBSIDIES IN THE 
WTO  
 
As mentioned in the introductory section (section 1.1), WTO disputes involving 
prohibited subsidies are challenged with the problem of delayed compliance with the 
rulings and recommendations of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). With a view to 
understanding the current situation regarding prohibited subsidy disputes in the WTO, 
this section will examine several numerical illustrations that indicate the status of 
compliance in WTO subsidy disputes. In addition, the types and forms of remedies that 
are available for non-compliant prohibited subsidy disputes in the WTO will be examined 
with an overview of how these remedies have been applied in prohibited subsidy disputes.  
 
3.2.1 THE COMPLIANCE PROBLEM IN WTO PROHIBITED SUBSIDY DISPUTES  
 
 The figures showing the current status of disputes which have been brought to 
the WTO and the record of non-compliance in WTO disputes are shown in Tables 5 and 6 
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below. As of March 2013, out of a total of 313 disputes that were brought to the WTO for 
which panels have been established,
129
 18 disputes are categorized as non-compliance 
cases (Table 5).
130
 Non-compliance cases include cases in which the implementing action 
taken by the respondent party has been deemed inadequate and thus referred to 
compliance proceedings which are either ongoing, completed without any finding of non-
compliance, or completed with a finding of non-compliance, and to arbitration 
proceedings for authorization of retaliation which have been requested or granted. While 
this figure is not a significant number, a closer look at the dispute cases shows that the 
problem of non-compliance is concentrated in a few areas (Table 6). It should be noted 
that, while the last row in Table 6, representing the cases for which a mutually acceptable 
solution on implementation has been notified to the WTO, has not been counted in as 
dispute cases with problems of non-compliance, the category has been included in this list 
in order to show the frequency of disputes involving subsidies among dispute cases for 
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In consultation 143 
Including dispute cases still in 
consultation stage since 1995 
Panel established, but not yet composed 22 - 
Panel composed 11 - 
Panel report circulated 1 - 
Panel report under appeal 2 - 
Appellate Body report circulated 0 - 
Report(s) adopted, no further action 
required 
27 
No further action required due to 
no finding of violation 
Report(s) adopted, with recommendation 
to bring measure into conformity 
28 - 
Implementation notified by respondent 83 
Implementation notified by 
respondent after RPT 
determination through Article 
21.3(c) arbitration proceeding 
Mutually acceptable solution on 
implementation notified 
21 
After initial disagreement on RPT 
(Article 21.3(c) arbitration), 
parties reach mutual agreement on 
RPT 
Compliance proceedings ongoing 3 




Compliance proceedings completed 
without finding of non-compliance 
2 




Compliance proceedings completed with 
finding of non-compliance 
5 
Article 21.5 arbitration 
proceedings 
[Inadequate implementation case] 
Authorization to retaliate requested 3 
Article 22.6 arbitration 
proceedings 
[(preliminary) Authorization of 
retaliation case] 
Authorization to retaliate granted 5 
Article 22.6 arbitration 
proceedings 
[Authorization of retaliation case] 
Authority for panel lapsed 7 - 
Settled or terminated (withdrawn, 
mutually agreed solution) 
93 - 
Total 456 - 















US-Offset Act (DS217) 
US-Offset Act (DS234) 
Canada- Aircraft II (DS222) 
US-Upland Cotton (DS267) 












US-Copyright Act (DS160) 
US-Sunset Reviews (DS268) 











EC-Bed Linen (DS141) 










EC-Civil Aircraft (DS316) 
US-Stainless Steel (DS344) 



















Japan-Alcoholic Beverages (DS8) 
Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II 
(Canada) (DS10) 
Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II (US) 
(DS11) 
Australia-Salmon (DS18) 
EC-Hormones (US) (DS26) 
EC-Hormones (Canada) (DS48) 
US-Wool Shirts (DS33) 
Turkey-Textiles (DS34) 
Japan-Agricultural Products II 
(DS76) 
US-DRAMS (DS99) 
Canada-Dairy (US) (DS103) 
GATT (Art.III) 
GATT (Art. III) 
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 It must be noted that the 5 dispute cases listed in this category have different status of 
implementation. Disputes in US-Offset Act and US-Gambling remain unresolved; Brazil did not 
impose the authorized countermeasures in Canada-Aircraft II dispute; Brazil and US agreed to 
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Canada-Dairy (New Zealand) 
(DS113) 
Australia-Automotive Leather II 
(DS126) 
EC-Sardines (DS231) 
US-Softwood Lumber III (DS236) 
Japan-Apples (DS245) 
US-Softwood Lumber IV (DS257) 
US-Softwood Lumber V (DS264) 
US-Softwood Lumber VI (DS277) 













Source: Compiled by the author based on information provided by the WTO website, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_current_status_e.htm 
 
 Table 7 below shows the amount of countermeasures that have been awarded by 
the WTO adjudicating bodies in Article 22.6 arbitrations to date. Two points are notable 
in this table: First, a majority of the Article 22.6 arbitrations involve dispute cases on 
subsidies, reflecting the importance of the subsidy measure as a national policy to WTO 
member countries, and difficulties in achieving compliance on subsidy policies. Despite 
high litigation costs involved in going through the multilateral track for dispute resolution 
with respect to subsidies, WTO members seem keen to obtain a ‘verdict’ on the other 
party’s subsidy measure that they perceive to be a violation of WTO law. Furthermore, 
the strategic characteristic of national subsidy policies seem to pose structural difficulties 
in removing the violating measure to a satisfactory level for the complaining party, 
resulting in delayed dispute settlement procedures involving arbitrations on compliance 
and authorization of retaliation. Secondly, some of the highest amounts of retaliation 
granted as a result of the Article 22.6 arbitrations are from subsidy disputes, such as in the 
US-FSC case where the amount requested by EC was granted in full by arbitrators. This 
is due to the difference in text in the SCM Agreement that allows “appropriate 
66 
 
countermeasures” in lieu of a retaliation level that is “equivalent to the level of 
nullification or impairment” as enshrined in DSU. Most of the arbitrators in relevant 
Article 22.6 disputes have interpreted the term “appropriate” to be a level allowing more 
than the level that addresses the trade-distorting effect on the injured party.  
 



























US$147.4 million   
(SCM 4.11) 
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 US-FSC (DS108) dispute has been settled with notification of a mutually acceptable solution 
on implementation (17 May 2006) after being referred to second recourse to Article 21.5 
compliance proceedings (adopted 14 March 2006) following authorization for imposing 
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 As observed thus far, the current status of compliance with respect to prohibited 
subsidy disputes may not be as satisfactory as the drafters of the rules on subsidies might 
have anticipated at the onset of their negotiations on subsidy matters. The next section 
will examine the remedies that are in place and how they are applied for addressing 
continued non-compliance with WTO rulings and recommendations in prohibited subsidy 
disputes.  
 
3.2.2 THE REMEDY SYSTEM IN ACTION FOR PROHIBITED SUBSIDIES IN THE WTO  
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 Brazil-Aircraft (DS46) dispute has been categorized as a case with “compliance proceedings 
without finding of non-compliance” since the case was referred again to Article 21.5 compliance 
proceedings after authorization for retaliation was granted as a result of Article 22.6 arbitration. 
Brazil took revised measures to conform to the DSB ruling, but was not accepted by Canada, 
which requested for second recourse to an Article 21.5 compliance panel.   
135
 EC-Bananas (DS27) dispute was settled with a mutually agreed solution on November 8, 2012 
after recourse to Article 22.6 arbitration and second recourse to Article 21.5 Appellate Body 
proceedings. WTO, Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution, WT/DS27/98, 12 November 2012.  
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 EC-Hormones (DS26, 48) dispute was settled with implementation of adopted reports. 
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 The WTO dispute settlement system provides for two types of ‘tracks’ for 
resolving disputes with respect to illegal subsidy measures. The ‘multilateral track’ allows 
WTO Members to bring a subsidy-related case directly to the WTO with the goal of 
obtaining a multilateral adjudication on whether the measure concerned is consistent with 
WTO rules and consequent recommendation for bringing the infringing measure into 
conformity.
137
 The ‘bilateral track’, on the other hand, allows WTO Members to 
unilaterally impose countervailing duties against the subsidizing country after going 
through due processes of investigation, determination, and imposition in accordance with 




3.2.2.1 Type of Remedies for Prohibited Subsidies 
 
 As previously mentioned, the dispute settlement procedure for disputes 
involving prohibited subsidies is different from the general provisions for dispute 
resolution that apply to the rest of the WTO covered agreements, mainly in terms of the 
expedited procedures that are in place for addressing illegal subsidies.
139
 However, prior 
to initiating formal litigation procedures, all potential disputing parties are first 
recommended to engage in consultations so as to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement 
which is acceptable to both parties, and which is consistent with the WTO agreements. 
However, if a mutually agreed solution cannot be reached at the pre-litigation stage, the 
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139
 Refer to supra note 4 for difference in time-lines in the dispute settlement procedures 
contained in the SCM Agreement and the DSU.  
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parties may initiate panel proceeding (and Appellate Body proceeding, if the decision has 
been appealed), which provide rulings that recommend the infringing party to comply 




There are two types of remedies that are available in the WTO dispute settlement 
system for prohibited subsidies against breach of the SCM Agreement. There is one final 
and primary remedy of ‘withdrawal’ (removal of the adverse effects of the subsidy or 
amendment by law so that the measure no longer provides benefits to the recipient in the 
subsidizing country), under which any measure found to be a prohibited subsidy must be 
‘withdrawn without delay’.
141
 In all cases, a specific time-period for implementation 
(“reasonable period of time”) is specified by the panel within which the measure must be 
withdrawn. In prohibited subsidy disputes, the ‘reasonable period of time’ is, in most 
cases, considered to be 90 days. However, when such act of compliance is not achieved 
within the given implementation period, the WTO provides for a secondary, temporary 
remedy for prohibited subsidies: ‘suspension of concessions’ or retaliation.  
Unlike other agreements covered by the DSU, the remedy of compensation is 
not available as a secondary remedy for prohibited subsidies. There is no legal basis for 
the use of compensation as a remedy for prohibited subsidy cases.
142
 In general, 
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 DSU, Article 19.1. 
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 SCM Agreement, Article 4.7.  
142
 The provisions concerning remedies for prohibited subsidies in the SCM Agreement do not 
mention any remedy of “compensation”. Article 4.7 stipulates that if a measure is found to be a 
prohibited subsidy, the violating party shall “withdraw the subsidy without delay”, while Article 
4.10 provides that in case the DSB recommendation is not followed within the period of 
implementation, the complaining party shall be granted authorization to take “appropriate 
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compensation as a form of remedy under the WTO consists of additional trade 
concessions on the part of the losing party, usually in related economic areas to the 
dispute. Such trade compensation is voluntary in nature, meaning that the losing 
respondent party needs to agree to compensation by self-imposing the terms of the 
arrangement. Therefore, the need for cooperation from the subsidizing country may lead 
to problems in enforcement. Furthermore, unlike the retaliation remedy which can be 
applied on a bilateral basis, the compensation remedy is subject to the requirement of 
MFN application. As a result, the remedy of trade compensation necessarily imposes a 
burden on the losing party (respondent) having to provide compensation to all the WTO 
Members, as a consequence of which, this remedy is rarely used. Also, as a secondary 
remedy to the preferred final remedy of withdrawal, the compensation remedy should be 
temporarily used, only until compliance is achieved, and applied prospectively, with 
compensation allowed only up to the level of damages that will be suffered in the future.  
The authorization to retaliate against the offending party, as a ‘last resort’ 
remedy in WTO countermeasures, is mainly in the form of suspension of concessions, or 
of raising tariff barriers to the pre-negotiation level, on strategically selected products of 
export that are of interest to the infringing party so as to induce compliance by the 
infringing party. The remedy of retaliation consists of three types, under which the 
winning party may suspend concessions on the same economic sector in which the 
violation has occurred, or on different sectors in the same agreement, or on sectors in a 
                                                                                                                   





 The retaliation remedy should also be applied only temporarily 
until the infringing measure has been withdrawn. On the other hand, due to its inherent 
nature, the retaliation remedy is generally understood to be trade-restrictive (‘shooting 
oneself in its own foot’), especially for smaller developing countries for which lifting 
their import barriers against products from developed countries may not be a valid option.  
The level of retaliation which is authorized to the requesting party is based on a 
standard that is termed differently for prohibited subsidy cases. Unlike the standard of 
“equivalence” which is prescribed for the general countermeasures in the DSU,
144
 
retaliation for prohibited subsidies is granted on the basis of “appropriate 
countermeasures”, meaning that they are “not meant to allow countermeasures that are 
disproportionate in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are 
prohibited”.
145
 The interpretation and application of these terms are discussed in the next 
section.  
 
3.2.2.2 Application of Remedies in Prohibited Subsidy Disputes   
 
 As explained in section 3.2.1, the remedy of retaliation has been most frequently 
used in prohibited subsidy disputes. The aircraft disputes between Brazil and Canada 
(Brazil-Aircraft and Canada-Aircraft II), US-FSC, and US-Upland Cotton disputes are all 
cases involving prohibited subsidy measures that have gone through the entire dispute 
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settlement process to reach the final stage of authorizing retaliatory measures against 
continuing acts of non-compliance.  
 
A. Application of the primary remedy of “withdrawal”  
 
In two of the four dispute cases (Brazil-Aircraft
146
 and Canada-Aircraft II
147
), 
the DSB recommended the respondent countries to withdraw the export subsidies found 
to be inconsistent with relevant provisions in the SCM Agreement, within the 
implementation period of 90 days. The time-period for implementation is normally 
specified by the panel in its recommendation, and in most cases that are brought to the 
WTO, the implementation period provided to prohibited subsidy cases has been 90 days. 
Panels seem to have considered the nature of the measures and issues regarding 
implementation to be relevant in determining the period for withdrawal.
148
 In contrast, 
under the general provisions of the DSU, the reasonable period of time (RPT) for 
implementing the DSB recommendations should not exceed 15 months,
149
 but in most 
cases the RPT provided is less than such the maximum allowed period, which can be 
determined by proposal from the complainant party, mutual agreement by the parties, or 
determination from arbitrators.
150
 On the other hand, the implementation period for 
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withdrawal in US-FSC and US-Upland Cotton were 12 months and 6 months, 
respectively.
151
 In both cases, ample consideration seems to have been given for the 
legislative process for amending related legislations on the part of the defending parties.  
While all four cases aforementioned (and all other WTO disputes) have applied 
the meaning of “withdrawal” to be forward-looking, there has been one distinct case in 
the WTO in which the term was interpreted differently. Arbitrators in Australia-Leather 
(Article 21.5) dispute,
152
 which involved non-recurring prohibited subsidies that had been 
granted in the past, found that the term “withdraw the subsidy” provided for in Article 4.7 
of the SCM Agreement is “not limited to prospective action only but may encompass 
repayment of the prohibited subsidy”.
153
 As a result, the Arbitrators viewed that 
“withdrawal” should mean retrospective, full reimbursement of the subsidy payment 
received for cases involving non-recurrent subsidies.
154
 This was based on their 
understanding that a mere termination of the subsidy program would have no impact as a 
remedy and no deterrent effect against other attempts to use one-time subsidy payments. 
However, this WTO ruling was subject to criticism from both parties to the dispute and 
prompted several proposals with regard to the interpretation of “withdrawal of the 
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 and ended in a mutual agreement on partial repayment of the subsidy and 




B. Application of the retaliation remedy  
 
So far under the WTO, the remedy of retaliation was authorized in four dispute 
cases involving prohibited subsidies. Brazil-Aircraft (Article 22.6)
157
 was the first 
arbitration proceeding pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM 
Agreement in which the remedy of retaliation for prohibited subsidies was requested and 
granted. In this case, the DSB had recommended Brazil to withdraw the prohibited export 
subsidies that had been found to exist, and in response, Brazil had to modify the subsidy 
program (PROEX) at issue. However, Canada challenged the revised program under DSU 
Article 21.5, where the measure was found to be inconsistent with the WTO obligations. 
Canada consequently requested authorization to take “appropriate countermeasures” 
against Brazil in the amount of C$700 million per year. The Arbitrators in this case 
looked into the meaning of the term “appropriate” to determine whether the proposed 
countermeasures were “appropriate”, taking note of the issues of what would constitute 
the subsidy to be withdrawn, and whether the level of countermeasures should correspond 
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to the amount of the subsidy or to the level of nullification or impairment suffered by 
Canada. In conclusion, the Arbitrators reasoned that the subsidy to be withdrawn would 
be the “full amount” of the subsidy payments on exports of the regional aircraft, and that 
when dealing with a prohibited export subsidy, an amount of countermeasures that 
corresponds to the total amount of the subsidy is “appropriate”.
158
 Based on this analysis, 
the Arbitrators calculated the total amount of the subsidy as the appropriate amount of 
countermeasures on the basis of: (1) average sale price of the aircraft models for which 
sales were subsidized; (2) projected annual production of each aircraft model during a set 
period; (3) calculated present value of the subsidy per aircraft model over the same period. 
Based on this methodology, the Arbitrators concluded that the amount of the subsidy is 
C$344.2 million per year.
159
  
In US-FSC, the DSB recommended that the US shall withdraw the prohibited 
export subsidies provided through the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) measure within 
the granted period of implementation. In response to the recommendation, the US 
modified its measure, but was challenged by the EC under DSU Article 21.5. At the same 
time, the EC requested authorization to take “appropriate countermeasures” pursuant to 
Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement and Article 22.2 of the DSU, and suspend 
concessions against the US in the amount of US$4,043 million per year, in the form of an 
additional duty of 100 percent ad valorem above the bound duty rate on various US 
products. In examination of whether the proposed countermeasures are “appropriate”, the 
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Arbitrator considered the fact that the subsidy measure concerned “creates systemic 
uncertainty and instability of expectations as to trading conditions, as opposed to security 
and stability of such conditions based on the understanding… that export subsidies are 
prohibited”.
160
 Notably, the Arbitrator in this case also considered that the US’ breach of 
obligation is “an erga omnes obligation owed in its entirety to each and every Member” 
and cannot be considered to be “allocatable” across the Membership. In conclusion, the 
Arbitrator viewed that the countermeasures proposed are “not disproportionate to the 
initial wrongful act to which they are intended to respond”,
161
 and found that the 




Canada-Aircraft II is closely tied to the earlier Brazil-Aircraft and the original 
Canada-Aircraft disputes. In both cases, panel found that illegal export subsidies had 
been provided, and the programs at issue were revised by Brazil and Canada respectively. 
While Brazil challenged the consistency of Canada’s revised subsidy program to 
implement the ruling, Article 21.5 compliance proceedings in the original Canada-
Aircraft dispute found that Brazil had failed to prove that the revised program is 
inconsistent with the SCM Agreement.
163
 As a result, Brazil challenged the revised 
programs again in a renewed dispute, under which some of the subsidy programs found to 
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be prohibited export subsidies were ordered to be withdrawn within 90 days.
164
 Claiming 
that Canada failed to follow the recommendations of the DSB within the required time-
period, Brazil requested for authorization to take “appropriate countermeasures” in the 
amount of US$3.36 billion, which corresponded to the value of the aircraft contracts not 
delivered as of the date that the subsidies at issue should have been withdrawn.
165
 
Examining Brazil’s “lost sales/competitive harm” methodology, the Arbitrator found that 
it does not justify the level of countermeasures proposed, and therefore the level is not 
“appropriate” under SCM Agreement Article 4.10.
166
 Instead, the Arbitrator calculated its 
own amount of appropriate countermeasures starting from using a methodology based on 
the amount of subsidy, which resulted in a net present value of the total amount of the 
subsidy of US$206,497,305.
167
 However, in addition, the Arbitrator considered it 
appropriate to adjust the result of the calculations “to take into account the fact that 
Canada, until now,…does not intend to withdraw the subsidy at issue and the need to 
reach a level of countermeasures which can reasonably contribute to induce compliance”. 
As a result, the Arbitrator adjusted the level of countermeasures by an amount 




Most recently, in US-Upland Cotton (Article 22.6), Brazil requested 
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authorization to take countermeasures with regard to US subsidy programs found to be 
prohibited export subsidies in the annual amount of US$3 billion.
169
 First, Brazil sought 
one-time countermeasures in relation to payments made by the US (Step 2 payments) 
during the period when it should have withdrawn the subsidies at issue (period after 
expiry of its implementation period until the period when the measure was repealed) in 
the amount of US$350 million. However, the Arbitrator found that the absence of any 
finding of non-compliance by an Article 21.5 panel regarding the repealed measure 
provided no legal basis for Brazil to seek countermeasures.
170
 In turn, Brazil’s proposed 
countermeasure in relation to the US subsidy program used for export transactions (GSM 
102 export credit program) was taken into consideration. In examining the 
“appropriateness” of the proposed countermeasures by Brazil, the Arbitrator determined 
that Brazil’s methodology, which consisted of “interest rate subsidies” and “additional 
sales resulting from the subsidy payments”, was “more than the amount of the subsidy, 
because it considers ‘benefits’ which extend outside the meaning of Article 1.1 of the 
SCM Agreement”.
171
 Accordingly, in determining the proper basis of calculation of 
“appropriate countermeasures”, the Arbitrator considered Brazil’s methodology in 
relation to the interest rate subsidy, full additionality and marginal additionality, and 
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found that the appropriate level of countermeasures is US$147.4 million.
172
 However, 
rather than resorting to the calculation methods used by the previous Arbitrators that were 
based on the total amount of the subsidy, the Arbitrator in this case apportioned the 
subsidy amount to the “trade-distorting impact to Brazilian producers and exporters”. 
This was based on the understanding that the requirement that countermeasures be 
“appropriate” and not “disproportionate” suggests that “there should be a degree of 
relationship between the level of countermeasures and the trade-distorting impact of the 
measure” on the complaining member.
173
 Table 8 below summarizes the amounts of the 
retaliation remedy that has been requested and awarded and the calculation standards 
used in each case.  
 





Granted Award Calculation Method 
Brazil-Aircraft 
(DS46) 





US$4,043 million Amount-of-subsidy approach 
Canada-Aircraft II 
(DS222) 
US$3.36 billion US$247,797,000 
Amount-of-subsidy approach 
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C. The compensation remedy  
 
 In contrast to the retaliation remedy, there has been no request or application of 
the trade compensation as a form of remedy in subsidy disputes that have been brought to 
the WTO. As noted previously, the voluntary nature of trade compensations by which the 
losing party agrees to lower its tariff barriers further against competing imports, and the 
obligation of MFN application attached to the compensation remedy, do not make the 
remedy necessarily attractive for the disputing parties to agree upon.  
 Although it does not involve prohibited subsidies, there has been one single 
WTO dispute case under which compensation in the form of monetary payment has been 
awarded by the WTO arbitrators to the complaining party. In US – Copyright Act (Article 
25)
174
, the arbitrators awarded the US to pay EC copyright holders an amount of 
€1,219,900 per year. The compensation amount was determined on the basis of the 
amount of royalty payments that would have been distributed by related organizations in 
the US to EC right holders had the offending US legislation not taken effect.  
 
3.3 THE DISTINCTIVE TREATMENT OF PROHIBITED SUBSIDIES IN THE WTO   
 
In this section, the treatment of prohibited subsidies that are quite distinctive in 
terms of its stringency and expedited rules for WTO Members are examined in more 
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detail. In order to understand the sui generis treatment of prohibited subsidies in the WTO, 
the historical evolution of the rules will be first reviewed, followed by an examination of 
how these rules have been interpreted and applied in practice by the WTO. During the 
process of this exercise, issues in WTO jurisprudence regarding prohibited subsidies will 
be identified for more detailed discussion in the subsequent chapters. 
  
3.3.1 EVOLUTION OF RULES ON PROHIBITIVE SUBSIDIES  
 
In order to place the current WTO remedial regime on prohibited subsidies in 
context, it is useful to examine the historical background of the remedial regimes that are 
associated with the rules on subsidies: beginning from the preparatory work of the 
Havana Charter to establish the International Trade Organization (ITO); the original 
GATT Agreement in 1947; the 1955 amendments to the GATT subsidy rules; the 1979 
Subsidies Code of the Tokyo Round; to the current SCM Agreement as a result of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations.  
 
3.3.1.1 Rules on Subsidies in the Draft ITO Charter  
 
 From its inception, GATT perceived subsidies as increasingly significant barriers 
to the free flow of trade, but there were critical difficulties in achieving a consensus on 
the problem of the international regulation of subsidies. Therefore, until the 1955 Review 
Session of the GATT, where major amendments were made to fill in the gap of a failed 
82 
 
ITO, subsidy rules in GATT consisted of only one paragraph which contained simply a 
requirement that any contracting party maintaining a subsidy must notify GATT.
175
  
 The draft ITO Charter,
176
 which contains explicit clauses corresponding to 
particular obligations contained in the GATT, consists of a more elaborate pattern of 
subsidy regulation that was not carried over into the GATT draft.
177
 Rules on subsidies in 
the ITO Charter were contained in Section C, Articles 25 to 28, under which general 
obligations of notification with regard to the maintenance of any subsidy and 
consultations where any party considers that subsidization has caused or threatened to 
cause serious prejudice to its interests were provided for. Unlike GATT 1947, the ITO 
draft also specified a prohibition on export subsidies, and an additional distinction 
between primary and non-primary products, providing for a special (more lenient) 
treatment for primary products with regard to subsidization. With respect to export 
subsidies, however, primary products were subject to limitations as well, as subsidies that 
would have the effect of maintaining or acquiring trade volumes that are “more than an 
equitable share of world trade” are not allowed.
178
 The provisions also provide that if an 
agreement cannot be reached within a “reasonable period of time”, the ITO would be 
                                           
175
 Article XVI:1 of the present GATT.  
176
 For the history on preparations for the ITO and the parallel preparatory work on GATT, see J. 
Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, MIT 
Press (1997), 36-38.  
177
 It should be noted that the preparatory work of GATT and ITO reflects the drafters’ 
consideration of GATT as more of an international “contract” with specific limited choices, while 
considering ITO and the explicit clauses contained therein, as providing a more expansive 
framework for interpretation for the contracting parties. J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of 
GATT: A Legal Analysis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1969), 49. 
178
 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (hereinafter Draft ITO Charter), 
Article 28 (1).  
83 
 
given the authority to determine what constitutes an “equitable share of world trade”, 
with the relevant Member required to conform to the determination.
179
  
 While there are no specific rules for remedies with respect to export subsidies, 
the general rules on dispute settlement in the ITO draft are provided in Chapter VIII 
(Settlement of Differences), in Articles 92 through 97. It contains provisions on 
consultation and arbitration, which can be referred to where any member considers that 
“any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly, implicitly or explicitly… is being 
nullified or impaired” with a view to a “satisfactory adjustment” of the matter.
180
 
However, the provision limits the authority of the arbitration, as decisions by an arbitrator 
would not be binding on any party to the dispute.
181
 If a satisfactory settlement is not 
reached, the matter may be referred to the Executive Board which investigates the matter 
and renders a decision on whether nullification or impairment exists.
182
 More specifically, 
if the Executive Board considers that the recommended actions are “not likely to be 
effective in time to prevent serious injury”, it may release the parties concerned from 
obligations or the grant of concessions “to the extent and upon such conditions as it 
considers appropriate and compensatory, having regard to the benefit which has been 
nullified or impaired” (emphasis added).
183
 It is notable that the explicit term of 
“compensatory” was not carried into GATT 1947. Jackson explains that since the ITO 
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Charter was made applicable to a broader set of obligations than those of the GATT, there 





3.3.1.2 Subsidy Rules in GATT 1947 and the 1955 Amendments  
 
 Due to the prospects of establishing the ITO as a separate organization to deal 
with trade regulations, the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
Agreement in 1947 provided very little discipline on the matter of subsidies. The first 
multilateral discipline on subsidies was contained in Article XVI:1 of GATT, which was 
drawn from Article 25 of the draft ITO Charter, and addressed subsidies that operate 
“directly or indirectly to increase exports”, which were subject only to general reporting 
and consultation requirements with regard to subsidization if determined that  serious 
prejudice is caused or threatened by the subsidization.  
 As mentioned previously, the more elaborate forms of subsidy regulation in the 
draft ITO, in terms of the prohibition of export subsidies and different treatment of 
subsidies for primary and non-primary products, have not been carried over to the 
original text of the GATT. Jackson (1969) observes that the argument for more stringent 
regulation of subsidies was ‘blunted’ by the prospect that the temporary GATT general 
provisions were to be superseded by the ITO Charter provisions, in addition to the US 
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position not to make any undertakings with regard to the matter of export subsidies.
185
  
 During the GATT Review Session in 1955, Article XVI was amended 
extensively and some of the original form of the subsidy regulations in the ITO draft was 
reintroduced into the GATT text.
186
 Section B, entitled “Additional Provisions on Export 
Subsidies” was added to Article XVI, with new focus on export subsidies with increased 
disparity of treatment in subsidy rules with respect to primary and non-primary products. 
In the case of primary products, GATT parties were to “seek to avoid” using export 
subsidies that resulted in obtaining a “more than equitable share of world export trade”.
187
 
On the other hand, subsidies for exports of non-primary products that “resulted in the sale 
at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the 
domestic market” were to be prohibited from January 1, 1958 or shortly thereafter.
188
 
Since most GATT parties did not comply promptly with this prohibition, this led to the 
establishment of a “Working Party on Provisions of Article XVI:4” in 1960, which led to 
the development a non-exhaustive list of measures considered to be prohibited export 
subsidies pursuant to Article VI:4.
189
  
 The rules on dispute settlement related to subsidies are contained in several 
articles in GATT. As the first and most significant countermeasure against the use of 
subsidies under GATT rules, Article VI on antidumping and countervailing duties 
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provides a self-help remedy to counter subsidies, by allowing the use of countervailing 
duties that may be levied “for the purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed, 
directly or indirectly, upon the manufacture, production, or export of any merchandise”.
190
 
Article XIX, related to the increase of imports that cause or threaten serious injury, 
provides for another possible remedy for foreign subsidies, by allowing the importing 
country to “suspend” GATT obligations or “withdraw or modify” GATT concessions 
related to imports.
191
 A third remedy to counter foreign subsidies can be found in Article 
XXIII, which provides for rights for consultation, and in extreme cases, suspension of 
GATT concessions or obligations in the event of “nullification or impairment” of a 
“benefit accruing…directly or indirectly” under GATT.
192
  
As can be compared from the original text of GATT 1947, there has been quite a 
development in the provisions regarding the rules and remedies on subsidies leading up to 
the 1960 amendments of the original GATT text. Rules on subsidies have been more 
elaborated with increased distinction between primary and non-primary products 
regarding subsidies for exports, albeit with more leniency for subsidies for primary export 
products, but more available remedy provisions to counteract acts of subsidization by 
foreign governments. 
 
3.3.1.3 Subsidy Rules in the 1979 Subsidies Code  
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 The next stage in the evolution of subsidy rule-making resulted from the Tokyo 
Round, in  the “Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and 
XXIII of GATT”, known as the “Subsidies Code”. One of the most principal 
achievements in the 1979 Subsidies Code was the ‘two-track’ approach for disciplining 
subsidies. The first track instituted disciplines for imposing countervailing duties with 
detailed requirements for injury finding (Part I of the Subsidies Code). More detailed 
rules pertaining to countervailing measures were established, notably in respect of 
procedures associated with countervailing duty investigations and standards for 
determining whether subsidies were a cause or threat of material injury. The second track 
contained disciplines on the use of subsidies, but with different treatment of export 
subsidies between primary and non-primary products (Part II of the Subsidies Code). The 
prohibition on the use of export subsidies on non-primary products are strengthened, with 
addition of an “Illustrative List” of export subsidies in the Annex that explicitly provided 
a non-exhaustive definition of what falls under the category of export subsidies. With 
regard to domestic subsidies, Article 2 provided first statements on the use of domestic 
subsidies, but in a quite ambiguous manner, reflecting the division of views among GATT 
contracting parties.  
 As observed, the subject of dispute settlement had not received any sustained 
attention prior to the Tokyo Round negotiations, when a variety of dispute settlement 
reforms were discussed, mainly in the various code groups as the issue was related to the 
enforcement of particular agreements, and the Framework Group that dealt with GATT 





 However, despite the renewed attention on the rules on dispute settlement 
in the 1979 Subsidies Code, the outcome may be judged as providing little effective 
discipline as regards the enforcement of subsidy rules in GATT. The remedies provided 
for prohibited export subsidies were mainly consultations or conciliation for reaching a 
mutually acceptable solution, or “appropriate” countermeasures, with no exact meaning 
of the term, when recommendations to resolve the issue had not been followed.
194
 On the 
other hand, a significant development in subsidy remedy rules was the establishment of 
dispute settlement procedures provided in Part VI of the Subsidies Code, consisting of 
Article 17 and 18. There is considerable resemblance with the current rules providing for 
countermeasures against prohibited subsidies, especially in Article 18(9) which stipulates 
that “if the Committee’s recommendations are not followed within a reasonable period, 
the Committee may authorize appropriate countermeasures (including withdrawal of 
GATT concessions or obligations) taking into account the nature and degree of the 
adverse effect found to exist”. However, a fundamental problem with regard to the 
enforcement of the new codes negotiated in the Tokyo Round was the principle of 
consensus decision-making, particularly the possibility of panel findings being blocked 
by the losing party. Furthermore, since subsidies were an area of considerable controversy, 
few countries ultimately signed onto the 1979 Subsidies Code, which only applied to the 
signatories among the GATT contracting parties, consequently limiting the scope of 
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application of the renewed enforcement measures that had been put in place.  
   
3.3.1.4 Subsidy Rules in the SCM Agreement  
 
 The Uruguay Round negotiations were launched with a mandate to improve 
GATT disciplines regarding all subsidies and countervailing measures affecting 
international trade. According to the 1985 Report by the GATT Secretariat,
195
 the 1979 
Subsidies Code had proven inadequate to resolve the problem of subsidies and 
countervailing measures. Thus, the resulting Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM Agreement) contained substantive modifications to subsidy disciplines. 
First, while GATT 1947 and the Subsidies Code contained no definition of the term 
“subsidy”, Part I of the SCM Agreement defines “subsidy” in more detail through 
requirement of “financial contribution by a government” and “benefit” conferred. 
Furthermore, the concept of “specificity” has been introduced in the SCM Agreement, 
under which both de jure and de facto specificity need be taken into account to determine 
which measures are subject to the multilateral subsidy disciplines.
196
  
A major change in the SCM Agreement is the classification of subsidies into 
three categories: “red light” (prohibited subsidies), “yellow light” (actionable subsidies), 
and “green light” (non-actionable) subsidies. There are two types of “red light” subsidies 
which are completely prohibited: export subsidies, which are contingent, in law or in fact, 
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on export performance, including all subsidies listed in the Illustrative List (attached as 
Annex I); and import substitution subsidies, which are contingent on the use of domestic 
over imported goods.
197
 Prohibited subsidies are irrebuttably presumed to distort trade 
and deemed to be specific. The rest of the subsidies that are determined to cause “adverse 
effects to the interests of other Members” are considered to be actionable subsidies,
198
 
and, along with prohibited subsidies, can be challenged either through the multilateral 
dispute settlement procedures or through the imposition of countervailing duties. The 
provisions on “green light” subsidies lapsed as of January 1, 2000, leaving only two 
categories of prohibited and actionable subsidies being covered by the SCM Agreement.   
 Articles 4 of the SCM Agreement specifies procedural rules for multilateral 
remedies regarding prohibited subsidies, providing for an expedited dispute resolution 
procedure in cases involving prohibited subsidies. Disputes brought to the WTO pursuant 
to Article 4 of the SCM Agreement are subject to much shorter time limits than normal 
disputes, including for the phases of panel establishment, and adoption of panel and 
Appellate Body reports.
199
 Furthermore, in the case of prohibited subsidies, withdrawal 
of the subsidy should be done “without delay”, and the arbitrators should specify a time-
period within which the measure must be withdrawn.
200
 In case the recommendation by 
the DSB is not implemented within the specified time-period, “appropriate 
                                           
197
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198
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countermeasures” may be authorized to the complaining Member.
201
 Prohibited subsidies 
may also be challenged through the imposition of countervailing duties under the SCM 
Agreement (two-track approach). Under this unilateral remedy against prohibited 
subsidies, the importing Member must conduct an investigation which demonstrates that 
the subsidized imports are causing injury to its domestic industry.
202
 The remedy 
procedures for actionable subsidies are provided in Article 7, which also provide for 
shorter time limits for dispute settlement proceedings than the general DSU procedures.
203
 
As a result, where there is determination that the subsidy has resulted in adverse effects to 
the interests of another Member, the subsidizing member shall “remove the adverse 
effects or shall withdraw the subsidy”.
204
 With regard to the level of the countermeasures 
that may be imposed, Articles 7.9 and 7.10 provide that countermeasures shall be 
“commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects determined to exist”. 
 Another important feature of the SCM Agreement is that by virtue of the ‘single 
undertaking’, the disciplines in the new Agreement apply to the entire WTO membership. 
This is a significant achievement for the dispute settlement rules, since more stringent 
subsidy disciplines can be enforced on all WTO Members and without the possibility of 
being blocked, due to the ‘positive’ consensus decision-making principle. While this 
implies an automatic, and thus binding nature of the DSB rulings, it also implies 
                                           
201
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considerable additional obligations for the developing countries. As a means to modulate 




 In sum, an observation of the evolution of the rules on prohibited subsidies and 
remedies show that the initial drafters of international trade regulations had intentions to 
strongly discipline subsidy measures with quite elaborate rules. However, due to the 
failure of ITO, the GATT discipline on subsidies seemed to have begun with quite 
ineffective rules for enforcement, further compounded by the ‘birth defect’ problem of 
GATT. However, as a result of negotiations and reforms, which culminated in the current 
WTO rules on prohibited subsidies, we have now in place a set of the most stringent rules 
for dealing with enforcement of prohibited subsidy related obligations. In the following 
subsection, we will examine how the current WTO rules on prohibited subsidies have 
been interpreted by the WTO Arbitrators to enforce non-compliant acts against prohibited 
subsidy rules.  
   
3.3.2 INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY RULES ON PROHIBITED 
SUBSIDIES  
 
 As the rules disciplining prohibited subsidies and remedies to enforce the rules 
have evolved so far, the application and interpretation of those rules under the GATT and 
WTO have also evolved somewhat. Disputes brought to the WTO dispute settlement 
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system involving remedies for prohibited subsidies have been already introduced in 
section 3.2.2.2, albeit with focus on the amount of authorized retaliation and the approach 
used by Arbitrators in prohibited subsidy disputes. This section looks into how the rules 
on prohibited subsidies have been interpreted and applied in practice by the WTO 
adjudicating bodies, in order to identify some major issues that remain unresolved.  
 WTO disputes involving remedies for prohibited subsidy involve cases where 
the measures taken to comply by the respondent party in accordance with the rulings and 
recommendations of the WTO adjudicating bodies have been challenged by the 
complainant party pursuant to DSU Article 21.5, and those for which authorization for 
countermeasures have been requested pursuant to SCM Article 4.10 and DSU Article 22.6 
in order to enforce the rulings of the DSB. These cases are listed in chronological order in 
Table 9 below.  
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** Length of Canada-Aircraft II taking into account the original Canada-Aircraft (DS70) dispute. 
 
 As shown in Table 9, there are four prohibited subsidy disputes that have 
resulted in the authorization of countermeasures against continued non-compliant actions 
by the respondent party (Brazil-Aircraft, US-FSC, Canada-Aircraft II, US-Upland 
Cotton), and two dispute cases where dispute settlement procedures have been prolonged 
due to continued non-compliance of the implementing measure taken by the respondent 
party (Brazil-Aircraft, US-FSC). More notably, an examination of the total length of the 
disputes on the prohibited subsidy cases (shown in the last column) illuminates that quite 
a long period of time is spent before a complaining Member can finally be granted the 
authorization to impose retaliatory countermeasures against non-compliant Members. 
Included in the table is Australia-Leather dispute, for which the Article 21.5 compliance 
ruling has raised an important issue with regard to the effective remedial measure for 
prohibited subsidies, and the original Canada-Aircraft dispute, as it is closely related to 
the Canada-Aircraft II dispute.  
 
3.3.2.1 Interpretation and Application of “appropriate countermeasures”  
 
In the first three Article 22.6 arbitration cases involving prohibited subsidies - 
95 
 
Brazil-Aircraft, US-FSC, and Canada-Aircraft II – the basis for calculating the level of 
retaliation, based on the interpretation of the term “appropriate countermeasures”, has 
been quite different from the most recent arbitration proceeding involving prohibited 
subsidies in US-Upland Cotton. In the former disputes, the remedies were set at a level 
deemed sufficient to compel compliance, with the basis of calculation of the level of 
countermeasures set at the ‘amount of the subsidy’. The arbitrators in these cases 
determined that the ‘amount of subsidy’, as opposed to the amount calculated on the basis 
of the ‘trade effect’ caused by the subsidy, is the proper basis upon which “appropriate 
countermeasures” should be calculated.
206
  
More specifically, the Arbitrators in Brazil-Aircraft (Article 22.6) held the view 
that it was appropriate to authorize Canada to take countermeasures up to the level of the 
subsidy paid by Brazil to its aircraft producers and not only up to the amount of injury 
suffered by Canadian producers operating in the same competing market. In interpreting 
the meaning of the word “appropriate”, the Arbitrators first looked into what constitutes 
the subsidy to be withdrawn, concluding that the subsidy payments (PROEX) “as a whole” 
are prohibited and must be withdrawn, not just a portion of the payments.
207
 Regarding 
the second question of whether the level of countermeasures should correspond to the 
‘amount of the subsidy’ or to the ‘level of nullification or impairment’, the Arbitrators 
concluded that a countermeasure is “appropriate” if it “effectively induces compliance”, 
                                           
206
 In a more detailed analysis, Shadikhodjaev (2009) provides that a ‘violation value’ approach 
based on benefits was used in Brazil-Aircraft (Article 22.6) and Canada-Aircraft II (Article 22.6), 
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which means inducing the withdrawal of the subsidy.
208
 The Arbitrators in this case 
further noted that since a different term (“commensurate with the degree and nature of the 
adverse effects determined to exist”) exists when the intention is to limit countermeasures 
to the trade-distorting effects of a subsidy, the term “appropriate countermeasures” does 
not have similar constraints.
209
 They also noted that footnotes 9 and 10, which explain 
that “appropriate” should not mean “disproportionate”, at least confirm that the term 
“appropriate” should not be given the same meaning as the term “equivalent” in Article 
22 of the DSU.
210
 
 In US-FSC (Article 22.6), the Arbitrators did consider the relevance of using the 
‘trade effects’ of the subsidy as the appropriate benchmark. In examining the meaning of 
the term “appropriate countermeasures”, the Arbitrators noted that, based on the text of 
the provision (SCM Article 4.10), the prohibition on export subsidies is a “per se 
obligation, not itself conditioned on a trade effects test”.
211
 Therefore, the Arbitrators 
considered that the text cannot be interpreted as “to confine the appropriateness test to the 
element of countering the injurious effects on a party”, and more importantly, that 
countermeasures for prohibited subsidies need to take into account “the legal status of the 
wrongful act and the manner in which the breach of that obligation has upset the balance 
                                           
208
 Ibid., paras. 3.44-3.45. In reaching this conclusion, the Arbitrators referred to the ILC Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility, which address the notion of countermeasures.  
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of rights and obligations between Members”.
212
 Furthermore, the Arbitrators considered 
that the distinction in the terminology relating to countermeasures for export subsidies 
shows a “clear and unambiguous intent to apply different and more exacting disciplines 
when it comes to export subsidies”.
213
 Finally, considering the object and purpose of the 
DSB’s mandate to authorize countermeasures pursuant to Article 4.10 of the SCM 
Agreement, the Arbitrator noted that, since in the case of prohibited subsidies, a panel can 
only recommend a subsidy found to be prohibited to be withdrawn without delay, a 
countermeasure should contribute to the ultimate objective of withdrawal of the 
prohibited subsidy without delay.
214
 In conclusion, the Arbitrator reasoned that, in the 
case of prohibited subsidies, where countermeasures are to “take into account the gravity 
of the breach and the nature of the upset in the balance of rights and obligations in 




The Arbitrators in Canada-Aircraft II (Article 22.6) went further to consider it 
appropriate to adjust the results of the calculations based on the subsidy amount to take 
into account Canada’s lack of intention to withdraw the illegal subsidy, by imposing 
countermeasures that “can reasonably contribute to induce compliance”.
216
 As a result, 
the Arbitrators in this case awarded a level of retaliation that constituted of the amount of 
subsidy, plus an amount tantamount to 20 percent of the subsidy amount so as to induce 
                                           
212
 Ibid., para. 5.24.  
213
 Ibid., para. 5.37.  
214
 Ibid., para. 5.56-57.  
215
 Ibid., para. 5.61.  
216





 In reaching this determination, the Arbitrator in this case referred to the 
interpretation of “appropriate countermeasures” in the two prior arbitrations, but also 
noted that the provisions in SCM Agreement do not a priori exclude methodologies for 
calculating appropriate countermeasures as suggested by the parties, and thus they need to 
ensure that the proposed countermeasures are not disproportionate.
218
 During the process 
of examining Brazil’s proposed countermeasures, the Arbitrator noted that it agreed that 
the need to induce compliance is a factor that should be considered in evaluating the 
appropriateness of the level of proposed countermeasures.
219
 However, it rejected 
Brazil’s arguments that the characteristics of a particular subsidy might sometimes justify 
the application of particularly high level of countermeasures and that any level of 
countermeasures that is not “manifestly excessive” should be considered appropriate. 
Rather, the Arbitrator considered that “some congruence must remain between the 
countermeasure and the measure to which it responds”.
220
 However, in the end, the 
Arbitrator referred to the prior arbitrations under Article 4.10 and found it “proper as a 
starting-point to calculate the level of countermeasures in this case based on the amount 
of the subsidy methodology, subject to adjustments if necessary to ensure that the level of 
countermeasures is appropriate”.
221
 As for ‘adjustments’, the Arbitrator in this case 
considered that the “specificities of this case” need to be taken into account that may 
justify an adjustment of the level of countermeasures. In particular, the lack of intention 
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by the respondent party (Canada) to withdraw the subsidy at issue led the Arbitrator to 
view that “a higher level of countermeasures than that based on Canada’s methodology 
would be necessary and appropriate” to induce compliance from the non-compliant 
party.
222
 As a result, the Arbitrator ‘adjusted’ the level of countermeasures “by an amount 
corresponding to 20 per cent of the amount of the subsidy”.
223
 
In a departure from the previous Article 22.6 arbitration cases involving 
prohibited subsidies, the Arbitrators in US-Upland Cotton (Article 22.6) adopted a 
method of calculation that is based on the ‘trade effects’ of the WTO-inconsistent 
measures for authorizing the level of retaliation. The interpretation of the term 
“appropriate countermeasures” by the Arbitrators in this case had taken account of “not 
only the prohibited nature of the subsidy at issue as such, but also the manner in which 
that illegal measure adversely affects the interests of the complaining Member”.
224
 They 
deemed that the ‘amount of the subsidy’ was not necessarily the only basis for calculation 
to be consistent with the legal standard embodied in Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, 
but rather, that the requirements that countermeasures be “appropriate” and “not 
disproportionate” suggest that “there should be a degree of relationship between the level 
of countermeasures and the trade-distorting impact of the measure on the complaining 
Member”.
225
 In the process, the Arbitrator acknowledged that while the arbitrators in 
these cases took into account the fact that the legal standard embodied in Article 4.10 of 
the SCM Agreement may allow ‘greater flexibility’ than those under Article 22.4 of the 
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DSU, the provisions do not exclude trade effects as a relevant consideration. In fact, the 
Arbitrator noted that, in the prior arbitration decisions, consideration was given to the 
trade effects of the measure on the complaining Member.
226
 As a result, the Arbitrators 
concluded that the “trade-distorting impact” of the subsidy is the proper approach to 
calculating the relation level, and awarded countermeasures that incorporated the subsidy 
amount and ‘additionalities’, that were further apportioned based on the amount of the 




3.3.2.2 Interpretation and Application of “withdraw the subsidy”  
 
The panel’s interpretation of “withdraw the subsidy” in Australia-Leather 
(Article 21.5) has brought to the fore the question of whether “withdrawal” involves a 
‘retrospective’ repayment of subsidies received. The subsidy measure at issue in this case 
was ‘one-time’ subsidy payments made under a grant contract by the Australian 
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government to an Australian leather company. Due to the current WTO remedy system 
which provides for only prospective remedies, WTO Members could, in theory, evade 
obligations in SCM Agreement Article 3 by making one-time payment under a subsidy 
program and then later terminating the program. The solution found by the panel in this 
case was to require that the subsidies be repaid in full. The panel concluded that 
“repayment in full of the prohibited subsidy is necessary in order to “withdraw the 
subsidy” in this case”.
228
 In their view, “if the term “withdraw the subsidy” can properly 
be understood to encompass repayment of any portion of a prohibited subsidy, 
‘retroactive effect’ exists”.
229
 In reaching this conclusion, the panel referred to Article 31 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, according to which treaties should be 
interpreted in good faith on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the terms in their context 
and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. In terms of the ordinary meaning of 
“withdraw the subsidy”, the panel viewed the term as referring to the “taking away” or 
“removing” the financial contribution, and thus encompassing “repayment” of the 
prohibited subsidy.
230
 With regard to the object and purpose, the panel viewed that the 
architecture of the SCM Agreement, particularly the special and additional rules for 
expedited dispute settlement in cases involving prohibited subsidies, implies that 
terminating a program found to be a prohibited subsidy on a prospective basis may “have 
no impact, and consequently no enforcement effect, in the case of prohibited subsidies 
                                           
228
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granted in the past”,
231
 and thus interpretation of “withdraw the subsidy” which 
encompasses repayment is consistent with the overall structure of the SCM Agreement. 
Finally, in terms of effectiveness of the remedy, the panel explained that for “withdraw 
the subsidy” to be a meaningful remedy, it must “be effective regardless of the form in 
which a prohibited subsidy is found to exist”. In effect, the panel considered that a finding 
that the term “withdraw the subsidy” does not encompass repayment would have the 
effect of “granting full absolution to Members who grant export subsidies that are fully 
disbursed to the recipient…for which the export contingency is entirely in the past”.
232
 
 The statements by the Australia-Leather (Article 21.5) panel on the issue of 
retrospective remedies were quite controversial among WTO Members,
233
 and the 
findings of this case were not adopted by any of the later panels. However, the possibility 
of considering retrospective remedies for prohibited subsidy cases was also mentioned by 
the panel in Canada-Aircraft II. The panel stated that “it is not entirely clear that the 
WTO dispute settlement system only provides for prospective remedies in cases 
involving prohibited export subsidies. In this regard, we recall that the Australia-Leather-
21.5 panel found that remedies in cases involving prohibited export subsidies may 
encompass (retrospective) repayment in certain instances”.
234
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In a similar vein, the issue of ‘one-time’ countermeasures to address a non-
recurrent subsidy program that had been repealed prior to the establishment of an Article 
21.5 panel had been raised in US-Upland Cotton (Article 22.6). The subsidy measure at 
issue was payments made by the US after the expiry of the time-period for 
implementation when the measure should have been withdrawn, until when the US 
repealed the subsidy program. However, since the measure did not exist at the time the 
compliance panel was established, there had been no multilateral finding on whether the 
measure at issue was in compliance by an Article 21.5 panel. In this case, due to the 
absence of a multilateral determination of non-compliance, the Arbitrator refused to 
consider the proposed countermeasures for the repealed subsidy measure that had been 
granted in the past. The Arbitrator reasoned that there is no “legitimate basis to such 
countermeasures as requested by Brazil in relation to past payments made until the 
repeal…in the absence of a multilateral determination of non-compliance in relation to 
such payments and independently of any continuing situation of non-compliance”.
235
  
On a different note, the dispute settlement proceedings in the US-FSC dispute 
illustrate another problematic area regarding the application of “withdraw the subsidy” in 
Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement. In all the prohibited subsidy disputes that have been 
referred to the Article 21.5 compliance panel, the panel has not provided any 
recommendations other than the statement that the implementing Member has failed to 
withdraw the subsidies and/or had failed to implement the rulings of the original panel.
236
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As a consequence, the US as the responding party in the US-FSC (Article 21.5) panel 
proceeding claimed that there was no recommendation made by the DSB under Article 
4.7 of the SCM Agreement that the compliance measure (ETI Act tax exclusion) be 
withdrawn, and that a new recommendation by a compliance panel would be necessary 
for the responding party to withdraw the prohibited subsidy measure.
237
 Regarding this 
issue, the panel was of the view that a new recommendation by Article 21.5 panel is not 
required, since “if an Article 21.5 panel made a new recommendation…which…required 
an additional time period for implementation, this would give an additional period of 
time for the Member concerned to bring itself into conformity with the covered 
agreements”, which “might lead to a potentially never-ending cycle, whereby a Member 
continues to adopt non-compliant measures in order to win more time to comply with 
adopted DSB recommendations and rulings”.
238
 In conclusion, the compliance panel 
ruled that the US “continues to fail to implement fully the operative DSB 
recommendations and rulings to withdraw the prohibited subsidies and to bring its 
measures into conformity with its obligations”, and that the original panel’s 





3.3.2.3 Interpretation and Application of “withdraw without delay”  
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 In most of the prohibited subsidy disputes where the DSB recommended the 
WTO-inconsistent measure to be “withdrawn without delay”,
240
 the specified time-period 







. However, in the case of US-FSC, 
the implementation period specified by the panel was nearly one year, since the FSC 
subsidies were recommended to be withdrawn by 1 October 2000.
244
 The panel had 
given ample consideration of the facts that it would require legislative action for the 
panel’s recommendation to be implemented, and that the US would only be able to 
implement the recommendation only after the following fiscal year which commences on 
1 October 2000. This due date was later extended further to 1 November 2000 by the 
request of the US.
245
 In US-Upland Cotton, the panel recommended that the prohibited 
subsidy measures be withdrawn “at the latest within six months of the date of adoption of 
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the Panel report by the Dispute Settlement Body or 1 July 2005 (whichever is earlier)”.
246
 
However, no specific reason was provided by the panel for the longer period of 
implementation.  
  
3.3.3 ISSUES IN WTO JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING PROHIBITED SUBSIDIES  
 
 The series of WTO dispute cases involving remedies for prohibited subsidies 
have revealed some of the most prominent and persisting problems in the WTO dispute 
settlement system. These issues can be categorized into: (1) the level of retaliation for 
addressing continued acts of non-compliance in prohibited subsidy cases; (2) the 
retrospective application of remedies for addressing non-recurrent payments found to be 
prohibited subsidies; (3) prolonged dispute settlement proceedings due to various 
loopholes in the remedy system for prohibited subsidies. These issues are discussed 
respectively in this section.  
 
3.3.3.1 Level of Retaliation: “appropriate countermeasures”  
 
 As previously explained in sections 3.2.2.2 and 3.3.2.1, the standard of 
calculation for the level of “appropriate countermeasures” that has been applied by the 
WTO adjudicating bodies has changed over the years. While in the first three cases 
(Brazil-Aircraft, US-FSC, Canada-Aircraft II), the standard of calculation was the 
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‘amount of subsidy’, the standard applied in the later dispute (US-Upland Cotton) was the 
‘trade effects’ of the subsidy for measuring the amount of “appropriate countermeasures” 
in Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement.  
As observed in the literature regarding the ‘appropriate’ or ‘optimal’ level of 
countermeasures for prohibited subsidies, legal and economic commentators seem to be 
satisfied with the departure shown by the WTO adjudicating bodies in applying the 
remedy rules on prohibited subsidies. In particular, the US-FSC arbitration has been 
criticized on the grounds that complaining nations could each retaliate based on the effect 
of the subsidy on all nations, and the resulting cumulative retaliation might ultimately 
prove to be ‘disproportionate’. Therefore, the decision of the arbitrator in US-Upland 
Cotton (Article 22.6) to apportion retaliation rights based on market share was viewed as 
a more a ‘reasonable’ response with respect to the concern of optimal retaliation.
247
  
Many legal scholars have referred to the ILC Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility and the concept of ‘proportionality’ contained therein to provide a 
reasonable method for applying a standard for measuring “appropriate 
countermeasures”.
248
 The concept of proportionality has been a prominent feature in 
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dispute settlement since the term appears explicitly in the two footnotes of the SCM 
Agreement for providing an explanation of the term “appropriate”. Proportionality as 
defined in Article 51 of the ILC Draft Articles specify that “countermeasures must be 
commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the 
internationally wrongful act and the rights in question” (emphasis added). While this 
provision needs to be read together with Article 49 of the ILC Draft Articles, which 
specify that “an injured State may only take countermeasures…in order to induce that 
State to comply with its obligations”, the Commentaries further explain that the 
imposition of countermeasures are subject to an “essential limit”, according to which in 
every case a countermeasure “must be commensurate with the injury suffered”, and 
“partly independent of the question of whether the countermeasure was necessary to 
achieve the result of ensuring compliance”.
249
 According to Mitchell (2007), this concept 
of proportionality seems to have been applied inappropriately in the series of Arbitrations 
involving prohibited subsidy countermeasures. In particular, the Arbitrators seem to have 
put too much emphasis on the purpose of inducing compliance, viewing the prohibited 
nature of subsidies as an aggravating factor, serving as justification for considering both 
harm and culpability of the inconsistent subsidy measure. The author cautions that the 
notion of proportionality should not be applied in an interpretative manner to change the 
intention of drafters that Members should not be entitled to countermeasures that go 
beyond the level of harm caused by the WTO-inconsistent measure.
250
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There have also been many economic scholars criticizing the application of the 
‘amount-of-subsidy’ standard in interpreting “appropriate countermeasures”. Grossman 
and Sykes (2011) looked into whether the use of lost trade volume as a metric for 
retaliation or an approach that ties retaliation to the amount of the subsidy is better 
supported by economic principles. Their analysis was based on the approach of Howse 
and Staiger (2005),
251
 which showed that retaliation at a level equal to the lost volume of 
trade (valued at pre-violation prices) can enable a complaining nation to restore its 
welfare to what it was before the tariff violation. First, they characterized the effect of the 
export subsidy on the injured country, which could be decomposed into a loss of producer 
surplus, gain in consumer surplus, and savings in government revenue. They observed 
that the welfare effect on the injured country would depend on the magnitude of the 
induced effect on the world price.
252
 However, they also noted that the overall effect on 
the injured country depends on the relative weights that the country’s government 
attaches to producer surplus, consumer surplus, and tax revenue, and the extent of the 
country’s support for its own import-competing industry. Next, in analyzing what level of 
retaliation would restore the injured country’s welfare, the authors concluded that the 
trade effects of the retaliatory measure would match those of the initial infringing 
measure, but only if the elasticity of export supply for the product in the retaliated 
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industry of the violating country is equal to the elasticity of the injured country’s export 
supply for the subsidized product.
253
 However, since such a situation may not necessarily 
always be the case, especially if the sector for retaliation is often chosen arbitrarily, the 
authors conclude that the approach to retaliation that balances trade effects is not likely to 
achieve its purpose in the real world.
254
 Therefore, while their analysis provides some 
support for an approach to retaliation that allows the retaliator to reduce the value of its 
imports by an amount equal to the value of its lost exports due to the violation, this 
approach can approximately restore lost welfare only if it is assumed that all components 
of welfare receive equal weight, and that trade in other goods is not affected significantly 
following the violation and subsequent countermeasure. But since these assumptions are 
unrealistic in general, the analysis provides support for the trade-volume-effects 
calculation, but only on a weak basis.  
Bown and Ruta (2010) provide a graphical representation of the different effects 
of retaliation for which the basis of calculation is the trade effects of the subsidy versus 
the amount of the subsidy. Using a framework that extends the model based on the theory 
of reciprocity by Bagwell and Staiger (2001),
255
 the authors show in a simple graphical 
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model that the retaliation based on the value of lost trade volumes under the reciprocity 
approach does not correspond to retaliation based on the value of the subsidy. 
Furthermore, the relationship between the two approaches is shown to be dependent on 













(a) Retaliation based on ‘trade-effects’     (b) Retaliation based on ‘subsidy amount’ 
Source: Bown and Ruta (2010)  
 
Figure 1 depicts the international markets from the perspective of: (a) the 
complainant country, and the (b) respondent country. Figure 1(a) shows the international 
market’s net import demand for exports from the complainant country (M
0
) and the 
                                                                                                                   
advantage in a third market, leading to a prisoner’s dilemma problem.  
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export supply from the complainant country (X*). Before the respondent country 
provides an export subsidy, the equilibrium is at point E0, at which the export price is P
0
 
and the corresponding trade volume is Q
0
. After an export subsidy is provided by the 
respondent country, the net import demand curve in the international market shifts 
downward (M
1
). Intuitively, this is because the export subsidy in the respondent country 
allows its exporters to supply products in the international market at a lower price, which 
reduces the demand for exports from the complainant country. At the new equilibrium 
(E
1
), the price received by exporters in the complainant country is lower (P
1
) and the 
quantity exported is reduced as well (Q
1
). Thus, the policy change in the respondent 
country hurts the exporting sector in the complainant country by lowering its market 
access in the international market and worsening its terms of trade. Since the shaded area 
represents the amount of trade lost by the complainant country due to the subsidy policy 
of the respondent country, it also corresponds to the amount of retaliation entitled to the 
complainant calculated based on the ‘trade effects’ approach.   
Figure 1(b) presents an illustration of the international market from the 
perspective of the respondent country which implements a subsidization policy. After the 
export subsidy policy (s
1





), and the shaded area represents the value of the respondent country’s export 
subsidy, corresponding to the amount of retaliation that is calculated based on the 
‘amount of subsidy’ approach. As can be seen from the graphs, while the sizes of the 
shaded areas in both figures do not seem to be equivalent at a glance, the sizes would 
ultimately depend on the elasticity of the import demand for the complainant country’s 
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export products in the international market and of the export supply of the respondent 
country.  
Other legal scholars have suggested an approach that neither supports the 
‘amount-of-subsidy’ or the ‘trade-effects’ approach as standards for assessing the 
permissible level of retaliation. Sebastian (2007) has observed that the amount-of-subsidy 
approach as applied by the previous Arbitrators disingenuously ignores the practical 
possibility of multiple complainants, in which case the retaliation awarded may result in 
disproportionate countermeasures. However, more problematic is the observation that the 
various theories on the purpose of remedies in the WTO cannot explain the structure of 
the remedial provisions of the DSU, or the SCM Agreement when it pertains to prohibited 
subsidies. While the ‘compliance’ rationale cannot explain the limitation of requiring 
countermeasures to be “equivalent” to the amount of injury done, neither can the 
‘compensation’ rationale be achieved in practice due to the nature of WTO obligations 
which requires ultimate compliance with its treaty obligations. Therefore, in such an 
absence of any valid theoretical benchmark in awarding retaliation against acts of non-
compliance, Sebastian suggests ‘minimalist standards’, such as due process, justification 
of any applied approach by text, and internally consistent award levels, with the rest of 
the gap in WTO treaty texts to be filled by Arbitrators’ discretion. Rather, the existence of 
a third-party arbitral review per se plays the most important role in bringing about a 
stable and predictable environment that can prevent costly spirals of counter-retaliation.
257
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 In sum, the prevailing view regarding the level of “appropriate” 
countermeasures, even for the allegedly ‘more flexible’ standard perceived for prohibited 
subsidy remedies, seems to be pointing towards allowing countermeasures that are 
closely related to the trade-distorting impact of the subsidy measure at issue. Principles of 
proportionality, the multilateral nature of the remedy system and economic principles 
based on welfare effects similarly point to the view that the more “appropriate” standard 
for measuring the level of countermeasures would be based on the ‘trade effects’ of a 
prohibited subsidy measure.  
 
3.3.3.2 Remedies for Past Injury: “withdraw the subsidy”  
 
 The issue of retrospective remedies is an important aspect in the discussion on 
the remedy system for prohibited subsidies in the WTO as shown in the Australia-Leather 
compliance case. As the panel argues, without retrospective payment of subsidies granted, 
there would be no effective way to deal with prohibited subsidies that have incurred 
injury to the domestic industry of the other Member which no longer exist to be 
addressed by the current prospective remedy system in the WTO. Such use of non-
recurrent subsidies is evidently a persistent problem in subsidy disputes as explained 
previously (section 3.3.2.2).   
 Problems exist when the notion of retrospective remedies is seriously considered 
as a possibility for the WTO remedy system. The ruling by the panel in Australia-Leather 
(Article 21.5) that withdrawal of a prohibited subsidy encompasses retrospective 
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remedies in the form of full repayment was met by strong criticism by many WTO 
Members. Australia naturally objected to the finding in that it was a ‘punitive’ remedy for 
which there was no basis in the WTO. It argued that WTO did not endorse any “notion of 
deterrence through retrospective punishment”, and that “retrospectivity without any 
statute of limitations” would be “a risky path” for the WTO. Furthermore, it argued that 
the nature of the panel’s findings are “at odds with democratic governance and economic 
reality”, and if the findings were to be accepted, it would have serious consequences for 
other Members as well in the future.
258
 Canada was also critical of the panel’s approach, 
and was of the view that panel’s interpretation of the operative phrase “withdraw the 
subsidy” was contrary to GATT/WTO custom and practice. It emphasized its 
understanding that the special and additional rules in Article 4.7 of the SCM agreement 
was with regard to ‘timing’. Furthermore, the ruling was in conflict with the principles of 
customary international law where the language of a treaty should clearly indicate 
whether retroactivity was to be inferred. Brazil and Japan also shared this concern that the 
retroactive remedy was inconsistent with GATT and WTO practice.
259
  
On the other hand, there were also views in favor of a retrospective system as a 
stronger means to induce compliance with WTO obligations. Hong Kong was 
appreciative of the need for effective remedies even if it represented a cost to violating 
members, but cautioned that the cost should be “measured against the damage inflicted on 
other Members through illegal actions” based on the pacta sunt servanda principle. The 
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US, as the complaining party in this case, was supportive of the panel’s finding, although 
it stated it did not agree with every wording of the panel report, particularly since the 
panel’s remedy went beyond that sought by itself.
260
  
Commentators of this case have shown mixed responses. Several scholars were 
strongly against the notion of retrospective remedies, arguing that retrospective remedies 
have no basis either in past GATT practices or under the WTO Agreements. In particular, 
they were critical of the fact that the Panel exceeded its mandate under the DSU by 
making a case for a complaining party, as well as infringing the fundamental due process 
principles that a responding party should not be subject to legal claims of which it had not 
been given sufficient notice for response. While acknowledging that customary 
international law provided for both prospective and retrospective remedies, such practice 
cannot be imported into WTO law since it would be against the basic principles and 
objectives of the multilateral trading system where Members bound themselves for 
specific reasons. They claimed that GATT practice did not provide for retrospective 
remedies.
261
 Furthermore, they were concerned about the consequences of implementing 
the retrospective repayment of monies granted, which could give rise to constitutional 
and democratic issues on the part of Member governments since there would be 
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significant legal constraints on expropriating private property for public purposes. Most 
importantly, they argued that the role of compensation and retaliation under Article 22 of 




However, while it is true that the GATT cases were related exclusively to anti-
dumping and countervailing measures under the Tokyo Round codes, the fact that the 
possibility of retrospective remedies was considered in the early years of GATT dispute 
settlement raises an important point. In fact, two of the three GATT subsidy cases were 
adopted, which contained recommendations of retrospective repayment of the 
countervailing duties and subsidy payments respectively.
263
 In United States – 
Countervailing Duties on Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, the panel 
recommended that US reimburse the countervailing duties corresponding to the amount 
of the subsidy, or make a subsidy determination consistent with GATT rules and 
reimburse the duties to the extent that they exceeded the amount of the subsidy 
determined to have been granted.
264
 In United States – Measures Affecting Imports of 
Softwood Lumber from Canada, the panel recommended that the US terminate the 
subsidy program and refund the cash deposits that were made during the period of 
application of the inconsistent measure.
265
 Therefore, the notion of retrospective 
remedies does not seem to be a totally new concept raised for the remedy system for 
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prohibited subsidies.  
It is notable that there were several views on the ‘prospective portion’ of a 
remedy as proposed by the parties to the dispute in Australia-Leather (Article 21.5). 
While the compliance panel viewed that the retrospective remedy should constitute ‘full 
repayment’ of the subsidy, US had proposed that Australia withdraw the ‘prospective 
portion’ of the prohibited subsidies found to have been provided, since that portion of the 
fund “continues to confer a benefit to Howe after the adoption of the Report in this 
dispute” (emphasis added). In order to calculate this amount, the US proposed to calculate 
the amount of the grant payments over the useful life of the production assets of the 
beneficiary company, and allocate the amount to the period following adoption of the 
panel report.
266
 In other words, the US seems to be of the view that the period that 
distinguishes the ‘retrospective portion’ and ‘prospective portion’ of a subsidy would be 
the period of adoption of the panel report in which a determination of whether a measure 
is consistent with the obligations is made. On the other hand, Australia proposed that the 
point of distinction exists where the implementation period ends.
267
 These proposals 
provide some valid suggestions as to how the current remedy system could be ‘remedied’ 
to apply retrospective remedies that would be feasible within the current framework of 
the WTO rules on remedies in the context of prohibited subsidies.  
 Other problems exist due to the lack of retrospectivity in compliance 
proceedings as well. As the case in US-Upland Cotton shows, WTO Members can delay 
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compliance until immediately before a compliance panel reviews the compliance record 
of the revised measure taken to comply, and then ‘uncomply’.
268
 Figure 2 below 
illustrates the chronology of events in the US-Upland Cotton dispute. As shown, the US 
had repealed certain cotton subsidies (Step 2 payments) that were ruled to be prohibited 
subsidies before the compliance panel was established, gained acknowledgement of the 
withdrawal of the measure, and then reinstated similar payments under the 2008 Farm 
Bill. When Brazil requested countermeasures against the reinstated measures, it was 
declined due to lack of a multilateral determination of non-compliance regarding the 
measure. This is possible due to the current dispute settlement rules which do not provide 
remedies for past violations, according to which, the jurisdiction of Arbitrators in Article 
21.5 proceedings is limited to on-going measures that are existent at the time of the 
compliance proceeding. Additionally, the limited jurisdiction of Article 22.6 Arbitrators 
relative to Article 21.5 Panels in being only able to authorize countermeasures on matters 
that have been subject to a compliance determination also compounds the problem. 
Consequently, Members can commit repeated violations without having to face any 
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<Figure 2> Chronology of Events in US-Upland Cotton Dispute 
 
 





In sum, the ineffective remedy mechanism for dealing with non-recurring 
subsidies due to the lack of a retrospective remedy system is a persistent, unresolved 
issue in the current system of remedies for prohibited subsidies. Arguments and positions 
are still varied and undecided over this issue. But, overall, despite the criticisms over the 
practical problems that can arise from implementing such a retrospective remedy, there 
seems to be a larger voice that recognizes the existence and persistency of this problem. 
This issue will be dealt in more detail in the chapter V.  
 
3.3.3.3 Prolonged Dispute Proceedings: “withdraw without delay” 
 
 While the time-period for implementation per se may not be a matter of issue in 
prohibited subsidy disputes, there have been several disputes under the general DSU 
procedures where the problems have been identified relevant to the determination of the 
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‘reasonable period of time (RPT)’ for implementation of the DSB rulings.
270
 With regard 
to prohibited subsidy disputes, a more serious problem lies in the length of the disputes, 
as already shown in Table 7. One of the reasons for this delay in the dispute settlement 
procedure, especially for subsidy disputes, is the fact that the inconsistent subsidy 
measure is usually retained until the end of the implementation period, and some times, 
even repealed shortly after the expiry of the RPT.
271
 There has even been a case where 
the original subsidy measure determined to be inconsistent had been revised, albeit only 
partially, leading to a series of compliance proceedings even after reaching the final stage 
of authorizing countermeasures to enforce the DSB recommendation.
272
  
Such significant delays in the dispute settlement procedure may also be 
attributable to the lack of retrospective application of remedies in prohibited subsidy 
cases. Due to the current system under which the retaliation remedy is applied only after 
the implementation period has expired for the respondent Member, there is no incentive 
for the respondent party to comply promptly within the given time-period for compliance 
(RPT). In fact, as shown in many dispute cases, respondent parties seem to be enacting 
their revised measures at the near-end or shortly after the time-period for implementation 
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has lapsed. This may not be a problem per se, since the purpose of granting a “reasonable 
period of time” is to take into account the need for member countries to take shorter 
administrative or longer legislative procedures for revising their measures. However, 
there is possibility that this system may be abused, especially when there is opportunity 
for the parties to the dispute to extend the RPT through Article 21.3(c) arbitrations or 
mutual agreement between the parties. In US-FSC and US-Upland Cotton, we have seen 
how the panels discretionally grant ‘reasonable period of time’ to the respondent parties, 
sometimes not even providing any explicit reason for a time-period that exceeds the 
normal recommendation of 90 days.
273
 With regard to the determination of the 
‘reasonable period of time’, Article 21.3 of the DSU provides that the time-period may be 
proposed by the respondent party, or mutually agreed by the disputing parties, or 
determined through binding arbitration, while for prohibited subsidies, Article 4.7 of the 
SCM Agreement only provides that the subsidy shall be withdrawn “without delay”. Most 
of the practice by WTO panels seems to have recognized this clear textual difference and 
have requested implementation within a period of 90 days for prohibited subsidy cases. 
However, this does not seem to have been always the case as previously mentioned.  
 However, a more serious problem regarding prolonged dispute proceedings 
seems to be due to the nature of the subsidy measure. In fact, the opportunistic practice of 
some WTO Members to comply with the DSB rulings and later ‘uncomply’, or to comply 
only partially to the effect that it does not completely remove the effect of the 
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subsidization are all problems that derive from the lack of willingness on the part of the 
subsidizing country to terminate the prohibited subsidy measure in the first place. While 
this problem may not be fundamentally addressed merely by remedy measures, at least 
the remedy system that is in place to enforce DSB rulings against non-compliant acts of 
subsidization may need to be tightened so as to fill in the loopholes that evidently exist in 
the current prospective remedy system for prohibited subsidies.  
 
3.4 SUMMARY  
 This chapter has observed the remedy system for prohibited subsidies in the 
WTO to understand the current problems and issues that remain unresolved despite the 
stronger rules for enforcement against prohibited subsidy measures. In this light, the 
evolution of rules on prohibited subsidies have shown that the drafters of the text were 
very much aware of the need to strongly discipline subsidy measures categorized as 
prohibited subsidies, through substantive rules and remedy procedures. The rules as 
applied by the WTO adjudicating bodies suggest that, while as a whole, Arbitrators have 
tried to provide meaningful rulings to make effective use of the WTO dispute settlement 
system, there are still many controversies over several determinations, that have revealed 
some critical loopholes in the current remedy system for dealing with prohibited subsidies. 
 In the next chapter, the current WTO remedy system will be examined further 
from an economic perspective to shed some light on the issue from a new standpoint, for 
the purpose of finding more substantiated grounds for the treatment of prohibited 




ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE WTO REMEDY SYSTEM 
 
4.1 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE RETALIATION REMEDY IN GENERAL   
 
 Economists have traditionally viewed remedies as a necessary feature of 
achieving an efficient equilibrium. Under the economic theory of contract remedies, the 
key objective of an enforcement system is to deter inefficient breaches, but to encourage 
efficient ones (“efficient breach”). In other words, a party would be induced to comply 
with its obligations whenever compliance yields greater benefits to the promisee than 
costs to the promisor, while allowing the promisor to depart from its obligations 
whenever the costs of compliance to the promisor exceed the benefits to the promisee.
274
  
Applying this principle of ‘efficient breach’ to understanding the dispute 
settlement system in GATT/WTO, scholars such as Schwartz and Sykes (2002) perceived 
the WTO provisions that respect renegotiation and settlement of disputes over breach of 
obligations as carefully designed to facilitate efficient adjustments to unanticipated 
circumstances. In particular, while the GATT system can be understood as having relied 
on unilateral retaliation and reputation to police the bargain, which eventually became 
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excessive and interfered with opportunities for efficient breach, the WTO mechanism for 
arbitrating the level of proposed sanctions has assured that retaliation levels are not set 
too high. Furthermore, retaliation is limited to measures that are substantially equivalent 
to the harm caused by the violation, which is incurred only after a ‘reasonable period of 
time’ for implementation has lapsed. Therefore, by limiting the retaliation remedy to 
equivalent-to-harm levels, the WTO remedy system may be understood as incorporating 
the ‘efficient breach’ principle for achieving more efficient outcomes.
275
       
 According to Bagwell and Staiger (2002), the role of retaliation comes as part of 
the discussion on the enforcement of trade agreements. Trade agreements are needed to 
internalize the negative externality of terms-of-trade driven unilateral trade policy choices 
(i.e. restrictions in trade volumes that arise when governments set tariffs unilaterally), 
thus offering governments a means to escape from a terms-of-trade driven prisoner’s 
dilemma. Enforcement of such trade agreements, in the form of retaliatory measures that 
are imposed against continuing acts of non-compliance with the negotiated trade 
agreements, are important in the sense that they can restrain governments which have a 
short-term incentive to deviate to a higher-than-is-efficient tariff in order to obtain 
consequent terms-of-trade gains. Thus, governments are dissuaded from such 
opportunistic behavior only if the pursuit of short-term gains results in long-term losses, 
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such as retaliation by other governments. In this sense, the GATT/WTO principles of 
reciprocity and nondiscrimination have been viewed by these scholars as complementary 
principles that assist governments in bilateral negotiations to achieve more efficient trade-
policy outcomes and ensure that welfare of third country governments are not altered.
276
  
 Bown has produced several empirical research on the GATT/WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism to understand the role of retaliation in the world trading system. 
Using GATT/WTO trade dispute data between 1973 and 1998, Bown (2004) has shown 
that the economic threat of retaliation has influence on determining a respondent 
country’s ability to credibly commit to trade liberalization (i.e. compliance with WTO 
rules). In other words, the so-far successful resolution of disputes has been positively 
influenced by the economic concern for retaliation, rather than the procedural or 
institutional features of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system.
277
  
 Maggi and Staiger (2009) contribute to understanding the remedy system in 
GATT/WTO based on the principles of the liability and property rules regarding the 
purpose of remedies.
278
 They observed that the GATT/WTO remedy system has seen a 
gradual shift from liability rules to property rules as the accuracy of DSB rulings has 
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 Sykes (2008), supra note 275, 339-354. Sykes further examines the discussion of trade 
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 C. Bown, ‘On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement’, 86 The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 811 (2004).  
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 The ‘property rule’ and ‘liability rule’ are principles used to explain the purpose of remedies in 
an enforcement system. Where obligations are protected by the ‘property rule’, under which the 
infringement of a person’s entitlement is strictly prohibited, rights are enforced by injunctive relief 
(i.e. specific performance). On the other hand, where obligations are disciplined by the ‘liability 
rule’, under which entitlements can be removed through the payment of legally determined 
damages (i.e. monetary compensation).  
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increased with the accumulation of dispute settlement reports adopted by GATT/WTO 
adjudicating bodies. Based on their models, the liability rule should be more prevalent in 
issue areas that are characterized by a higher degree of uncertainty over the joint benefits 
of free trade. Furthermore, where the liability rule is optimal, it is never optimal to set 
damages at a level high enough to make the exporter ‘whole’, so as to enable a party to 
breach when it is optimal to ‘buy out’ the injured party. On the other hand, if there is less 
ex-ante uncertainty about the joint benefits of free trade, the property rule is a more 
optimal institutional arrangement. Therefore, they suggest that the optimal institutional 
arrangement for the WTO dispute settlement system, as the accuracy of DSB increases 
over time, tends to move away from the liability rule to the property rule.
279
  
There is not much economic literature with respect to the remedy of 
compensation as compared to the legal literature on the subject. Though not dealing with 
the compensation remedy directly, Beshkar (2010) suggests that if monetary 
compensation is not available as a form of remedy in addition to the retaliation remedy, 
trade agreements cannot ensure efficient breach. In other words, a system that is 
structured by the ‘liability rule’ cannot ensure efficient performance unless cash payments 
(i.e. monetary compensation) or other efficiency-neutral methods of compensation are 
available and enforceable. Beshkar further argues that if there is no remedy of financial 
compensation available in a system (which is the case of the WTO dispute settlement 
system), an optimal remedy system would constitute a less-than-proportional retaliation 
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scheme against an offending country. This is because if there are no ‘efficiency-neutral’ 
side payments available as a method of compensation, it would be in the best interest of 





4.2 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE REMEDY SYSTEM FOR PROHIBITED 
SUBSIDIES   
 
As compared to the positive discussions on the role of retaliation in enforcing the 
world trade rules in general, the economic discussions on the narrower subject of 
remedies for prohibited subsidies seem to be puzzled with the distinct sui generis rules 
regarding prohibited subsidies (as compared to the general remedy rules in the DSU) and 
their application in practice.  
Sykes (2005) provides economic support for the distinctive treatment for export 
subsidies in the WTO. While acknowledging that economic theory offers no general 
objection to the use of subsidies since subsidies may be used constructively by 
governments to remedy ‘market failures’, Sykes suggests that some subsidies may be 
deemed undesirable by economists, such as protective subsidies and subsidies for export 
promotion.
281
 From an economic standpoint, export subsidies are generally undesirable, 
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 Beshkar (2010), supra note 275. 
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 A. Sykes, ‘Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’, in P. Macroy, A. Appleton, M. Plummer 
eds., The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis (2005), 88-93. Sykes 
(2005) further explains that protective subsidies upset the expectations associated with market 
access commitments in the GATT/WTO system, and distorts resource allocation as subsidies allow 
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since they diminish market access opportunities for competing exporters and upset 
expectations pursuant to negotiated trade agreements. This may result in fewer trade 
agreements and a battle of competing subsidy programs which may in turn dissipate 
resources on a broader scale for no useful economic purpose. Furthermore, even if an 
export subsidy does not frustrate market access expectations of other trading nations, it 
can be a source of economic distortion. Therefore, even though subsidies may be 
economically needed to correct market failures, they should be made contingent on the 
activity that is undersupplied due to the market failure. But, in political reality, it may be 
quite difficult to imagine a market failure that is best addressed with an export subsidy.
282
 
In contrast, Lawrence (2003) views that when it comes to export subsidies, the 
WTO has moved away from the paradigm of reciprocity which guides the rest of the 
agreement. This is based on the observation that there is no reference to their ‘trade 
effects’ in the SCM Agreement, and infringers do not have any mechanism for ‘legal 
breach’ as violations of the SCM Agreement are rather treated as ‘crimes’. The author 
notices that in the case of export subsidies, the basis of retaliation in the WTO to deal 
with violations has shifted from ‘rebalancing concessions’ to ‘inducing compliance’, 
which fundamentally changes the character of WTO retaliation.
283
 
In a more developed view on export subsidies, Lawrence and Stankard (2005) 
                                                                                                                   
domestic firms to expand output at the expense of imports, thus diverting productive resources into 
domestic production away from foreign production, and goods and services are no longer 
produced at the lowest possible cost.  
282
 This is because export subsidies may not necessarily be the solution that directly addresses the 
market failure problem at issue.  
283




argue that economic theory suggests greater leniency, rather than stringency for export 
subsidies. More specifically, the authors hold that there lacks economic reasoning not 
only for the unique status for export subsidies in terms of its outright prohibition in the 
WTO, but also for greater or more stringent retaliation for violation of export subsidy 
rules. Other than the strategic and political reasons for restricting export subsidies,
284
 the 
treatment of export subsidies in the WTO reflects a theoretical and practical orientation 
which is inconsistent with the objective of rebalancing of rights and obligations in the 
WTO. In particular, the WTO practice which shows an absence of injury or adverse effect 
as a prerequisite for challenging export subsidies may be a dangerous shift for any legal 




Bagwell (2008) uses a terms-of-trade-based welfare approach to understand the 
purpose and design of the WTO retaliation mechanism. In considering the SCM 
Agreements and the associated remedy system, he argues that the terms-of-trade approach 
does not support the use of disproportionate retaliation in response to export subsidies as 
a means of facilitating efficient breach, but rather, that export subsidies should be used 
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 Strategically, prohibition of export subsidies may provide help for governments, particularly 
for developed economies, to resist rent-seeking producers (since export subsidy reduces national 
welfare). Moreover, when exporters are forced to compete with foreign firms receiving export 
subsidies, governments are often pressured to ‘level the playing field’.  
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with greater leniency. Governments would achieve mutual gains through trade 
agreements that facilitate reciprocal increase in export subsidies. Also, while restrictions 
on the use of export subsidies may be favorable to exporting governments, they may 
come at the expense of importing countries and world welfare. Furthermore, Bagwell 
notes that the SCM Agreement provides for countervailing duties (CVDs) as another form 
of remedy against consequences that result in welfare loss for the importing country 
competing against subsidizing exporters, and that the importing government must gain 
when it imposes a CVD that offsets the effect of the export subsidy.
286
 Therefore, 
implying that disproportionate retaliation in response to export subsidies may constitute 
redundant or excessive response to violations of export subsidy rules. 
With regard to the method of calculating the level of countermeasures in 
prohibited subsidy cases, Grossman and Sykes (2011) stress the need to understand the 
objectives of the SCM Agreement and what behaviors it is meant to discourage.
287
 They 
conclude that there is no economic support for the ‘amount of subsidy’ approach in 
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 This is because the countervailing duty (raising tariff barriers) restores the original local price 
in the importing country, and through increased tariff revenue, resulting in a terms-of-trade gain 
for the importing country . 
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 In a more detailed analysis on the objective of the SCM Agreement from an economic 
perspective, Grossman and Mavroidis (2003a) observed that the main objective of the SCM 
Agreement is to discourage subsidies that might harm producers in importing countries. If the 
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previous arbitrations, and a more rational approach to retaliation would employ non-
prohibitive tariffs that would enhance the terms-of-trade of the importing country. 
Prohibitive tariffs would be an odd instrument of retaliation since they generally reduce 
welfare in the complainant country, while non-prohibitive tariffs could impose the same 
harm on the violator while generating a gain for the complainant. Therefore, the authors 
conclude that if the concern is about the effect of welfare of other nations when using the 
retaliation remedy, it is the magnitude of the terms-of-trade effect that matters, rather than 
the formal structure of the subsidy program.  
Bown and Ruta (2010) have examined how arbitrators authorizing the retaliation 
remedy use economic analysis to determine the awards. In particular, they observed that 
in disputes involving prohibited export subsidies, the arbitrators clearly deviate from the 
‘reciprocity approach’, based on the trade-effects approach from Bagwell and Staiger 
(2002), for determining the level of countermeasures, as compared to most dispute cases 
not involving prohibited subsidies. As already shown in Figure 1 (section 3.3.3.1), the 
size of the subsidy’s value does not necessarily correspond to the size of the trade effect 
of the subsidy, and the sizes ultimately depend on the elasticity of the world market’s 
import demand and the respondent country’s export supply. In conclusion, the authors 
contend that in the disputes in which the ‘reciprocity approach’ has not been used, the 
procedural difficulties confronted by the arbitrators and other political constraints may 
hinder the use of economic analysis in practice.
288
 
In an assessment of the economic perspectives on prohibited subsidy rules and 
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retaliation to enforce the rules so far, the economic approach on calculating the level of 
countermeasures in prohibited subsidy cases seems to be more rational and readily 
acceptable, as demonstrated by the departure of the WTO Arbitrators in their approach to 
determining the level of countermeasures in the actual cases (as observed in Section 
3.3.2.1). However, the understanding of the purpose and design of the remedy mechanism 
for enforcing prohibited subsidy rules seems to be based on inaccurate assumptions 
regarding the remedy system for prohibited subsidies. First of all, the arguments by 
Lawrence (2003, 2005) that the treatment of export subsidies should be in such a manner 
that brings it into conformity with the overall WTO paradigm of reciprocity, and 
accordingly, that export subsidies should be treated under the objective of ‘rebalancing 
concessions’, do not accurately take into account the purpose of the WTO rules on 
prohibited subsidies. Furthermore, Bagwell (2008)’s argument that the level of authorized 
retaliation in the case of export subsidies does not “facilitate efficient breach” seems to be 
based on a different understanding of the purpose of the SCM Agreement disciplining 
prohibited subsidies. In fact, the purpose of rules on prohibited subsidies in the WTO 
does not pertain to the objective of rebalancing WTO rights and obligations. As observed 
in the discussion so far on the purpose of remedies (Section 2.2) and the remedies in 
place and in action for prohibited subsidies in the WTO (Section 3.2.2), the rights and 
obligations in prohibited subsidy rules are not of a nature that can be ‘rebalanced’ through 
tariff renegotiations. Rather, the purpose lies in inducing the specific performance of 
‘withdrawal’ in accordance with the property rule. In other words, the purpose of 
remedies for enforcing prohibited subsidy rules is not served by the liability rule, under 
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which the main purpose of remedies would be to allow ‘efficient breach’. The purpose of 
remedies in the SCM Agreement for all kinds of subsidies should be to ensure a 
‘proportional’ level of countermeasures to the amount of harm uncured by the WTO-
inconsistent subsidy measure; but even if ‘proportional’, such remedies would not be 
used to allow ‘efficient breach’, at least when it comes to the case of prohibited subsidies.  
On a second note, Bagwell (2008) also mentions that the alternative remedy of 
countervailing duty (CVD) measures that may be imposed unilaterally by the importing 
country in response to an export subsidy offsets the effect of the subsidy, and thus 
retaliation in response to export subsidy violations may need to be weakened or granted 
greater leniency.
289
 However, this argument may be based on an imprecise understanding 
of the remedy mechanism for prohibited subsidies as well. In fact, WTO members can 
choose only one remedy track for addressing illegal subsidies – the unilateral track of 
imposing CVDs, or the multilateral track of resorting to WTO DSB for a multilateral 
determination of inconsistency and subsequent order to termination of the illegal subsidy. 
Therefore, the complaining party may only resort to one remedy for counteracting WTO-
inconsistent export subsidies, rather than being able to impose CVDs in addition to being 
allowed to retaliate for continued non-compliance with WTO ruling to remove the illegal 
export subsidy measure.  
On a similar note, Beshkar (2010) explains that the ‘expectation damages’ rule 
does not have the same efficiency properties in the trade context as it does in the context 
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of domestic contract law. This is because efficiency relies on the availability of ‘cash 
transfers’ as a means of compensation, while such monetary compensation is not 




More recently, Bagwell and Staiger (2012) revisited the economic logic behind 
the treatment of export subsidies in GATT/WTO, using a new model that takes into 
account some novel reasons for trade policy intervention.
291
 Existing theories have so far 
viewed GATT/WTO efforts to restrain export subsidies as representing an inefficient 
victory for exporting governments that come at the expense of importing governments. In 
an important departure from the existing literature, the authors demonstrate that it is 
possible to understand the formal treatment of export subsidies in trade agreements, under 
which the gradual tightening of restraints on export subsidies over the development of 
GATT/WTO may be interpreted as “deriving naturally from the gradual reduction in 
import barriers that member countries have negotiated”.
292
  
Figure 3 below depicts the linear Cournor delocation model that has been used 
by Bagwell and Staiger.
293
 With the price of a homogeneous good sold at the home 
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 The authors have used a ‘Cournot delocation’ model which exhibits a ‘firm delocation’ effect, 
whereby higher trade cost along one channel of trade increases the number of firms in the 
importing country while decreasing the number of firms in the exporting country. This model has 
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country (P) on the vertical axis, and the price of the good sold at the foreign country (P*) 
on the horizontal axis, the curves labeled   
    and   
    represent the home-firm 
and foreign-firm zero profit loci, respectively.
294
 The point at which the two curves cross, 
  , corresponds to the initial equilibrium price combination, which is denoted by    
  
and    
  . An increase in the trade cost ( ), triggered by an increase in either the import 
tariff imposed by the home country (th) or export tax imposed by the foreign country (tf), 
leaves the   
    unaffected, but shifts out the   
    locus to the new locus depicted 
by the curve labeled   
   , and the new equilibrium (  ) corresponds to prices denoted 
by    
  and    
  . In other words, an increase in trade cost that is imposed on foreign 
firms for exports to an importing (home) market, results in a competition-enhancing 
effect through the entry of domestic firms which reduces the price in the home market, 
and a competition-restricting effect through the exit of foreign firms which raises the 
price in the foreign market. This surprising price impact of tariff intervention is the key 
feature of the ‘firm delocation’ effect as first introduced by Venables (1985). This firm 
                                                                                                                   
with imperfectly competitive industries (i.e. duopoly). In this model, industries are comprised of 
firms which produce homogeneous goods, giving rise to two-way (intra-industry) trade in identical 
commodities, with transport costs arising between the markets, and each government imposing a 
trade tax on trade flows (trade cost) in and out of its market. Bagwell and Staiger first applied the 
Cournot delocation model in their working paper, ‘Delocation and Trade Agreements in 
Imperfectly Competitive Markets’ (NBER Working Paper 15444, October 2009), in which they 
considered the purpose and design of trade agreements in imperfectly competitive environments 
featuring firm-delocation effects. 
294
 These are: (1) the locus of home and foreign prices (P and P*) that, for any trade cost involved 
for home-firms to export a product (  ), is consistent with the home-firm zero-profit condition 
(market clearing condition), under which firms no longer enter the market since no more profit can 
be earned; and similarly, (2) the locus of home and foreign prices that, for any trade cost involved 
for foreign firms to export a product (    is consistent with the foreign-firm zero-profit condition. 
The equilibrium zero-profit condition holds since, under free entry, the number of home firms and 
foreign firms adjust to ensure that the maximized profits of home and foreign firms, respectively, 
are equal to zero. 
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delocation effect gives rise to a ‘novel’ motive for trade policy intervention: while an 
import tariff can benefit a country’s consumers, by stimulating entry of domestic firms 
and thereby reducing domestic prices through enhanced competition, this benefit, 
however, comes at the expense of foreign consumers, who experience higher prices as a 
result of foreign firm exit and diminished competition in the foreign market.
295
 
Accordingly, some form of trade policy intervention that corrects the inefficient outcome 
caused by the firm-delocation effect may be needed to better reflect the practical 
consequences of trade negotiations under the GATT/WTO.  
 








Source: Bagwell and Staiger (2009) 
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Therefore, according to Bagwell and Staiger (2012), for governments to achieve 
an efficient outcome (based on the assumption that governments use symmetric policies 
of import and export policies when they negotiate over import tariffs), the resulting 
import tariff must be positive (    ) and the associated export policy must be an export 
subsidy that exactly offsets the import tariff (    ) so that the sum of the total trade cost 
is zero. Similarly, when starting at an efficient point, if the import tariffs were further 
lowered to the free-trade level (    ), then efficiency would be maintained if and only 
if export subsidies were also capped at the free-trade level (    ), so as to maintain a 
total trade cost of zero (    . In other words, since current import tariff levels are near 
zero due to trade liberalization efforts to date under the GATT/WTO, the authors 
demonstrate that the gradual tightening of restraints on export subsidies that has occurred 
in the GATT/WTO may be interpreted as a natural consequence of the gradual reduction 
in import tariff levels that member countries have negotiated.
296
  
While there is almost no economic literature examining the alternative remedy of 
compensation as a remedy for prohibited subsidies, Sykes (2008) presents an examination 
of a system that provides direct compensation to exporters. He concludes that the case for 
replacing the current system of trade sanctions with some form of direct compensation to 
injured exporters is a weak one. He also notes the practice of WTO members that do not 
elect to use the compensation remedy when it is available, as shown in the US-Copyright 
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 However, there are limitations to applying this model as well. As explained by the authors, this 
model may offer rationale for GATT/WTO efforts to restrict the use of export subsidies in areas 
where import tariff levels are near zero, but not in areas where tariff levels are still high, such as in 







4.3 SUMMARY  
 
As observed thus far, the economic perspectives on the role of remedies in the 
enforcement of trade agreements mostly view remedies as a necessary feature of 
achieving efficient outcomes in terms of adjustments to circumstances that cannot be 
anticipated ex ante. Enforcement of trade agreements, which serves to help governments 
escape the prisoner’s dilemma problem of engaging in potential reciprocal subsidy wars, 
is assisted by GATT/WTO principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination that work 
together to deliver efficient trade policy outcomes. The role of the remedy of retaliation 
has also been econometrically shown to influence WTO Members to comply with the 
WTO rules, and economic models suggest that the optimal institutional arrangement for 
the current WTO remedy system, where there has been an accumulation of DSB rulings 
with precedent effect, may be the property rule under which rights are enforced by the 
specific performance of compliance.  
Furthermore, from an economic perspective, the key objective of retaliation as a 
remedy to enforce obligations seems to be the level of retaliation that will restore the lost 
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 Reasons provided are: (1) concerns of excessive reliance on expectation damages that will lead 
to compensating promisees for breach even when breach is inefficient; (2) enormous costs of 
measuring the economic losses caused by violations; (3) deadweight costs of the tax system to 
raise the funds to pay compensation; (4) increasing volume of litigations due to prospect of 
compensation; (5) aggravated concerns to developing countries that would not be able to meet 




welfare of the complainant, or more specifically, a level of tariffs that would offset the 
terms-of-trade loss due to the violation. It has been demonstrated through a series of 
economic models that the harm done, as calculated directly by the ‘amount of subsidy’, 
and the harm as calculated by the ‘trade-distorting impact’ of the subsidy cannot be 
equivalent. Therefore, there now seems to be an economic, as well as legal, consensus 
that the level of “appropriate countermeasures” against continued acts of non-compliance 
of prohibited subsidy rules, should not refer to the standard of calculating 
countermeasures based on the ‘amount of subsidy’, but rather on the ‘trade effects’ of the 
subsidy as a more ‘proportional’ level of countermeasures for inducing compliance. 
However, it is necessary to distinguish the rules for remedies that apply to 
different rights and obligations of different nature and with different objectives. In other 
words, the rights and obligations protected by the prohibited subsidy rules do not pertain 
to the rights that can be rebalanced through tariff (re)negotiations, but rather to the rights 
that are governed by the ‘property rule’, where the specific performance of compliance is 
required to resolve any breach of obligation. The rights and obligations protected by the 
prohibited subsidy rules would not be appropriately governed by the ‘liability rule’ which 
is based on the principle of ‘efficient breach’, or through the use of less-than-
proportionate damages. Therefore, several arguments by economic scholars which 
counter the treatment of export subsidies in the WTO as inconsistent with the objective of 
rebalancing rights and obligations in the WTO, and that the use of ‘disproportionate’ 
retaliation in response to export subsidies is a means of facilitating ‘efficient breach’, 
seem to be based on inaccurate assumptions and misunderstandings about the purpose of 
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remedies and the features of the rules on prohibited subsidies in the first place.  
Therefore, despite the generally critical arguments against the distinctive 
treatment of prohibited export subsidies in GATT/WTO from an economic perspective, 
the criticisms seem to fail to provide any firmly-grounded economic arguments against 
the rules on prohibited subsidies and the remedies to enforce related obligations. 
Furthermore, with assumptions and models that have been adjusted to better reflect the 
practicalities and features behind subsidization policies of governments, the results seem 


















‘REMEDYING’ THE REMEDY SYSTEM FOR PROHIBITED SUBSIDIES 
IN THE WTO 
 
 Based on the above analysis of the issues that have been identified by examining 
how the rules and disciplines on prohibited subsidies have been applied in practice and 
the economic perspectives on the treatment of prohibited subsidies in the WTO, this 
section will suggest several proposals to ‘remedy’ the current remedial regime for 
prohibited subsidies in the WTO dispute settlement system in a way that is most coherent 
with the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement as was drafted by the WTO Members. 
Furthermore, the proposed alternative system aims to move toward a direction that is 
supported by the economic principles that will contribute to establishing a remedial 
system that takes into account not only the efficiency of outcomes but also the feasibility 
and practicality of the remedy system. This section discusses in more detail the 
alternative system of retrospective remedies as a practical solution to addressing the 
implementation problem in prohibited subsidy disputes as identified in the previous 
chapters. The three alternative remedies discussed are concentrated on the discussion of: 
(1) the retrospective remedy of retaliation, (2) the retrospective remedy of monetary 






5.1 INTRODUCTION OF THE ‘RETROSPECTIVE RETALIATION’ REMEDY FOR 
NON-RECURRING PROHIBITED SUBSIDIES  
 
The persisting problem of the lack of any remedial measure against non-
recurring subsidies
298
 gives rise to legitimate concerns about the effectiveness of the 
dispute settlement system on its failure to deal with WTO-inconsistent prohibited subsidy 
measures that can be used without any economic consequences. If such noncompliant 
practices are not appropriately addressed, WTO members will be given ample opportunity 
to repeatedly engage in temporary subsidization practices that do not ultimately comply 
with the WTO rules, thus creating a large loophole in the WTO system.    
As a partial solution to resolve this problem, introducing a ‘retrospective remedy 
of retaliation’ for addressing past non-recurring subsidies may need to be seriously 
considered. This notion is distinguished from the retrospective remedy through monetary 
compensation, which will be discussed in the following section (section 5.2). Under this 
scenario, the level of retaliation is calculated retrospectively, from the period where the 
measure at issue has been determined to be a violation of WTO obligations (adoption of 
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 In fact, there is no legal distinction between ‘recurring’ and ‘non-recurring’ subsidies as 
proscribed in the SCM Agreement. However, there seems to be quite a number of WTO dispute 
cases which involve issues related to non-recurring subsidies, and the lack of sufficient treatment 
under the current subsidy discipline in the WTO. Perhaps, as an economic criteria for 
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Grossman and Mavroidis (2003a), supra note 287, at 189-193.  
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the panel report), rather than from the prospective period of time when the measure at 
issue needs to be implemented and compliant with WTO obligations (end of the 
‘reasonable period of time’).
299
  
The reasoning behind this approach is that countermeasures (as a temporary 
measure imposed to induce compliance) need be “proportional” to the harm done by the 
illegal measure. This is a fundamental principle for rules on remedies in public 
international law as stipulated in the International Law Commissions’ codifications 
regarding the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. Proportionality is 
the principle used to assess the lawfulness of countermeasures, and also serves as a 
restraint on imposing ‘punitive’ sanctions which would more likely lead to a spiral of 
counter-retaliations.
300
 Article 35 of the ILC Draft Articles specifies that while a state 
that commits an internationally wrongful act is under the obligation to make ‘restitution’ 
(re-establishment of the situation which existed prior to the commitment of the wrongful 
act), the level of restitution should “not involve a burden out of all proportion to the 
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benefit” from the remedy of restitution. In other words, the obligation of restitution is not 
unlimited, and the burden of restitution imposed on the infringing state and the benefit 
gained by the injured state must be proportional. Furthermore, the commentaries to the 
relevant provision explain that the notion of proportionality is based on considerations of 
“equity and reasonableness”.
301
 In the WTO, Arbitrators have referred to the principle of 
proportionality in their assessment of the “appropriate” level of countermeasures for 
prohibited subsidies or the level of “nullification or impairment” for non-subsidy 
violations.  
As observed, the role of proportionality in WTO law has been mainly to limit the 
extent of countermeasures that WTO Members may take against each other.
302
 However, 
in the case of prohibited subsidies, the opposite seems to have been true. Three 
Arbitrations that have authorized countermeasures against violations of the prohibited 
subsidy rules have interpreted the requirement of proportionality attached to the meaning 
of “appropriate” in Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement as the need to consider both 
culpability and harm in assessing the level of countermeasures so as not to be 
‘disproportionate’. For prohibited subsidy cases, the Arbitrators seem to have applied the 
principle of proportionality as an ‘aggravating’ factor rather than as a ‘mitigating’ 
factor.
303
 As a result, the awarded countermeasures calculated on the basis of ‘amount of 
subsidy’ in the first three Article 22.6 Arbitrations related to prohibited subsidies can be 
viewed as being of a level that is ‘more-than-proportionate’, and has raised some serious 
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concerns given the fact that the WTO is a multilateral agreement under which multiple 
Members affected by the measure may challenge the prohibited subsidy.  
On the contrary, in the case of non-recurring subsidies of which payments have 
been made in the past and thus not within the jurisdiction of the panels since they are no 
longer existent, the concern lies in the fact that the level of countermeasures for non-
recurring subsidies is ‘disproportionate’ in the sense that it is ‘less-than-proportional’. In 
other words, since no countermeasure can be authorized for repealed measures under the 
current prospective system, the level of countermeasures for non-recurring subsidies is 
naturally disproportionate to the harm incurred by the subsidy measure. Therefore, the 
lack of a retrospective remedy for non-recurring subsidies results in an ineffective remedy 
system for prohibited subsidies in the sense that it offers a disproportionate (less than 
proportional) level of remedies, which goes against the basic principle of 
countermeasures in customary international law and WTO law.  
While there may be strong criticism against retrospective remedies in the sense 
that they can be punitive or prohibitive, this pertains to the case of recurring subsidy 
measures where there are on-going benefits conferred by the prohibited subsidy measure, 
and thus fall within the jurisdiction of the current prospective remedy system. In such 
cases, the retrospective application of remedies may result in an additional increase in the 
level of countermeasures which can result in unnecessarily punitive sanctions against 
breach of obligations.  
There may also be arguments that since the ultimate objective of the WTO 
dispute settlement system is to have the inconsistent measure removed, the fact that a 
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prohibited subsidy measure that once existed, but no longer exists, may be a situation that 
is not problematic from the perspective of WTO law. If such subsidy programs that have 
existed long before are all subject to challenges within the WTO, it would undermine the 
legitimacy and functioning of the WTO dispute settlement system.
304
  
However, in an economic analysis by Grossman and Mavroidis (2003), the injury 
caused by non-recurring subsidies is shown to be the same as the injury caused by 
recurring subsidies. While the direct effect of a non-recurring subsidy is to increase the 
scale of investment, the indirect effect of lower marginal costs to the domestic producers 
(since profit-maximizing firms will produce at a greater scale and supply more output) 
will ultimately reduce the world price of the subsidized good, and as a result, producers in 
the importing country who must compete with the subsidized good may suffer as a result. 
This is the same effect of a recurring subsidy which induces a decline in world price and 




The economic implications of the lack of remedy for non-recurring subsidies 
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<Figure 4> Effect of Subsidies and Retaliatory Remedies in the 









As shown in Figure 4, E
0
 is the point representing the equilibrium price 
combination of the home and foreign firms (  
  and   
  ). In this figure, however, the 
foreign-firm zero profit loci shifts to the left, due to the effect of the subsidy measure 
imposed by the foreign country (exporting country), from   
 =0 to   
 =0. The subsidy 
granted to foreign firms drives down the prices in the foreign market due to the entry of 
foreign firms and resulting enhanced competition in the foreign market. On the other 
hand, the prices in the domestic market (importing country) rise due to the opposite effect. 
As a result, the initial equilibrium point (E
0
) shifts to a new equilibrium point (E
1
), where 
changes in the prices in the domestic and foreign markets benefit foreign consumers at 







   

















In order to return to the efficient equilibrium point of E
0
, there need be 
‘proportional’ retaliatory countermeasures in the form of import tariffs that can offset the 
effect of the subsidy on prices. However, the lack of any such remedy will be unable to 
bring back the economies back to the equilibrium point. In the case of non-recurring 
subsidies, this would mean that the lack of retrospective retaliatory countermeasures as a 
remedy to offset the effect of the subsidy would retain this inefficient new equilibrium. 
Furthermore, only when the retaliatory tariffs are ‘proportional’ to the trade effects of the 
subsidy measure will the impact of the subsidy measure be fully offset by the retaliatory 
remedy. This implies that under the current prospective remedy system for non-recurring 
subsidies, the equilibrium remains at the inefficient level of E
1
; while introducing a 
retrospective remedy system for non-recurring subsidies would bring the equilibrium 





With regard to the method for applying the retrospective remedy system, there 
have been some views by WTO Members regarding the time-period for calculating the 
level of retrospective remedies. In a proposal of its methodology for calculating the 
“appropriate” level of countermeasures in the Australia-Leather (Article 21.5) proceeding, 
the US refers to a ‘prospective portion’ of the subsidy to be withdrawn, by allocating the 
amount of the grant payments over the useful life of the recipient firm’s production assets, 
and calculating the amount allocable to the “period following adoption of the [panel] 
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 In its reasoning, the US explained that it found support for this approach in the 
practice of the Members in calculating subsidy amounts under Part V of the SCM 
Agreement that provides for countervailing measures as a unilateral remedy. In a related 
provision on retroactivity for the application on provisional measures and countervailing 
duties, Article 20.1 of the SCM Agreement provides that such duties shall be applied to 
products which enter for consumption after the time when the decision on the existence 
and amount of the subsidy is made effective. In this light, a balance between the 
multilateral and unilateral remedy tracks may need to be considered. Therefore, aside 
from the need for a retrospective calculation of the level of countermeasures for non-
recurring prohibited subsidies, there may also be the need for a more balanced approach 
in the two tracks of remedy that are separately allowed for subsidy disputes.
308
 
Furthermore, in the case of non-recurring subsidies, the implementation period would be 
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meaningless, since the measure no longer exists for it to be withdrawn within a 
‘reasonable period of time’ for implementation.  
Taking into account the proportionality concerns and the multilateral approach to 
remedies, the standard for calculating the level of the retaliation remedy for non-recurring 
subsidies will preferably have to be linked to the actual harm done by the illegal subsidy 
measure, which would be the trade-distorting effects of the subsidy measure on the 
injured Member, rather than the amount of the subsidy in its entirety. When considering 
the nature of the retaliation remedy as a multilateral-track remedy that allows other 
Members affected by the measure to challenge the measure as well, it gives legitimate 
reason for apportioning the amount of injury based on individual retaliation rights rather 
than for the imposition of countermeasures that are based on the global effect of the 
subsidy. As Grossman and Sykes (2011) have shown, the imposition of ‘non-prohibitive’ 
tariffs that enhance the terms-of-trade welfare of the retaliating Member country is a more 
rational approach to retaliation.
309
 While the authors have used the term ‘non-prohibitive’, 
in the context of their paper, it is rather closer in meaning to the notion of ‘proportional to 
the harm incurred by the illegal subsidy measure’ in the legal context.  
In this light, the approach by the Arbitrators in US-Upland Cotton (Article 22.6) 
may provide some direction in our quest to apply ‘proportional’ countermeasures to 
address non-recurring prohibited subsidies in a retroactive manner. In order to calculate 
the ‘trade effects’ of the prohibited subsidy measure at issue, the Arbitrators calculated the 
value of the subsidy and the additional sales incurred by the subsidy, which was 
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apportioned to the share of Brazil’s market in the world export market for cotton products. 
Basically, the Arbitrator’s approach was based on the ‘benefit’ that was conferred to the 
recipient of the subsidy, but reduced to the amount that is commensurate to the harm 
suffered by the individual injured Member. In this case, the time-period that was used to 
calculate the countermeasures was the period following the end of the implementation 
period, since the case involved recurring prohibited subsidy measures that were revised 
near the end of the implementation period. However, when imported to the case of non-
recurring subsidies, this same methodology for calculating the trade-distorting effects of 
the subsidy on individual measures can be applied from the period after which the panel 
report is adopted, since the multilateral determination on the existence of a prohibited 
subsidy measure is made at that time. This proposed methodology as applied in the 
Australia-Leather dispute for calculating the “appropriate” level of countermeasures for 
non-recurring prohibited subsidies is shown in Figure 5 below.  
<Figure 5> Retrospective Retaliation Remedy for Non-Recurring  
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As shown in Figure 5, the level of the retrospective retaliation remedy has been 
calculated from the period after the adoption of the panel report where the determination 
of the existence of a prohibited subsidy has been made. As explained, since the subsidy 
measure in this case is not existent to be subject to withdrawal by the end of a reasonable 
period of time, there will be no need to take account of the RPT. Instead, the period 
applicable for non-recurring subsidies would be the period when the DSB has determined 
the existence of a prohibited subsidy – period when the Panel Report is adopted. If any 
kind of remedy is to be granted for past one-time prohibited subsidies, it would have to be 
calculated from the time when a determination of non-compliance has been made, which 
would be the period when the panel report has been adopted. Therefore, in the Australia-
Leather case, the ‘proportional’ retaliation remedy to be awarded would have to be 
calculated from the period following the adoption of the panel report until when the grant 
contract ends. For comparison purpose, the ‘prospective remedy’ as indicated in Figure 5 
is the amount of remedy that was proposed by Australia in the pertinent case.  
The key objective of the retrospective remedy for non-recurring subsidies is that 
there need be ‘proportionality’ between the remedies provided as compensation for harm 
done by the breach and the benefits gained from the breach. Although the remedy is only 
temporary in nature, it should be at least proportional to the harm done by the non-
recurring measure, since if to the contrary (less than proportionate), there will be no 
incentive for the infringing party to give up its benefits from the breach. The current 
system of prospective remedies does not provide for that ‘proportionality’ for non-
recurring prohibited subsidies, creating an important loophole in the WTO remedy system. 
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In order to provide that ‘proportionality’, the aim of the retrospective retaliation remedy 
is to devise a method that will best capture the amount of injury by the non-recurring 
subsidy based on the methods proposed by WTO Members and Arbitrators. As shown 
using the Cournot model (Figure 4), the proposed retrospective remedies would bring the 
WTO remedy system closer to the equilibrium level than the current prospective remedy 
system for addressing non-recurring subsidies.   
There may also be limitations to this proposed remedy in that the 
countermeasures would not exactly match the amount of harm done by the non-recurring 
subsidy measures. From this perspective, the remedy of monetary compensation may be 
considered as a better remedy, since it has the advantage of being able to offer direct 
compensation that better approximates the amount of injury by an illegal act. In the next 
section, we will discuss why a retrospective remedy through monetary compensation is 
not a viable option as a retrospective remedy for prohibited subsidy disputes. 
 
5.2 MONETARY COMPENSATION AS A RETROSPECTIVE REMEDY FOR 
PROHIBITED SUBSIDIES   
 
 There have been some confusion on the notion of retrospective remedies with 
regard to its form. The compliance panel in Australia-Leather (Article 21.5) viewed 
retrospective remedies in the form of monetary payment, as it ordered full repayment of 
the monies that were granted to the recipients of the subsidy. Furthermore, the strong 
opposition by the WTO Members regarding retrospective remedies pertains to the form of 
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retrospective repayment of the subsidies received, rather than the notion of retrospectivity 
itself. Therefore, the reasoning provided by the compliance panel in Australia-Leather 
may have to be distinguished between the need for more effective remedies for 
addressing non-recurring subsidies in the WTO system vis-à-vis the argument for the 
repayment of monies as a remedy for past one-time subsidies.  
 The remedy of monetary compensation is different from the current ‘trade’ 
compensation remedy as provided in the WTO dispute settlement system. The current 
compensation remedy is in the form of lowering tariff barriers in areas other than where 
the violation has been found, and is allowed as a temporary remedy until the DSB 
recommendation and rulings are implemented. Furthermore, agreement on the 
compensation remedy is voluntary (only possible with the consent of the non-complying 
country), and if granted, should be provided on an MFN basis according to the non-
discriminatory principles of the WTO.
310
 Therefore, from an economic perspective, 
‘trade’ compensation can be preferred to the retaliation remedy (lifting of tariff barriers) 
since it is trade-liberalizing rather than trade-restricting. However, trade compensation 
has, at the same time, serious drawbacks on both complainants and respondents in the 
dispute. This is because, for the complainant, compensation in the form of lowering trade 
barriers in other areas does not actually eliminate the non-compliance in the area subject 
to the dispute, thus having no compliance-inducing effect or any practical ‘compensation’ 
effect. Furthermore, the voluntary nature of trade compensation agreements provide no 
incentive for the respondent party since it would mean agreeing to increased foreign 
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 On the other hand, the remedy of compensation in the form of monetary 
repayment has no specific legal basis in the WTO Agreements.
312
 However, the 
international law on remedies provides for the remedy of compensation as a form of 
‘reparation’, which must be made in full for any injury caused by an internationally 
wrongful act.
313
 Based on this observation, some commentators raise the possibility of 
introducing monetary compensation as a form of retrospective remedy on a case-by-case 
basis.
314
 There are also commentators who view that monetary compensation may be a 
reasonable possibility, especially when the retaliation remedy is not effective, especially 
for smaller countries.
315
 Since small countries generally face terms of trade that are fixed, 
retaliation may not provide them with any remedial effect since responding with 
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increased tariff barriers will lead to less efficient outcomes for their economy (‘shooting 
oneself in its own foot’). Pauwelyn (2000) suggests that pecuniary compensation would 
make more economic sense since it directly compensates the injured sector, it would be 
easier to monitor, and more accessible for weaker WTO members.
316
   
 Economists who analyze the WTO system using the economic theory of 
contracts note that in an efficient enforcement system, parties will be induced to comply 
when compliance yields greater benefits to the injured party than the costs to the 
infringing party, whereas parties will depart from its obligations when the costs of 
compliance to the infringing party exceeds the benefits to the injured party. The key 
element for the latter situation where infringing parties will opt for ‘efficient breach’ is 
‘expectation damages’ that “place the promisee in as good a position as it would have 
been if the promisor had performed”.
317
 In the WTO context, the remedy of monetary 
compensation will allow the infringing party to ‘efficiently breach’ from its obligations 
when it deems that it is more beneficial, which is viewed to be a more efficient outcome 
where unanticipated circumstances cannot be covered by WTO treaties.    
 There has been one WTO dispute case where the remedy of monetary 
compensation has been awarded under Article 25 of the DSU. In US – Section 110(5) 
Copyright Act (Article 25), the Arbitrator determined that the level of nullification or 
impairment suffered by the EC was €1,219,900 per year.
318
 However, after failure by the 
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US to implement the recommendations within the reasonable period of time, request for 
authorization of suspension of concessions was made pursuant to DSU Article 22.6. Later, 
parties to the dispute agreed to suspend the Article 22.6 proceedings and agreed on a 
mutually satisfactory temporary arrangement under which the US was to make a lump 
sum payment to EC performing rights societies in the amount of $3.3 million.
319
 
 However, the award of compensation in monetary form in the above case can be 
quite distinguishable from the case of prohibited subsidies. This form of remedy may be 
appropriate as a remedy for disputes under the TRIPS Agreement, where it is clear who 
the right holders are, and intellectual property rights are associated with direct pecuniary 
benefits granted to the right holders for their intellectual property. On the other hand, 
subsidy measures have broader economic consequences, such as the indirect effect of 
stimulating investments in related industries where the subsidy has been granted. Subsidy 
payments may be made in the form of money transfer, but the impact need be assessed 
policy-wise, and it is not clear who the recipients are. Therefore, importing the case for 
monetary compensation as a remedy for prohibited subsidy cases may not be appropriate, 
as the two cases do not exactly match in terms of the effects of the monetary transaction.  
 In a broader sense, the remedy of monetary compensation is problematic in the 
sense that it provides a ‘buy-out’ option for respondent parties that have larger economies, 
while it may be more burdensome to the respondent parties that have less-developed, 
smaller economies. While this possibility of ‘buying out’ may also apply to the retaliation 
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remedy, it has more serious consequences for smaller economies when faced with the 
remedy of monetary compensation as a respondent party to a dispute, since it would 
require the collection of money from its national budget or private companies, which may 
not afford to make such payments. Furthermore, an agreement on monetary compensation 
between the disputing parties normally occurs under the framework of a bilateral 
arrangement, where the power imbalance among developed and developing countries 
further manifests itself, thus further undermining the position of the smaller economies 
which tend to have weaker negotiating positions. In addition, the advantage of resorting 
to a more legally rigorous multilateral remedy track to challenge the other country’s 
subsidization practice may be undermined in such a case. More importantly, since the 
payment of compensation has been agreed in accordance with the terms of a mutually 
satisfactory arrangement, there will be no means to enforce the payment of monies in the 
event of non-compliance. In a related problem, rather than serving as a ‘temporary’ 
enforcement tool to induce compliance, monetary compensation can become a ‘final’ 
remedy, and hinder the achievement of the primary and ultimate obligation of compliance, 
which would be the withdrawal of the inconsistent measure at issue. Rather than serving 
its intended temporary role of enforcing the rulings by the DSB Arbitrators in order to 
induce compliance, monetary compensation may enable WTO Members to ultimately 
‘buy out’ of their WTO obligations.
320
  
 In the more specific case of prohibited subsidies, the problem lies in the 
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implementation of the remedy. Where initial subsidy payments have been made by the 
government to its firms or the industry, the expropriation of the monies may constitute a 
constitutional issue and create democratic concerns as it is related to the private property 
rights. As a number of WTO Members have reacted to the DSB ruling to pay back the 
monies received in Australia-Leather (Article 21.5), the constitutional constraints on 
expropriating property are indeed a practical issue that cannot be ignored.
321
 Particularly, 
considering the fact that the WTO Agreement is a treaty among WTO Members and its 
legitimacy lies in the willingness of the Member governments to comply with the agreed 
obligations, countermeasures that go against the very nature of their constitutional law or 
democratic expectations are unlikely to gain much support. While rules and norms are 
important for maintaining the predictability and stability of any system, the feasibility of 
measures must not be overlooked, especially when it pertains to the actions of sovereign 
states. Indeed, the most significant constraint to applying the remedy of monetary 
compensation is the issue of enforcement as noted by many legal commentators in 
discussing the possibility of monetary compensation as a WTO remedy.
322
  
Furthermore, a law-and-economics approach regarding the purpose of remedies 
in the WTO dispute settlement system provides some support to the view that the remedy 
of monetary compensation may not be appropriate for prohibited subsidies. According to 
Pauwelyn (2007), the WTO rules on prohibited subsidies are protected by a property rule 
where specific performance (i.e. withdrawal of the prohibited subsidy) is required for 
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 However, allowing monetary compensation as a form of remedy under 
the liability rule would go against the nature of protection that governs the discipline on 
prohibited subsidies. Since prohibited subsidies are illegal per se, the transaction costs 
involved in dispute settlement can be considered to be lower than for other cases, since 
only existence of a prohibited subsidy is required for a ruling of non-compliance. 
Furthermore, as Maggi and Staiger (2009) suggest, as uncertainty over the benefits of free 
trade falls, the optimal institutional arrangement tends to move away from liability rules 
toward property rules. On the other hand, liability rules are more prevalent than property 
rules in issue areas that are characterized by a higher degree of uncertainty over the joint 
benefits of free trade.
324
  
However, this does not mean that the option of monetary compensation should 
be totally ruled out as a remedy for prohibited subsidies. The possibility of monetary 
compensation in the context of a mutually agreed solution should remain open for 
disputing parties who wish to resort to that option for a satisfactory resolution of the 
dispute at hand. But, in other more general cases, establishing the remedy of monetary 
compensation as a permanent remedy which may substitute the primary obligation of 
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It should also be noted that the remedy of monetary compensation is 
increasingly being considered as a remedy for enforcement in bilateral FTAs as well. In a 
quite unique case, the recently concluded Korea-US FTA provides for dispute settlement 
rules which allow the payment of “monetary assessment” in lieu of the retaliation remedy. 
More specifically, a complaining party may not retaliate if the respondent party offers to 
pay an “annual monetary assessment”. If the parties, however, are not able to reach an 
agreement on the amount of the monetary payment, the amount may be “equal to 50 
percent of the level of the benefits the panel has determined…to be of equivalent effect”, 
or if there has been no prior panel determination, “50 percent of the level that the 
complaining party has proposed to suspend”.
326
 Considering the fact that FTAs are 
essentially bilateral arrangements related to market access commitments, such a provision 
allowing for monetary compensation may be a practical alternative as a remedy for 
enforcing negotiated commitments. However, it is also true that there are no bilateral 
arrangements covering the subject matter of subsidies in any bilateral FTAs, since subsidy 
matters, inherently and structurally, need to be dealt with on a multilateral basis, mainly 
due to its repercussive economic effects. Therefore, the introduction of the monetary 
compensation remedy as a means of enforcement in the case of non-implementation of 
FTA obligations cannot be seen as applicable to the discipline on subsidies in the context 
of WTO obligations.   
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5.3 IMPROVING THE ‘FAST TRACK’ PROCEDURE FOR PROHIBITED SUBSIDY 
DISPUTES  
 
Most prohibited subsidy disputes are faced with the problem of delayed 
implementation of the rulings and recommendations by the DSB. As illustrated in the 
introductory part of this section (Table 9), some of the lengthiest disputes involving 
prohibited subsidies have taken up to 7 years before the injured party was able to reach 
any multilateral authorization for using countermeasures to enforce DSB rulings to 
withdraw the illegal subsidy measure. Such delays have led to concerns about the 
effectiveness of the multilateral WTO remedies for prohibited subsidy disputes and the 
legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system as a whole.  
The need for making the WTO dispute settlement system more effective by 
addressing the lack of timeliness in compliance with the DSB rulings has been raised by 
many legal commentators, albeit from different aspects of the problem. Davey (2010) 
frames the compliance problem in terms of ‘quality’ and ‘timeliness’, explaining that the 
‘timeliness-of-compliance’ problem is a broader problem that exacerbates the ‘quality-of-
compliance’ problem. The timeliness problem is a broader problem in the sense that it 
encompasses the failure of WTO Members to implement within the RPT, questionable 
implementation measures, Article 21.5 actions, and the lack of serious attempts by the 
adjudicating bodies to stay within the established timeframes. The quality of compliance 
problem arises from the practice of WTO Members which implement measures that have 
been slightly revised to accommodate DSB recommendations and are deemed 
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unsatisfactory by the complainant Member, thus resulting in a series of compliance 
proceedings that delay dispute resolution.   
There may be numerous reasons why WTO Members do not promptly comply. 
However, in the case of prohibited subsidies, due to the strategic nature of national 
subsidy programs which are closely linked to the economic performance of a country, 
both the quality and timeliness of compliance are significant matters of concern than for 
other trade policy instruments. As shown in Brazil-Aircraft and US-FSC disputes, WTO 
Members can either implement measures of inadequate quality to meet the DSB 
recommendations which often times result in secondary recourses to the compliance 
proceedings, or, as in US-Upland Cotton, implement measures to temporarily satisfy the 
compliance panel requirements, and then re-instate a prohibited subsidy measure after the 
compliance proceedings and avoid any countermeasures being imposed against them.  
The current prospective system that calculates the level of countermeasures 
from the period following the end of the RPT may be an important reason for delaying 
prompt implementation within the RPT. There would be no incentive for the respondent 
party to comply early if it can wait until the end of the given implementation period 
without any economic consequences for doing so. As in the US-Upland Cotton dispute, 
the US implemented the DSB recommendation at the end of the RPT by revising the 
GSM 102 subsidy program (although unsatisfactorily), while retaining the Step 2 subsidy 
program until a request for a compliance panel was made. Davey (2010) suggests that by 
measuring trade effects from an earlier point in time (i.e. period following adoption of 
panel report) would greatly encourage timely compliance, although it may not solve the 
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quality of compliance problem.
327
  
However, it seems questionable whether calculating the level of 
countermeasures from another set time-period which does not take into account the time-
point when the respondent party has actually implemented the revised measure would be 
of any value. In other words, regardless of whether the implementation measure has been 
taken earlier or not within the RPT, if the measure is determined non-compliant by the 
compliance panel, the level of countermeasure awarded will be the same, as it will be 
calculated from the date following the adoption of the panel report in either case. In the 
case of recurring prohibited subsidies, measuring the level of countermeasures from an 
earlier point in time would only have the effect of increasing the level of countermeasures. 
Furthermore, recurring prohibited subsidies, which involve on-going benefits conferred 
by the subsidy measure, falls within the jurisprudence of the current prospective remedy 
system. In such cases, the retrospective application of remedies may result in 
unnecessarily punitive countermeasures. Therefore, in the case of recurring prohibited 
subsidies, a more practical solution would seem to involve methods that would capture 
the trade-distorting effects of the prohibited subsidy measure that was not awarded any 
countermeasure due to its repeal before establishment of a compliance panel. After all, as 
in the US-Upland Cotton dispute, while countermeasures were authorized for the revised 
GSM 102 measure, there was none authorized for the repealed Step 2 measure. In fact, 
the repealed Step 2 measure was effectively replaced by the 2008 US Farm Bill which 
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was not subject to the Article 22.6 proceeding as it was introduced by the US after the 
Article 21.5 Arbitration was finalized. Therefore, when it comes to recurring subsidy 
measures, a more serious problem seems to involve the ‘quality’ problem of compliance, 
such as the practice by WTO Members of reinstating measures in order to avoid the 
jurisprudence of the current WTO remedy system.  
Furthermore, there is value to giving Members a certain period of time to 
implement the DSB recommendations.
328
 It may be more important to enable infringing 
Members to “fully” comply within the set implementation period so that no further delays 
in compliance would occur. Despite problems related to the “reasonable period of time 
(RPT)” for implementation under the current system, WTO Members do maintain the 
right for the ‘reasonable period of time’ for legislating and administering measures that 
need be taken to comply with the DSB recommendations. Therefore, while ‘preserving’ 
the requirement to take measures to comply within the given implementation period 
(RPT), it may be more imminent for Members to have a means to ‘improve’ the dispute 
settlement procedures by addressing such practical problems as shown in the US-Upland 
Cotton dispute. Especially in the case of prohibited subsidies, the SCM Agreement 
provides for a ‘fast track’ procedure under which dispute resolution procedures are 
expedited, mostly by half the time frame that is proscribed for the general DSU. However, 
the current practice by some WTO Members regarding their implementation actions for 
                                           
328
 In the current Doha negotiations on DSU reform, a number of delegations expressed concern 
about changing the nature and role of the RPT. The importance of maintaining the reasonable 
period of time for implementation was emphasized, and the time was considered ‘fundamental’ to 
give members ‘a chance to implement DSB rulings’. Report by the Chairman to the Trade 
Negotiations Committee, Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, TN/DS/25, 21 April 
2011, at pages B-4 and B-22, paras. 24 and 134.  
167 
 
subsidy rules violations seems to be making the ‘fast track’ procedure void and 
ineffective. Indeed, in the US-Upland Cotton dispute, the US had argued that the new 
measures (marketing loan and counter-cyclical payments made after the expiry of the 
implementation period) were not such a measure taken to comply, and therefore, “not 
properly within the scope of Article 21.5 proceedings”.
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Regarding the issue of jurisdiction of Article 21.5 compliance panels, there has 
been some observation that the approaches by Article 21.5 panels can be summarized as: 
(1) giving deference to the complaining member, and (2) looking for a clear connection 
between the new measure and the original violation, with both approaches having evolved 
significantly. However, in general, when it comes to measures alleged to be non-
compliant that are ongoing at the time of Article 21.5 proceedings, the compliance panels 
have broadly authorized 21.5 jurisdiction over almost all measures.
330
  
On the other hand, when it comes to measures that have been re-enacted during 
or after the Article 21.5 proceedings under the current WTO dispute settlement system, it 
is more likely that a complainant member may have to re-initiate a dispute to challenge 
the “new” measures. If members have no other means to seek a remedy against such new 
measures under the current system, then this may be another significant cause of delay in 
efficient dispute resolution. This may pertain especially to the case of prohibited subsidies, 
since there are more ‘stringent’ requirements for dispute resolution in the SCM 
Agreement as compared to the general DSU. In fact, whereas the DSU requires violating 
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members to ‘bring the measure into conformity’, the SCM Agreement obligates members 
to ‘remove the adverse effects’ or ‘withdraw the subsidy’. Further compounded by the 
fundamental political nature of subsidies (which provide less incentive for prompt 
removal), the efficient resolution of disputes via satisfactory or sufficient withdrawal of 
the subsidy measure at issue may be more difficult. In such a case, a complainant member 
will have to bring a new case to the WTO in order obtain some kind of redress against the 
violating re-enacted measure under the current remedy system.    
The need for reform regarding the problem of such “moving targets” has been 
raised as a proposal for reform regarding Article 21 of the DSU. The problem arises due 
to the limited jurisdiction of Article 21.5 panels to make compliance determinations only 
regarding measures that are existent as of the time of its establishment. Pauwelyn (2004) 
suggests that there is a need to distinguish the mandate of normal panel procedures from 
the mandate of Article 21.5 panel procedures so that such “new” measures that occurred 
just before or during the Article 21.5 procedures can be examined by the panel. However, 
he also cautions that if the new measures are examined, the panel may risk going beyond 
its mandate as provided for in the DSU. But if not, it can invite respondents to simply 
change their measure just before or during procedures so as to avoid adverse ruling.
331
   
In a similar note with Pauwelyn, Townsend and Charnovitz (2011) suggest the 
need for broadened jurisprudence of Article 21.5 panels. They argue that the 
jurisprudence of compliance panels should be extended to cases of ‘uncompliance’ 
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(temporarily revising measures to satisfy the compliance panel, then later replacing them 
with new WTO-inconsistent measures), so that the compliance of replacement measures 
can be judged after a compliance panel finding, rather than having such cases referred to 
newly initiated disputes. However, the authors go further to contend that the voluntary 
“sequencing” arrangement agreed between the US and Brazil has forfeited from the 
complaining party (Brazil) its right to authorized retaliatory action as provided by the 
DSU when there has been no measure taken to comply from the respondent party (US), at 
least not for a long time (14 months) after the expiry of the implementation period.
332
    
There have also been proposals made to the DSB by WTO Members regarding 
the implementation problem related to such new measures that are able to escape the DSB 
jurisprudence. Korea proposed the need for “frontloading” the determination of 
nullification or impairment at the Article 21.5 panel stage to facilitate the implementation 
of compliance panel proceedings with or without reference to Article 22.6 arbitration.
333
 
Korea reasoned that it is a feasible possibility since both Article 21.5 and 22.6 panels are 
composed of members of the original panel, and that the Member concerned will be able 
to have an up-front picture of the consequences of non-compliance and thus be more 
strongly encouraged to comply. Brazil proposed a ‘fast track’ procedure for panel and 
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appeal proceedings if it concerns a measure that has already been determined to be illegal 
by a previous DSB ruling.
334
  
There actually exists some legal basis in the DSU text for broadening the scope 
of Article 21.5 jurisdiction. In accordance with Article 21.5 of the DSU, compliance 
panels should assess not only the “consistency” but also the “existence … of measures 
taken to comply”.
335
 Therefore, by law, Article 21.5 compliance panels seemingly have 
broad jurisdiction to scrutinize “new” measures that “exist” during or after compliance 
proceedings. Furthermore, the relevant provision seems to emphasize the need for 
resorting to the original panel ‘wherever possible’, and not go back to stage one to initiate 
a new dispute, which would further delay dispute resolution for the pertinent case.  
In WTO case law in general, the Appellate Body seems to have generally 
rejected the arguments that “new” measures should be ignored from Article 21.5 panels. 
For example, the Appellate Body in US-Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5) ruled that a 
violating member’s designation of a measure as one taken to comply is relevant, but it is 
ultimately a determination to be made by the Article 21.5 compliance panel with regard to 
the “ambit” of its jurisdiction.
336
 In other related dispute cases, the Appellate Body 
directed compliance panels to assess whether the new measure is part of a “continuum of 
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events relating to compliance”,
337
 and that the compliance panels should examine the 
“timing, nature and effects of the various measures” and the “factual and legal 
background” against which the new measures are adopted”.
338
 
Therefore, both in terms of case law and legal text, in addition to the suggested 
proposals for reform regarding DSU Article 21.5, there seems to be a rather consistent 
and coherent argument for ‘improving’ the current Article 21.5 procedures, by broadening 
the current jurisdiction of Article 21.5 compliance panels to include “new” measures that 
have been implemented, not only after expiry of RPT, but also those that are enacted after 
Article 21.5 determinations have been made (but before Article 22.6 authorization of 
countermeasures). To deal with the latter cases (new measures taken after Article 21.5 
proceedings), this would more specifically entail ‘expedited’ Article 21.5 proceedings, 
enabling complainant parties to have their cases heard by the original Article 21.5 panel 
without initiating a new dispute, so that Article 22.6 arbitrators will be also be able to 
authorize countermeasures based on a multilateral determination on compliance.  
While there have been some legal commentators questioning the need for 
“sequencing” when weighed from the implementation problem perspective,
339
 it would 
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be hard to ignore the history of practice among WTO Members for their attempts to solve 
the textual deficiency of the DSU by relying on such voluntary arrangements of 
sequencing. However, there may need to be some ‘conditions’ attached to the current 
practice of such ‘voluntary’ sequencing arrangements. In other words, sequencing 
arrangements are essentially ‘bilateral’ arrangements, outside the formal multilateral DSU 
rules, and, as a result, may be abused against ‘weaker’ members in the WTO by its 
stronger members. As in the US-Upland Cotton case, the US showed its clear lack of 
willingness to remove its subsidy measure which was ruled to be WTO-inconsistent, by 
retaining its measure for 14 additional months from the time of expiry of its compliance 
period. Furthermore, through a sequencing agreement with Brazil, it was able to block 
Brazil from resorting to retaliatory countermeasures until compliance proceedings were 
concluded (after which it re-enacted “new” measures to avoid Article 21.5 jurisdiction). 
Therefore, sequencing should be made ‘conditional’ on the compliance efforts made by 
the respondent party. In other words, complainant parties should only agree to 
‘sequencing’ when the respondent party has actually taken all measures to implement the 
DSB rulings within the RPT (or at least before the compliance proceedings), or otherwise 
immediately resort to Article 22.6 proceedings. Perhaps the terms for agreeing to a 
sequencing arrangement could be made conditional on the ‘quality’ of the measures taken 
to comply by the respondent party, as an equally ‘bilateral’ and ‘voluntary’ means to 
enforce compliance for the complainant party.  
In conclusion, to address some of the persistent problems of delayed 
compliance, particularly in prohibited subsidy disputes, the current rules for ‘expedited’ 
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dispute resolution for prohibited subsidy disputes could be ‘improved’ by: (1) broadening 
the jurisdiction of Article 21.5 panels to include measures that are implemented after 
expiry of RPT until completion of the Article 21.5 proceedings; (2) enabling ‘expedited’ 
Article 21.5 proceedings for “new” measures that are enacted after Article 21.5 
proceedings, if shown that these measures are in continuum of the prior measures ruled to 
be WTO-inconsistent; (3) agreeing on ‘conditional’ sequencing arrangements, to only 
when sufficient implementation measures have been taken by the respondent party. As 
demonstrated so far, the current DSU text and WTO case law seem to be in line with this 
proposition, and there is no need for any revisions in the DSU text, nor sharp deviation 
from current WTO case law practice. Furthermore, this ‘improved’ dispute settlement 
procedure may be applied to other subject matters under the WTO Agreement as covered 
by the DSU, since circumstance may also arise in other areas that call for application of 
these rules. While this type of problem may have been first raised in the subsidy context, 
it is not necessarily the case that such delayed compliance in terms of both ‘time’ and 
‘quality’ will always be raised only with respect to subsidy matters. It is highly likely that 
similar domestic regulations, involving safety and health issues, which are covered by the 
SPS and TBT Agreements in the WTO, may also become subject to such compliance 
issues as they come to the fore.  
 
5.4 SUMMARY  
This chapter has proposed several alternatives for addressing certain prohibited 
subsidy measures that lack sufficient remedies for enforcement under the current 
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prospective remedy system. In particular, the lack of remedy for dealing with past non-
recurring subsidies that do not fall under the current WTO jurisdiction, or with recurring 
subsidies that have been employed in ‘opportunistic’ practices to avoid WTO jurisdiction, 
is a persistent problem that has not been resolved as of yet.  
Under the current prospective system of remedies, the level of countermeasures 
for non-recurring subsidies may be assessed to be ‘less-than-proportional’, as such 
subsidy practices face no economic consequences if repealed prior to the establishment of 
WTO adjudicatory proceedings. The proportionality principle for assessing the lawfulness 
of countermeasures requires that a remedy should be proportional to the harm incurred by 
the violating act. In this case, there is harm done by a prohibited subsidy, but there is no 
remedy for non-compliance by the prohibited subsidy measure.  
In order to address this particular problem, the retaliation remedy needs to be 
retrospectively applied. This may be done by calculating the level of countermeasures 
retrospectively, from the time-period when the pertinent measure has been multilaterally 
determined to be illegal. The prospective calculation method which takes into account the 
RPT for implementation is no longer applicable, since there is no measure in existence to 
be implemented. The alternative retrospective remedy through monetary compensation is 
not a viable option as a remedy for prohibited subsidies, mainly due to practicality 
concerns and features of the remedial mechanism that go against the rules for protection 
of rights and objectives of the SCM Agreement with respect to prohibited subsidies. The 
remedy for enforcing compliance should not be the ultimate remedy, nor be subject to 
renewed problems of enforcement. For determining the level of retrospective retaliation 
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(and also prospective retaliation), the multilateral nature of the remedy should be 
considered, under which the trade effects of the prohibited subsidy measure on individual 
WTO Members should be the basis for calculating the level of countermeasures for 
inducing compliance.  
The problem of delayed implementation involving recurring prohibited 
subsidies, whether intentional or inadvertent, may be an intricate matter that mainly 
derives from the fundamental nature of subsidies as a strategic national policy. However, 
the loophole that is created as a consequence of which undermines the stability and 
predictability of the WTO remedy system should not go unaddressed. Increasing the level 
of countermeasures has not proven to be effective in inducing compliance in a more 
prompt manner. Rather, it may be more effective to deal with the loopholes in the existing 
fast track procedures that are in place for the remedy system for prohibited subsidies. 
Problems that have been identified by examining WTO case law seem to point to the 
narrow jurisdiction of WTO compliance panels and the arbitrary ‘sequencing’ 
arrangements in compliance and authorization proceedings. Once these shortcomings in 
the current prospective system of remedies for addressing recurring prohibited subsidies 
are addressed, the resulting remedy system may work to give WTO remedies the 
effectiveness it duly provides. It should also be noted that all the proposed alternative 
remedial mechanisms do not require any significant legal amendments. Rather, it would 
be the role of the WTO adjudicating bodies and the Members to apply the rules in a 
sensible and practical manner that gives meaning and effectiveness to the WTO rules in 






        The current remedy system under the WTO has proved to be ineffective in 
inducing prompt compliance in the case of prohibited subsidy disputes that are brought to 
the WTO dispute settlement system. Such ineffectiveness include issues of both 
‘timeliness’ and ‘quality’ of compliance, a particularly prominent problem in subsidy 
disputes. This can be explained from the understanding that subsidies are unilateral trade 
policies that are strategically needed to help governments overcome various externalities 
that hinder economic growth. Hence, governments may be naturally reluctant to promptly 
remove their subsidy measures even though determined to be WTO-inconsistent, 
resulting in delayed compliance within the given implementation period, insufficient 
removal of subsidy measures ruled to be illegal, or reinstatement of prior repealed 
measures in a way that escapes the jurisprudence of the present WTO remedy system.  
While the traditional economic perspectives on trade agreements and the role of 
remedies as a means of enforcing trade agreements has been rather positive, economists 
have viewed the distinctive treatment of prohibited subsidies under the WTO legal regime 
to be quite puzzling. The sui generis discipline on prohibited subsidies that prohibit the 
use of export subsidies per se, in addition to a more allowable level of retaliation in 
response to non-compliance, and the expedited procedures for inducing compliance, have 
been viewed as being perhaps too stringent. Rather, leading trade economists have called 
for more “lenient” treatment of export subsidies based on economic welfare analyses that 
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also take into account such key legal concepts that are enshrined in the WTO as the 
principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination.  
In contrast, the legal provisions that discipline subsidies under GATT/WTO 
have been developed towards a direction that further “tightens” the rules on subsidies, 
prohibited export subsidies in particular. The application of the rules in actual WTO 
dispute arbitrations involving prohibited subsidies show that there has indeed been a 
tendency to view prohibited subsidies as an erga omnes (collective) obligation that 
warrants strict compliance, even through excessive or punitive retaliatory measures as a 
means to induce compliance. Such an approach has been criticized among legal scholars 
as well, one basis of analysis being the principle of proportionality, which requires 
countermeasures to be equivalent to the harm done by the illegal measure. Accordingly, 
the level of retaliation, even for prohibited subsidy measures, needs to be ‘proportional’ to 
the amount of injury, with consideration of the ‘multilateral’ nature of the WTO remedy 
system. 
On the other hand, the remedial mechanism for resolving prohibited subsidy 
disputes seems to require special consideration of the structural and political nature of the 
measure at issue, as explained above. A particularly persistent problem in export subsidy 
disputes involves the issue of retrospective remedies for addressing illegal subsidy 
payments that have been granted in the past and remain unaddressed under the current 
prospective remedy system of the WTO. Another problem in subsidy disputes involve the 
limited jurisdiction of WTO compliance panels that result in opening the door for certain 
‘opportunistic’ practices by incalcitrant WTO Members.  
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The introduction of a retrospective remedy system in the WTO regime may be 
subject to deep concerns and criticism. There has indeed been a substantial amount of 
interest on this possibility within the trade legal community as a whole, but none have 
been able to offer any concrete proposals for introducing the system. To come up with a 
feasible solution, first of all, the form of the retrospective remedy would need to be 
distinguished (whether in the form of suspension of concessions or monetary repayment), 
based on the purpose of the remedy that is intended to serve under the pertinent legal 
regime.  
First of all, with regard to subject matters covered by the WTO Agreement 
where entitlements are protected by the property rule, the primary obligation would be 
‘specific performance’, thus requiring the remedy of enforcement by ‘injunctive relief’ 
(i.e. sanctions). Since the purpose of protection under these regimes is to ensure the 
fundamental right of ownership, the transfer of entitlements requires the consent from 
both parties, and unilateral takings are prevented. Therefore, entitlements under these 
regimes typically involve ‘unique’ goods, which are often non-tradable and have high 
levels of subjective value attached to the product. Therefore, under the regimes to which 
the property rule applies, entitlements cannot be ‘monetized’, and thus monetary 
exchange (i.e. monetary compensation) for the transfer of entitlements is not possible. 
Such regimes that fall under this category would include not only subsidies, but also 
SPS/TBT, and other domestic regulations on health, labor or environment.  
On the other hand, under the regimes for which the liability rule of protection 
of entitlement applies, entitlements can be taken unilaterally as long as some form of 
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compensation is paid. In other words, commitments made under negotiated agreements 
may be removed if the infringer is willing to pay the value of the entitlement determined 
by the courts, and the infringer is allowed to ‘efficiently breach’ the contract if deemed 
more beneficial than enduring the costs of compliance. Therefore, the entitlements that 
are protected under these regimes would involve ‘fungible’ goods that can be easily 
monetized for exchange. When applied to the WTO Agreements, such a regime seems to 
pertain to the tariff renegotiation provisions in the GATT/WTO (GATT Article XXVIII), 
provisions allowing renegotiation of specific commitments in trade in services (GATS 
Article XXI), and the TRIPs Agreement.
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Based on the above analysis, implications can be made that for regimes under 
the WTO such as subsidies and SPS/TBT, the discussion on remedies would have to be 
based on the understanding that the nature of the entitlements and the rules of protection 
may warrant more stringent rules in terms of inducing compliance, as compared to other 
regimes that are better served by the liability rule of protection. Furthermore, since the 
remedy of monetary compensation would not be an appropriate remedy for regimes 
served by the property rule, the possibility of using the remedy of retrospective retaliation 
would be a more likely alternative for addressing the persistent problem of 
noncompliance that are especially evident in prohibited subsidy disputes to date. More 
importantly, the economic perspectives, which have so far been non-supportive of the 
prohibited subsidy rules in the WTO, now appear to be in support of the need for 
maintaining the tight regulations on prohibited subsidies in light of the trade liberalization 
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efforts so far under the GATT/WTO. In addition, this paper has been able to provide some 
economic explanation in support of the need for retrospective remedies, at least for 
disciplining prohibited subsidy rule violations under the WTO.  
In conclusion, this study does not propose that the alternative remedy system is 
appropriate and applicable to all other areas in the WTO. This is based on the observation 
that different regimes that are served by different rules for protection of entitlements need 
to have different remedy systems established as appropriate to the distinct features and 
purpose. This study aims to contribute by providing a more specific proposal for the 
precise field of prohibited subsidies, as a starting point for further studies regarding the 
respective remedy systems that may be best appropriate for individual legal regimes.  
In the case of prohibited subsidies, the political sensitivity of a sovereign state’s 
national policy that has repercussive effects on its economy, and the world trade rules that 
govern these acts based on reciprocal agreements among member countries, render the 
discipline on prohibited subsidies an area that places more significance on the 
performance of obligations by member states that contribute to preserving the balance 
and stability of the world trade order. In contrast, other subject matters covered by the 
WTO agreements and the remedies that work to achieve their respective objectives shall 
need to be examined more carefully in order to propose more meaningful remedies for the 
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WTO 분쟁해결제도는 다른 국제법 분야와는 다른 독특한 이행체제를 
갖추고 있어 국제통상법 학자들의 많은 주목을 받아왔다. 특히, WTO 금지  
보조금 규정은 다른 WTO 협정분야에 비해 가장 엄격한 반면, 실제 금지   
보조금의 분쟁이행 실적은 상대적으로 저조한 편이다. 이에 따라 현 WTO  
금지보조금 분쟁판결의 이행을 촉진시키기 위한 구제제도의 효과성에 대한  
의문이 생기지 않을 수 없다. 더욱 특이한 점은 법학자들과는 달리 국제경제
학자들은 금지보조금으로 규정되어 있는 수출보조금에 대한 현 WTO 규정을 
보다 유연하게 하여 각 국이 전략적 경제정책 차원에서 보조금을 사용할 수 
있도록 해야 한다는 입장이다.  
이에 따라 본 연구에서는 WTO 금지보조금 구제제도에 대한 법·경제
학적 분석을 바탕으로 WTO 금지보조금 구제제도의 나아갈 방향을 경제적  
근거에 입각하여 제시하고자 한다. 특히, 본 연구는 기존의 경제모형을 활용
한 연구 결과와는 달리, 최근에 제시된 경제모형을 활용하여 WTO 금지    
보조금 구제제도에 대한 새로운 이해를 도출해내고자 하였다. 그 결과, WTO 
금지보조금에 대한 현 규정의 수준은 WTO 보조금 협정이 추구하는 목적과 
취지에 맞게 보다 강화되어야 하며, 보다 효과적인 구제제도의 마련을 위하여 
기존의 미래지향적(prospective) 피해 구제가 아닌 소급적인(retrospective) 
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구제가 가능해야 함을 주장하고 있다. 특히 금지보조금 규정상 적용 가능한 
기존의‘신속절차(fast track)’규정이 제 효과를 발휘할 수 있도록 WTO  
이행패널의 관할권 및 DSU 제21.5조와 제22.6간의 적용순서(sequencing) 
관련 규정의 올바른 해석과 적용이 요구될 것이다. 또한 WTO 보조금 협정의 
보호대상 및 목적에 따라 금전적 보상은 적합한 구제방안이 될 수 없으며,  
특히 이행 촉진을 위한 보복조치의 수준은 보조금의 다자적(multilateral)   
성격을 고려하여 보조금의 무역효과에 근거하여 결정되어야 한다고 주장하고 
있다. 결국 WTO 규정의 올바른 의미와 효과를 제고하기 위해서는 WTO   
재판관과 회원국들의 합리적이고 현실적인 판단을 통하여 해당 규정의 목적과 
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